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I.

INTRODUCTION

The appropriate scope of federal court jurisdiction is a sub2
ject that is under constant reexamination by scholars,' courts
and legislators. 3 The major contours of federal court jurisdiction
1. See, e.g., Field, Proposals on Federal DiversityJurisdiction, 17 S.C.L. REV. 669
(1965); Frank, Federal DiversityJurisdiction-An Opposing View, 17 S.C.L. REV. 677
(1965); Frank, The Casefor DiversityJurisdiction, 16 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 403 (1979);
Hertz, Misreading the Erie Signs: The Downfall of Diversity, 61 Ky. L.J. 861 (1973);
McCormack, The Expansion of Federal Question Jurisdictionand the PrisonerComplaint
Caseload, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 523; Rowe, Abolishing DiversityJurisdiction: Positive Side
Effects and Potentialfor FurtherReforms, 92 HARV. L. REV. 963 (1979); Wright, Federal Question Jurisdiction, 17 S.C.L. REV. 660 (1965).
2. See infra notes 147-258 and accompanying text.
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1982). The Act of July 25, 1958 amended the
definition of corporate citizenship for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction to
include the state of the corporation's principal place of business. See Act ofJuly
25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 2, 72 Stat. 415. Another amendment to the
jurisdictional statutes was made in 1980, when Congress eliminated the $10,000
amount in controversy requirement for federal question jurisdiction. See, Act of
Dec. 1, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1982)). For a partial list of bills considered by Congress to eliminate
diversity jurisdiction, see infra notes 260 & 275.

1985]

DOMESTIC RELATIONS EXCEPTION

309

are delineated by the Constitution 4 and Congress 5 and are
framed in terms of what cases can be heard by federal courts.
There exist, however, two major judicially created exceptions to the
jurisdiction of federal courts: the probate exception 6 and the do4. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Article III provides in pertinent part:
The judicial Power [of the United States] shall extend to all cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority-to all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admirality and maritime Jurisdiction;-to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States,-between a State and Citizens of
another State;-between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens
of the same State claiming Lands under the Grants of different States,
and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
Id.
The Constitution created only one federal court, the Supreme Court, and
left the creation of inferior federal courts to the discretion of Congress. Id. art.
III, § 1.
5. The original jurisdiction of federal district courts with which this article
is primarily concerned is set forth in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330-1363 (1982). The question of the applicability of the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction arises primarily with respect to cases filed in federal court under diversity
jurisdiction. See id. § 1332. Section 1332 provides in pertinent part as follows:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$10,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and is between(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of
a foreign state are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as
plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.
Id. § 1332(a).
The applicability of the domestic relations exception may also be pertinent
in cases arising under federal question jurisdiction. See, e.g., Zak v. Pilla, 698
F.2d 800 (6th Cir. 1982); La Montagne v. La Montagne, 394 F. Supp. 1159 (D.
Mass. 1975). The federal question statute provides that "[t]he district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). For a general
discussion of the exception in federal question cases, see Comment, FederalJurisdiction and the Domestic Relations Exception: A Searchfor Parameters,31 UCLA L. REV.
843, 864-71 (1984).
Since this article considers the applicability of the domestic relations exception to both diversity and federal question cases, references to the domestic relations exception herein refer to federal jurisdiction in general, as opposed to the
designation in some commentary as the "domestic relations exception to diversityjurisdiction." See, e.g., Note, The Domestic Relations Exception to DiversityJurisdiction, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1824 (1983) [hereinafter cited as COLUMBIA Note]; Note,

The Domestic Relations Exception to Diversity Jurisdiction: A Re-evaluation, 24 B.C.L.
REV. 661 (1983) [hereinafter cited as B.C. Note].
6. See generally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 25 (4th ed. 1983);
Vestal & Foster, Implied Limitations on the DiversityJurisdiction of Federal Courts, 41

310

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30: p. 307

mestic relations exception.7 While these exceptions have a significant impact on the number and types of cases being decided by
federal courts,8 until recently they have not been the subject of
the rigorous evaluation and examination directed toward the statutorily created contours of federal jurisdiction. 9
MINN. L. REV. 1, 13-23 (1956); Note, FederalJurisdictionand Practice: ProbateMatters, 15 OKLA. L. REV. 462 (1962).
7. See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 6, § 25; Vestal & Foster, supra note 6.
In addition to the domestic relations and probate exceptions to federal jurisdiction, there exist a number of other judicially-created restrictions on the exercise
ofjurisdiction by federal courts. For example, federal courts may invoke abstention doctrines and decline to exercise jurisdiction in cases concededly within
their power under the Constitution and jurisdictional states. C. WRIGHT, supra
note 6, § 52. While the domestic relations exception and abstention doctrines
are similar in that they may preclude federal courts from entertaining suits which
would appear to fall within the plain language of constitutional and statutory
grants ofjurisdiction, certain differences among these doctrines lead most commentators to consider them as discrete phenomena requiring separate analytical
treatment. Compare C. WRIGHT, supra note 6, § 25 (exceptions) with id. § 52 (the
abstention doctrines) and id. § 52A ("Our Federalism"), See also IA J. MOORE,
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE,
0.201, 0.203-204 (2d ed. 1974).
One basic distinguishing factor is that the domestic relations exception has
been characterized as an implied exception to the constitutional and statutory
grants of federal jurisdiction. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
Given this characterization, the changing nature of domestic relations law and
the changing balance of power between the states and the federal government in
the domestic relations field are of limited relevance to a federal court faced with
the applicability of the exception. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
Once a case is characterized as a domestic relations case, jurisdiction does not
exist under the present statute. See id.
Abstention doctrines, on the other hand, are characterized as prudential
declinations or postponements of concededly proper jurisdiction. See IA J.
MOORE, supra 0.202. These doctrines are not grounded on interpretations of
the jurisdictional statutes, but rather on the sensitivity of federal courts to the
concepts of equity, comity and federalism. Thus, they can be more responsive
to changes in the balance of power between the state and federal government at
particular points in the history of our nation with respect to particular areas of
law. It is true that some rigidity in the application of abstention doctrines has
been noted. See Soifer & Macgill, The Younger Doctrine: ReconstructingReconstruction, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1167-68 (1977). However, this rigidity is not compelled by the doctrines' foundation in the same way as the domestic relations
exception.
The greater flexibility of abstention doctrines has led some commentators
to suggest that these doctrines be used to limit the number of domestic relations
cases heard in the federal courts, thereby avoiding the rigidity inherent in the
domestic relations exception. See Atwood, Domestic Relations in Federal Court: Toward a Principled Exercise of Jurisdiction, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 571, 574 (1984); Note,
Application of the FederalAbstention Doctrines to the-Domestic Relations Exception to Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1095, 1120.
8. For example of case involving the domestic relations exception, see cases
discussed infra at notes 147-258 and accompanying text. For cases involving the
probate exception, see Moore v. Lindsey, 662 F.2d 354. (5th Cir. 1981); Rice v.
Rice Found. 610 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1979); Starr v. Rupp, 421 F.2d 999 (6th Cir.
1970).
9. The domestic relations exception has been examined by a number of
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This article examines the domestic relations exception to federal court jurisdiction both in the context of the ongoing debate
regarding the appropriate scope of federal court jurisdiction and
in light of current domestic relations law. In recent years, the
field of domestic relations law has undergone tremendous expansion and change. New causes of action have been recognized'
and there is increased awareness of the problems of interstate domestic relations conflicts." Many of these new causes of action,
new theories of recovery, and interstate domestic relations conflicts are finding their way to federal forums. As a consequence,
the federal courts are faced with the difficult task of determining
whether these cases are within the judicially-created domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction. The task of the federal
courts is made even more difficult because of the murky origins of
the exception, 12 the lack of uniformity among the courts as to the
nature and scope of the exception,' 3 and, until quite recently, the
dearth of scholarly commentary of the exception.' 4 The unsatisfactory state of the law in this area was noted by Judge Gibbons of
commentators in the past few years. See Atwood, supra note 7; Rush, Domestic
Relations Law: FederalJurisdictionand State Sovereignty in Perspective, 60 NOTRE DAME
LAw. 1 (1984); Comment, supra, note 5; Comment, Enforcing State Domestic Relations Decrees in Federal Courts, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1357 (1983); B.C. Note, supra
note 5; COLUMBIA Note, supra note 5, Note, FederalJurisdiction-TheDomestic Relations Exception and the Tort of Interstate Child Snatching: Bennett v. Bennett, 16
CREIGHTON L. REV. 815 (1983). For a recent discussion of the probate exception, see Note, The "Probate Exception" to Federal DiversityJurisdiction: Matters Related to Probate, 48 Mo. L. REV. 564 (1983).
10. See, e.g., Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (recognition of tort of interference with child custody rights); Marvin v. Marvin, 19 Cal.
3d 660, 557 F.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1977) (recognizing a variety of potential theories of recovery upon the dissolution of a nonmarital cohabitation relationship); Butcher v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 3d 58, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503
(1983) (extension of loss of consortium action to cohabitants).
11. For example, every state has enacted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT §§ 1-27, 9 U.L.A. 116
(1968). See id., 9. U.L.A. at 22-23 (supp. 1985)(Table of Jurisdictions wherein
Act has been adopted); Freed & Foster, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview,
17 FAM. L.Q. 365, 409-10 (1983). The Act is designed to 1) deter controversies
over child custody, 2) deter child abductions and 3) promote interstate assistance in adjudication. Id. at 409. For a further discussion of the Act, see infra
notes 434-39 and accompanying text. Additionally, Congress recently enacted
the Federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982). For
a further discussion of § 1738A, see infra notes 277, 285 & 440-48 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of the historical origins of the domestic relations exception, see infra notes 16-75 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the lack of uniformity in the interpretation of the
domestic relations exception, see infra notes 76-140 and accompanying text.
14. For a list of recent commentary on the exception, see supra note 9.
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the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit: "[T]here is no wellestablished'domestic relations exception. Rather there is a collection of misstatements of ancient holdings and of ill-considered
5
dicta."'
The article will first examine the origins of the domestic relations exception and its interpretation by lower courts. The article
will then review the application of the exception both to traditional types of domestic relations cases and to recently recognized
causes of action. It will be argued that continued adherence to
the exception by lower federal courts no longer can be justified by
either the substantive or procedural reasons commonly relied
upon by courts in applying the exception. The article concludes
that repudiation of the exception is the appropriate course of
action.
II.

THE ORIGINS OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS EXCEPTION

The task of federal courts faced with the problem of applying
the domestic relations exception to particular cases is made difficult by the fact that the exception did not originate in an unequivocal direct holding by the Supreme Court of the United States,
but rather evolved from dicta in several Supreme Court decisions
in the nineteenth century. Tracing the history of the exception is
important as a predicate to understanding the exception and for
evaluating the compulsion that the origins of the exception im6
pose upon federal courts today.'
The first Supreme Court case to suggest the existence of a
domestic relations exception to federal court jurisdiction was Barber v. Barber.17 In that 1859 case, a wife residing in New York sued
her husband, a Wisconsin resident, on the equity side of the federal district court in Wisconsin to enforce a New York decree
granting her a divorce a mensa et thoro'i and an award of alimony.19 The basis of federal jurisdiction in Barber was diversity of
15. Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F. 2d 1018, 1030 (3d Cir. 1975) (Gibbons,J.,
dissenting).
16. For an analysis of the precedential value of the Supreme Court cases,
see infra notes 334-85 and accompanying text.
17. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1859).
18. A divorce a mensa et thoro is a limited divorce, similar to what is today
more commonly referred to as a legal separation, which gives the parties the
right to live apart, but does not permit the parties to remarry. H. CLARK, LAW OF
DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 11.1 (1968).
19. The husband had left New York after a divorce proceeding ending with
a decree in the wife's favor "for the purpose of placing himself beyond the jurisdiction of the court which could enforce it." 62 U.S. at 588. Although a divorce
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citizenship. The major issues addressed by the Court were
whether the wife could acquire a domicile apart from her husband
which would entitle her to sue him in a federal court to recover
past due alimony, and whether a court of equity was the appropriate tribunal. 20 Before dealing with these issues, the Court gratuitously commented on the types of cases it would not hear:
Our first remark is-and we wish it to be
remembered-that this is not a suit asking the court for
an allowance of alimony. That has been done by a court
of competent jurisdiction. The [federal] court in Wisconsin was asked to interfere to prevent that decree from
being defeated by fraud.
We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts
of the United States upon the subject of divorce, or for
the allowance of alimony, either as an original proceeding in chancery or as an incident of divorce a vinculo, or
21
to one from bed and board.
Following this disclaimer, the Court addressed the jurisdictional
issues raised by the record and concluded that the federal court
was entitled to grant the wife the relief she had sought. 22 No explanation for the disclaimer ofjurisdiction was enunciated.
Justice Daniel, joined by Chief Justice Taney and Justice
Campbell, dissented, partially on the ground that the wife in Barber could not become a citizen of a state different from that of her
husband during the existence of the marriage. Therefore, there
was no diversity of citizenship. 23 The dissent also argued, however, that federal courts did not have the power to grant relief in
a mensa et thoro authorized a husband and wife to live apart, it did not free the
parties from all obligations of marriage. A husband remained obligated to support his wife, and this obligation was enforced through a judicially imposed
monetary award designated as alimony. H. CLARK, supra note 18, § 14.1, at 420.
The concept of alimony came to be applied in the United States to absolute
divorces, which completely severed the marital relationship between the parties,
although theoretically it is questionable why a man had any continuing obligation to support a woman after the matrimonial bond was severed. Id., at 421.
20. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 584.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 584-90. The Court held that a wife "under a judicial sentence of
separation from bed and board is entitled to make a domicile for herself." Id. at
597-98. The Court also held that equity was an appropriate forum for the wife's
action since equity courts in England were permitted to compel alimony payments decreed by an ecclesiastical court. Id. at 590.
23. Id. at 600-02 (Daniel,J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the Court
should have adhered to the traditional rule that a married woman's domicile is
the same as her husband's. Id. See H. CLARK, supra note 18, § 4.3, at 149-50.
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this case.2 4 While the majority's "disclaimer" language could be
construed to mean that federal courts possessed the power to
hear domestic relations cases but chose to surrender that power,
the dissent focused on the absolute lack of power?
The Federal tribunals can have no power to control
the duties or the habits of the different members of private families in their domestic intercourse. This power
belongs exclusively to the particular communities of
which those families form parts, and is essential to the
25
order and to the very existence of such communities.
Justice Daniel viewed the paramount interest of the states in regulating the domestic relations of its citizens as one reason for an
exception to federal court jurisdiction in this area. The dissent
stated that "[ilt is not in accordance with the design and operation of a Government having its origin in causes and necessities,
political, general, and external, that it should assume to regulate
the domestic relations of society .... -26
A second reason the dissent gave for the federal courts' lack
of power in the domestic relations area was an historical one.

The scope of federal court chancery jurisdiction was traditionally
defined in terms of the boundaries of the English chancery's jurisdiction at the time the Constitution was adopted.2 7 The dissent
noted that in England the subject of alimony was the province of
the ecclesiastical court, not of the chancery.2 8 Thus, Justice

Daniel concluded, the chancery jurisdiction of the federal courts
did not extend to the subject matter of the suit.29
Unlike the majority, the dissent did not distinguish between

suits to obtain an award of alimony and suits to enforce alimony.
Because the right to alimony, even alimony previously awarded,
might be forfeited under certain circumstances, the dissent saw

the enforcement of the right to alimony as a subject that should
24. 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 602-03 (Daniel, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 602 (Daniel, J., dissenting).
26. Id.

27. Id. at 604 (Daniel, J., dissenting). See Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. (17
How.) 369, 384 (1854); Boyle v. Zacharie and Turner, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 648
(1832). See generally Morse, The Substantive Equity Historically Applied by the U.S.
Courts, 54 DICK L. REV. 10 (1949).
28. 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 604 (Daniel, J., dissenting). See generally H. CLARK,
supra note 18, § 11.1. The historical accuracy of the dissent's statement has been
questioned in recent years. See infra notes 268-69 & 334-40 and accompanying
text.
29. 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 605 (Daniel, J., dissenting).
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be under the control of the state courts. It was the state courts,
according to the dissent, that were the proper tribunals for evaluating the circumstances leading to the original award or to its
termination.30
Thus, even in this seminal case there was disagreement as to
the nature and scope of the domestic relations exception. As discussed in a subsequent section of this article, this disagreement
has endured to the present day and can be noted in the differing
l
ways in which lower courts explain and apply the exception.3
The next Supreme Court case to mention a domestic rela32
tions exception to federal court jurisdiction was In re Burrus,
which involved a child custody dispute. The child's father had left
the child with grandparents in Nebraska to remain there during
the illness of the child's mother. The mother died. The father
remarried and attempted to regain custody of the child. The
grandparents refused, and the father, a resident of Ohio, applied
to the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska for
a writ of habeas corpus to recover the care and custody of the
child. The court issued the writ, ruled that custody was properly
in the father, and ordered the grandparents to return the child to
the father. The grandparents failed to comply, and the district
judge held the grandfather in contempt. The grandfather challenged the contempt order on the ground that the district court
33
had no jurisdiction in the original habeas corpus proceeding.
The Supreme Court held that the district court had no jurisdiction to issue the writ of habeas corpus and ordered the peti30. Id. at 603 (Daniel, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that under state
law the wife's entitlement to alimony was "always dependent upon the personal
merits and conduct of the wife," and that proof of criminality or misconduct
could be the basis for forfeiture of alimony allowances. Id. The dissent
concluded:
The essential character, then, of this allowance, viz: its being always
conditional and dependent, both for its origin and continuation, upon
the circumstances which produced or justified it, is demonstrative of
the propriety and the necessity of submitting it to the control of that
authority whose province it was to judge of those circumstances. That
authority can exist nowhere but with the power and the right to control
the private and domestic relations of life. The Federal Government has
no such power; it has no commission of censor morum over the several
States and their people.

Id.
31. For a discussion of the confusion among lower federal courts over the
rationale and scope of the domestic relations exception, see infra notes 76-140
and accompany text.

32. 136 U.S. 586 (1890).
33. Id. at 587-89.
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tioner to be released.3 4 The Court based its holding on the
limited jurisdiction of district courts. At the time Burrus was de35
cided, only the circuit courts had jurisdiction in diversity cases.
The Burrus Court reviewed alternative bases for district court jurisdiction, but noted that no argument had been made that the
child was being restrained under, or by virtue of, the authority of
the United States. Nor had it been contended that the restraint
was in violation of the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United
States. Therefore, no federal question sufficient to support jurisdiction had been raised. In the context of its exploration of alternative bases of jurisdiction, the Bun-us Court made a statement
which is often quoted as authority for the existence of a domestic
relations exception to federal court jurisdiction: "The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and
child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the
36
United States."
This sentence is frequently invoked to support the domestic
relations exception even though the two sentences following it
make clear that the sentence referred not to cases where there
existed a settled basis for federal jurisdiction such as diversity, but
rather to the question of whether federal laws or concerns in the
area of domestic relations would themselves supply the basis for
federal question jurisdiction:
As to the right to the control and possession of this
child, as it is contested by its father and its grandfather,
it is one in regard to which neither the Congress of the
United States nor any authority of the United States has
any special jurisdiction. Whether the one or the other is
entitled to the possession does not depend upon any act
of Congress, or any treaty of the United States or its
37
Constitution.
Cases relying on In re Burrus have also ignored the fact that
the Court's holding was expressly limited to the since-revised jurisdictional authority of district courts. The Bun-us Court specifi34. Id. at 596-97.
35. Id. at 596. Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, only circuit courts were
granted diversity jurisdiction. SeeJudiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. Subsequently, Congress abolished circuit courts and merged their jurisdiction into
the jurisdiction of the district courts. SeeJudicial Code of 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat.
1087. See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 6, § 1, at 3-7.
36. In re Burrns, 136 U.S. at 596.
37. Id. at 594.
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cally reserved judgment on the appropriateness of federal
jurisdiction in domestic relations cases where jurisdiction was
based on diversity of citizenship:
But whether the diverse citizenship of parties contesting
this right to the custody of the child, could, in the courts
of the United States, give jurisdiction to those courts to
determine that question has never been decided by this
court that we are aware of. Nor is it necessary to decide
it in this case, for the order for the violation of which the
petitioner is imprisoned for contempt is not a judgment
of the Circuit Court of the United States, but ajudgment
38
of the District Court of the same District.
In 1899, the Supreme Court in Simms v. Simms 39 cited both

Barber and Burrus as authority for the existence of a domestic relations exception. In Simms, the wife had been awarded alimony
and counsel's fees by a territorial court of Arizona and the award
had been upheld by the Supreme Court of the Territory of Arizona. The husband appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States, but the wife challenged the Court's jurisdiction. She argued both that the jurisdictional amount of $5000 had not been
satisfied and that because the decree below involved divorce and
alimony, the case was not within the jurisdiction of federal courts.
Addressing the wife's jurisdictional claims, the Court first quoted
the "disclaimer" language in the Barber opinion. 4° It then stated:
It may therefore be assumed as indubitable that the Circuit Courts of the United States have no jurisdiction,
either of suits for divorce, or of claims for alimony,
whether made in a suit for divorce, or by an original proceeding in equity, before a decree for such alimony in a
41
state court.
The Court then cited In re Burrus for the proposition that
"[w]ithin the States of the Union, the whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the
42
laws of the State, and not to the laws of the United States."
Despite its apparent approval of the domestic relations ex38. Id. at 596-97.

39. 175 U.S. 162 (1899).
40. For a discussion of Barber, see supra notes 17-31 and accompanying text.
41. 175 U.S. at 167.
42. Id. (citing Burrus, 136 U.S. at 593-94).
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ception, the Simms Court held that the exception had "no application to the jurisdiction of the courts of a Territory, or to the
appellate jurisdiction of this court over those courts." ' 43 After reviewing the relevant statutes, the Court concluded that "the original jurisdiction of suits for divorce is vested in the district courts
of the Territory," 44 and that the Supreme Court had appellate
jurisdiction over the orders of the district court. 45 Consequently,
although Simms cited Barber and Burrus, in no way did Simms rest its
holding on the domestic relations exception. Nevertheless, Simms
is often cited along with Barber and Burrus as authority for the
46
existence of the exception.
A fourth case, De La Rama v. De La Rama,4 7 is also frequently
cited in lower court opinions 48 as authority for the domestic relations exception. Yet, De La Rama, like Simms, held that the general rule of Barber had "no application to the jurisdiction of the
43. Id. at 167-68.
44. Id. at 168.
45. Id. The Court went on to hold that it had no jurisdiction to review the
divorce decree because it involved "a matter the value of which could not be
estimated in money." Id. at 168-69. Thus, the decree did not meet the Court's
$5,000 amount in controversy requirement which was in effect when Simms was
decided. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 73. This holding is
especially significant because it correctly demonstrates that the amount in controversy requirement will rarely be satisfied in cases involving determinations of
status. If such a threshold jurisdictional deficiency exists, then the question of
the applicability of the domestic relations exception is moot. Curiously, however, courts rarely forego the opportunity to invoke the exception, even in cases
that clearly fail to satisfy the threshold amount in controversy requirement. See,
e.g., Hernstadt v. Hernstadt, 373 F.2d 316, 318 (2nd Cir. 1967) (action for declaratory judgment construing custody and visitation provisions of divorce decree dismissed under domestic relations exception and because jurisdictional
amount not met).
Another interesting aspect of the Simms opinion is the distinction it makes
between the Court's jurisdiction to review the divorce decree and its jurisdiction
to review the alimony award. The Court stated that although the alimony award
was "in one sense an incident to the suit for divorce," it was also "a distinct and
severable final judgement . . .for a sum of money of a sufficient jurisdictional
amount, and is therefore good ground of appeal." 175 U.S. at 169. Thus, the
Court's decision to review the alimony award but not the divorce decree depended not upon any policy concerns regarding the appropriate role of federal
courts in domestic relations matters, but instead upon straightforward considerations of whether the jurisdictional amount had been satisfied.
46. For examples of cases citing Simms, Barber and Burnus, see infra note 52.
47. 201 U.S. 303 (1906). In De La Rama, a wife sued for divorce a mensa et
thoro in a territorial trial court, and was awarded alimony and one-half of the
property of the marriage. The Supreme Court of the Phillipine Islands reversed
the order of the trial court after finding that the wife had committed adultery.
The wife appealed the reversal to the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 30405.
48. For examples of cases citing De La Rama, Barber, In re Burrus and Simms,
see infra note 52.
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territorial courts or of the appellate jurisdiction of this [Supreme]
Court over those courts."'4 9 De La Rama characterized the domestic relations exception as "a long established rule,"' 50 but offered
reasons different from those advanced by the Barber dissent:
[T]he courts of the United States have no jurisdiction
upon the subject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony, either as an original proceeding in chancery, or an
incident of a divorce or separation, both by reason of
fact that the husband and wife cannot usually be citizens
of different States, so long as the marriage relation continues (a rule which has been somewhat relaxed in recent
cases), and for the future reason that a suit for divorce in
itself involves no pecuniary value. 5 '
The Supreme Court in De La Rama therefore characterized
the exception as evolving not from lofty policy considerations
such as the appropriate balance of state and federal power, nor
from any historical restriction on the jurisdiction of federal
courts, but rather from the potential difficulty which domestic relations cases face in satisfying either the diversity of citizenship
requirement or the amount in controversy requirement.

These four cases-Barber, In re Burrus, Simms, and De La
Rama-have become the foundation of a domestic relations exception to federal court jurisdiction. 5 2 Today, the question of the
applicability of the exception arises most often in diversity
cases. 53 Yet none of these seminal cases involved the denial ofju49. 201 U.S. at 307-08. The De La Rama opinion went a little further than
Simms in upholding federal court review of domestic relations cases from territorial courts. In De La Rama, the grounds for granting the divorce had an impact
on the wife's entitlement to alimony. Id. at 310. In order to review appropriately the appellant's contention that the alimony award was in error, the Court
had to examine the propriety of the divorce itself. Thus, although the Simms
Court considered its jurisdiction to review the divorce as a separate matter from
its jurisdiction to review the alimony award, the De La Rama Court looked to the
interrelationship between various parts of the judgment, and concluded that the
Court could examine the entire decision where the propriety of an alimony
award or division of conjugal property depended upon evidence relating to the
right to a divorce. Id.
50. Id. at 307.
51. Id. For a discussion of the Barber dissent, see supra notes 23-30 and
accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1022 (3d Cir. 1975); Morris v. Morris, 273 F.2d 678, 682 (7th Cir. 1960); McCarty v. Hollis, 120 F.2d 540,
542 (10th Cir. 1941); Robinson v. Robinson, 523 F. Supp. 96, 97-98 (E.D. Pa.
1981); Williamson v. Williamson, 306 F. Supp. 516, 518 (W.D. Okla. 1969);
Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 800 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
53. The recent increase of civil rights actions involving domestic relations
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risdiction in a domestic relations case based upon diversity. In
Barber, jurisdiction was upheld in a diversity case to enforce an
alimony award. 54 In re Burrus involved the denial ofjurisdiction in
a habeas corpus case in a no longer existing form of federal
court. 55 In Simms the Court denied jurisdiction to review a divorce granted by a territorial court because the case did not meet
the amount in controversy requirement, but upheld the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review alimony awards of territorial
courts that met the requirement. 56 And De La Rama upheld the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review territorial courts' decisions regarding both the granting of a divorce and the award of
alimony. 5 7 Given this shaky foundation, it is no wonder that the
domestic relations exception has been a source of debate and dif58
ficulty in the federal courts.
It was not until 1930 that the Supreme Court appeared to
hold for the first time, on the basis of the domestic relations exception, that federal courts did not have jurisdiction in a domestic
relations case. 59 In Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler,60 the Vice Counsul
of Romania challenged the jurisdiction of an Ohio state court to
hear a divorce action which had been instituted by his wife. He
claimed that pursuant to Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution 6 ' and the federal statutes implementing that constitutional
issues is forcing federal courts to address the application of the domestic relations exception in the context of federal question cases. See Comment, supra
note 5, at 864-72.
54. For a discussion of Barber, see supra notes 17-31 and accompanying text.
55. For a discussion of In re Burrus, see supra notes 32-38 and accompanying
text.
56. For a discussion of Simms, see supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
57. For a discussion of De La Rama, see supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
58. For a discussion of interpretations of the exception by lower federal
courts, see infra notes 76-140 and accompanying text.
59. See Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379 (1930).
One treatise characterizes Popovici as the "first square holding" applying the
domestic relations exception. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER,

HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS

AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

1190 (2d ed. 1973). In fact, the holding of Popovici is very limited. See infra notes
70-75 and accompanying text. See also Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018,
1030-31 n.3 (3d Cir. 1975) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (Popovici holds only that
Ohio state courts have jurisdiction to hear a divorce case involving consuls).
60. 280 U.S. 379 (1930).
61. See U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 2. Article Three provides in part that
"[in all Cases affecting... Consuls, ..
the Supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction." Id.
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provision, 62 the federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction over all
63
suits and proceedings against consuls or vice-consuls.
The Supreme Court acknowledged that a plain reading of the
constitutional and statutory language appeared to encompass the
divorce suit. 64 Yet the Court held that "like all language [the jurisdictional provisions have] to be interpreted in the light of the
tacit assumptions upon which it is reasonable to suppose that the
language was used."' 65 The "tacit assumptions" of which the
Court spoke were those found in Barber, In re Burrus, Simms, and De
La Rama regarding the existence of a domestic relations
66
exception.
The Court noted that the statutory language did not control
the case "if it be true as has been unquestioned for three-quarters
of a century that the Courts of the United States have no jurisdiction over divorce." 6 7 It then reasoned that "[i]f when the Constitution was adopted the common understanding was that the
domestic relations of husband and wife and parent and child were
matters reserved to the States, there is no difficulty in construing
the instrument accordingly." '6 8 Thus, the Court concluded that
the constitutional provision conferring exclusive jurisdiction
upon federal courts in suits involving consuls and vice-consuls
was to be interpreted "to refer to ordinary civil proceedings and
not to include what formerly would have belonged to the ecclesi69
astical Courts."
At first glance, the Popovici decision appears to be a clear
statement by the Supreme Court that a domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction does indeed exist. A closer examination of the decision, however, highlights its very narrow and even
conservative nature. In the first place, Popovici involved a narrow
constitutional and statutory basis for federal jurisdiction-that
conferring jurisdiction in suits involving ambassadors, public
ministers, consuls and vice-consuls. 7 0 While one might argue that
the reasoning of Popovici could be extended easily to other more
62. SeeJudicial Code of 1911, ch. 231, §§ 24, 233, 256, 36 Stat. 1093, 1156,
1160. (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1351 (1982)).
63. 280 U.S. at 382-83.
64. Id. at 383.
65. Id.
66. Id. The Court relied on Barber, Simms and De La Rama in holding that
federal courts have always denied jurisdiction over divorces and alimony. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 383-84.
69. Id. at 384.
70. See id. at 384.
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frequently invoked bases of federal jurisdiction, no Supreme
Court case has so extended Popovici. Secondly, the language used
by the Supreme Court in Popovici is far from an unequivocal approval of the domestic relations exception. The Court spoke not
of a brightly defined exception, but rather of "tacit assumptions." 7 ' The Court did not positively state that the domestic relations exception has existed for three quarters of a century.
Rather, it spoke of the propriety of state court jurisdiction "ifit be
true as has been unquestioned for three-quarters of a century that
the Courts of the United States have no jurisdiction over divorce." 72 The Court did not expressly hold that at the time the
Constitution was adopted, it was the common understanding that
domestic relations jurisdiction was reserved to the states. Rather,
the Court stated that, "[if when the Constitution was adopted, the
common understanding was that domestic relations . . . were
matters reserved to the States,"' 73 the Constitution should be interpreted in light of that understanding. The decision refused to
upgrade the basis of the domestic relations exception beyond the
"tacit assumptions" of which the Court spoke.
Another aspect of Popovici that restricts its precedential value
is that the case involved a suit for divorce, which is a domestic
relations case, even under the narrowest definition of that term.
Moreover, Popovici failed to define what is encompassed by the
term "domestic relations," thereby leaving lower courts with the
onerous task of construing the appropriate boundaries of the exception. Thus, although Popovici has been described as "the most
extreme case" of application of the domestic relations exception,74 the circumstances of that case were so unique as to severely circumscribe its usefulness as a guide to interpreting the
domestic relations exception. An indication that lower courts do
not consider Popovici to be the definitive holding on the domestic
relations exception is that courts do not cite Popovici as having
supplanted Barber, Burrus, Simms, and De La Rama as a precedent
for the domestic relations exception. Rather, it is cited together
with these older cases as indicative of the existence of the
75
exception.
71. Id. at 383.
72. Id. (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 383-84 (emphasis added).

74. C.

WRIGHT,

supra note 6, § 25, at 144 n.10.

75. See, e.g., Buechold v.Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 1968); McCarty
v. Hollis, 120 F.2d 540, 542 (10th Cir. 1941); Robinson v. Robinson, 523 F.
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THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS EXCEPTION: A POWER
LIMITATION OR DISCRETIONARY DISCLAIMER?

During the fifty years since Popovici was decided, lower courts
have advanced substantially divergent interpretations of the nature and scope of the domestic relations exception. The differences derive in part from the confusion that exists in the seminal
Supreme Court opinions giving rise to the exception.
The most important issue of disagreement is whether the exception derives from a lack of constitutional and/or statutory
power, or whether it arose as a result of a disclaimer of jurisdiction by the Supreme Court. The majority in Barber spoke in terms
of disclaiming jurisdiction in domestic relations cases. 76 The Barber dissent, however, explained the exception in terms of a lack of
power to hear domestic relations cases. 77 This difference of opinion has survived among the lower federal courts. Some emphatically characterize the domestic relations exception as a question
of power. 78 Other federal courts claim that the exception is a discretionary surrender of, or abstention from, jurisdiction in favor
79
of state courts.
The power-disclaimer issue has great significance, for it defines the amount of discretion a court can exercise in a particular
case. If a court bases the existence of the domestic relations exception on a lack of constitutional or statutory power, then a
court's sole means for exercising discretion lies in its initial determination of whether the case does in fact involve "domestic relations." If, however, a court views the exception as a discretionary
Supp. 96, 97 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 800

(E.D.N.Y. 1968).
76. For a discussion of the disclaimer rationale of the Barber majority, see
supra note 21 and accompanying text.
77. For a discussion of the power rationale of the Barber dissent, see supra
notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Williamson v. Williamson, 306 F. Supp. 516, 518 (W.D. Okla.
1969) ("subject matter jurisdiction . . . is wholly lacking in a federal court in
spite of the fact that" the jurisdictional requirements of § 1332 have been satisfied). See also Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1024 (3d Cir. 1975) ("federal courts do not have jurisdiction in domestic relations suits"); McGovern v.
Blaha, 496 F. Supp. 964, 965 (W.D.N.Y. 1980) (action for child support payment
is "jurisdictionally prohibited").
79. See, e.g., Firestone v. Cleveland Trust Co., 654 F.2d 1212, 1215 (6th Cir.
1981) ("federal courts traditionally have refrained from exercising jurisdiction
over cases which in essence are domestic relations disputes"). See also Crouch v.
Crouch, 566 F.2d 486, 487-88 (5th Cir. 1978) (applicability of domestic relations
exception is determined in light of policy considerations); Kilduff v. Kilduff, 473
F. Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (federal court may decline jurisdiction even in tort
action if tortious conduct arose from marital relationship).
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disclaimer based upon reasons of policy, then not only may the
court use its discretion in the determination of whether the case
involves domestic relations, but it may also determine whether a
given case implicates the policy considerations that gave rise to
the exception."s This latter approach permits a court to consider
changes in the court system and changes in domestic relations
law, while such a flexible approach is more difficult to use when
the exception is viewed as arising from a lack of constitutional or
statutory power.
In addition to those courts justifying the exception in terms
of lack of power and to those adopting the disclaimer rationale
are those courts that combine both rationales in their analyses.
Since the alternative characterizations of the exception are just
that-alternatives rather than potential complements-unifying
the two rationales produces confusion and unpredictability. For
example, in Welker v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. ,81 the plaintiff
brought an action in federal district court to recover insurance
benefits as a putative spouse. 82 The district court dismissed the
action on the basis of the domestic relations exception. Initially,
the court stated that since the primary issue in the case involved
the status of husband and wife, the district court "should decline
jurisdiction."8 3 But the court went on to state that the case was
"not within the power granted to the federal courts by the Constitution." 8 4 The court concluded that "based on notions of federalism and the competency of the federal courts to decide state
domestic relations issues, this action must be dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction." 85 Thus, both the lack of power and
the disclaimer rationales are present in Welker.
Another approach that combines both rationales was recently
adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Csibi v. Fustos.8 6 In Csibi, the court
distinguished between two types of domestic relations cases, ap80. See Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1978). Crouch identifies
the following policy considerations for applying the exception: a strong state
interest in domestic matters, the special competence of state courts, the possibility of conflicting federal and state decrees, and the problem of congested federal
courts. Id. at 487.
81. 502 F. Supp. 268 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
82. d. at 269. Plaintiff and decedent were married before divorces from
their respective spouses had become final. Id. For a definition of the term "putative spouse," see infra note 149.
83. Id. at 269 (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 270 (emphasis added).
85. Id.
86. 670 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1982).
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plying the power rationale to one category and the discretionary
disclaimer rationale to the other. The first category was described by the court as "at the core of the domestic relations exception" 8 7 and included cases where federal courts are asked to
grant a divorce or annulment, to determine support payments or
to award custody of a child. 8 8 As to these cases, the federal courts
have no subject matter jurisdiction. The second category of domestic relations cases to which the exception applied included
those "where domestic relations problems are involved tangentially to other issues determinative of the case." 89 As to this second category of cases, Csibi concluded that federal courts may
exercise discretion in deciding whether to accept jurisdiction.
Nothing in the seminal Supreme Court opinions suggests
that a two-tiered analysis is appropriate for determining which
cases may be heard in federal court. The Supreme Court decisions advanced different rationales for the exception90 and different interpretations of the scope of the exception. 9 1 Perhaps the
Csibi court sought to synthesize the disparate approaches with a
two-tiered analysis, rather than attempt to choose between the
differing conceptions of the exception. 9 2 Nevertheless, Csibi is
further evidence of the lack of uniformity among lower courts in
interpreting both the historical basis for the exception and its
boundaries.
IV.

LOWER COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SCOPE OF THE

DOMESTIC RELATIONS EXCEPTION

Not only did the majority and the dissent in the Barber case
disagree on the nature of the domestic relations exception, they
also disagreed on its scope. The Barber majority distinguished between requests for the allowance of alimony, with respect to
87. Id. at 137.
88. Id. These actions were chosen as core cases because they resembled
historical eccesliastical actions. Id.
89. Id. As an example of an action falling into this second category, the
court cited a suit to enforce a defaulting spouse's obligations under a state decree. Id.
90. For a discussion of the divergent Supreme Court rationales, see supra
notes 25-29, 34-36, 40-42 & 50 and accompanying text.
91. For a discussion of the divergent interpretations of the scope of the
exception, see supra notes 30, 37-38, 43-45 & 49 and accompanying text.
92. See also Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1981). In Sutter, the First
Circuit also distinguished between two categories of domestic relations cases.
Like the Csibi court, the Sutter court found that federal courts had no jurisdiction
over cases in the first category, while they should abstain from adjudicating cases
in the second. Id. at 843.
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which it disclaimed jurisdiction, and suits to enforce alimony
awards, which it felt were properly within the jurisdiction of federal courts. 93 The dissent, however, argued that federal courts
did not have jurisdiction to enforce an alimony award. The dissent stated that since alimony awards were modifiable they were
properly a subject for state control, 94 and that federal courts
lacked jurisdiction over divorce and alimony because those mat95
ters were reserved in England to the ecclesiastical courts.
Although the Barber majority distinguished between different
types of domestic relations cases, 9 6 the language in In re Burrus is
substantially more encompassing: "The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child belongs to
' 97
the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States.
Simms compounded the confusion by referring to both the narrow
disclaimer language of Barber and the expansive description of the
exception in In re Burrtts.9 8
Given the uncertain history of the exception, it is not surprising that lower courts have offered differing interpretations of its
scope. At one end of the spectrum are courts that define "domestic relations" expansively and avoid the difficult line-drawing process. 9 9 Under this approach, any litigation involving parent and
child or husband and wife is labeled as a domestic relations case
and thus within the exception.' 0 0 At the other end of the spec93. For a discussion of the majority opinion in Barber, see supra notes 20-22
and accompanying text.
94. For a discussion of the dissent's argument that alimony awards are
modifiable, see supra note 30 and accompanying text.
95. For a discussion of the role of ecclesiastical courts in England, see supra
notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
96. Barber, 62 U.S. at 584. In Barber, the Court's disclaimer language was
only addressed to suits "upon the subject of divorce, or for the allowance of
alimony, either as an original proceeding in chancery or as an incident to divorce
a vinculo, or to one from bed and board." Id.
97. Burrus, 136 U.S. at 593-94. For a discussion of Bunus, see supra notes
32-38 and accompanying text.
98. Simms, 175 U.S. at 167. For a discussion of Simms, see supra notes 39-46
and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., Firestone v. Cleveland Trust Co., 654 F.2d 1212, 1215 (6th Cir.
1981)("suit whose substance is domestic relations generally will not be entertained in a federal court"); Kamhi v. Cohen, 512 F.2d 1051, 1056 (2d Cir.
1975)(federal court's policy will remain "to keep hands off actions which verge
on the matrimonial"); Welker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 502 F. Supp. 268,
269 (C.D. Cal. 1980)(federal court should decline jurisdiction where primary issue in diversity case involves status of parent and child or husband and wife).
100. See, e.g., Gargallo v. Gargallo, 472 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 805 (1973). In Gargallo, a father sought both an injunction and damages for
his ex-wife's illegal removal of their children from Ohio. Id. at 1220. The Sixth
Circuit summarily held that this case fell within the domestic relations exception,
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trum are courts that hear cases appearing to implicate the domes-

tic relations exception, with no discussion at all as to the
propriety of jurisdiction. 10 ' In between these two extremes are
the majority of lower courts struggling to find a test to determine
whether a case involves "domestic relations" for purposes of the
exception.
There appears to be little controversy that a suit for a divorce, an original alimony award, a division of property, or a determination of child custody fall within the exception. 10 2 Such
cases are rarely brought to federal court.10 3 For the most part, the
cases that raise the question of the scope of the domestic relations
exception are cases involving enforcement, modification or challenges to existing decrees, or suits based upon tort, contract or
constitutional law theories which in some way involve family relations. As discussed below, courts have not responded in a uniform way to the issues posed by such cases. The variety of
although the court made no attempt to specifically analyze the issues presented
in the case to determine whether the entire case actually fell within the exception. See also Kilduff v. Kilduff, 473 F. Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). In Kilduff, a
mother sued her ex-husband for false imprisonment of their children after he
violated the custody agreement by failing to return the children following a trip.
Id. at 874. The district court dismissed the action, holding that even though the
action sounded in tort, the case essentially focused on an alleged breach of a
custody agreement and therefore was clearly a domestic relations case within the
exception. Id.
101. See, e.g., Fenslage v. Dawkins, 629 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1980) (affirming
damage award against plaintiffs ex-husband and his relatives for taking and concealing their children in violation of a custody order); Hinton v. Hinton, 436
F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (complaint charging a child's grandmother with inducing child not to return to parents stated a cause of action); Carr v. Wisecup, 263
F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1959) (suit by wife against husband for damages under contracts executed in anticipation of divorce); Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. 15
(E.D.N.Y. 1978) (action against ex-husband for taking plaintiffs child from her
in violation of custody order). The fact that none of the parties may have raised
jurisdictional questions in these actions does not explain the court's hearing
these cases, since "[w]henever it appears by suggestion of the parties or othenise
that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the
action." FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (emphasis added). It is well settled that ajurisdictional defect is nonwaivable and may be asserted on the court's motion either
at the trial level or the appellate level. See 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1393 (1969).

102. See, e.g., Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1981)(federal courts
have no diversity jurisdiction to grant divorces, determine alimony and resolve
custody dispute); Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1087 (4th Cir. 1980) ("district
courts have no original diversity jurisdiction to grant a divorce, to award alimony, to determine child custody, or to decree visitation").
103. The rarity of these core domestic relations cases in federal courts is
probably due to the insurmountable problem of satisfying the threshold diversity and amount in controversy requirements. For a discussion of the difficulty
in meeting these threshold requirements, see infra notes 326-29 and accompanying text.
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approaches utilized by courts demonstrates their present confusion as to the appropriate boundaries of the exception.
A.

The Status-Property Rights Test

Some courts apply a "status" test to determine whether a
04
particular case falls within the domestic relations exception.'
Under this analysis, if a case requires a determination of marital
or familial status, then the exception is invoked. For instance, in
Buechold v. Ortiz, 10 5 a case involving paternity and child support,
the Ninth Circuit stated that federal courts "must decline jurisdiction of cases concerning domestic relations when the primary issue concerns the status of parent and child or husband and
wife."' 1 6 Finding that the case before it involved a determination
of the status of parent and child, the Buechold court upheld the
lower court's dismissal for lack ofjurisdiction. Similarly, in Welker
v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. ,107 the plaintiff sought a declaration that she was the putative spouse of the decedent, which
would have entitled her to the benefits of a group life insurance
policy under which the decedent was insured.' 0 8 Following the
rationale of Buechold, the district court dismissed the case on the
grounds that the primary issue required a determination of marital status. 109
By contrast, other federal courts have asserted their power to
make marital status determinations if the issue was raised in a
104. See, e.g., Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1968); Welker v.
Metropolitan Ins. Co., 502 F. Supp. 268 (C.D. Cal. 1980). Professors Vestal and
Foster also favor application of a status test. See Vestal & Foster, supra note 6, at
31. Under their formulation, federal courts should refuse jurisdiction in cases
"where a problem of status arises. Where only property rights are involved jurisdiction should be taken." Id.
105. 401 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1968).
106. Id. at 372.
107. 502 F. Supp. 268 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
108. Id. at 269. For a definition of putative spouse, see infra note 149.
109. Id. One problem with utilizing a status-property test is the difficulty in
determining what constitutes an adjudication of "status." For example, in a case
with facts similar to those in Welker, the district court reached the opposite conclusion from Welker on the ground that the question of whether a person was a
putative spouse did not involve the adjudication of marital status, but merely an
inquiry into responsibilities. See Lee v. Hunt, 431 F. Supp. 371, 376 (W.D. La.
1977).
Another problem with the status-property rights test is its lack of uniform
application among the courts. Some courts have invoked the domestic relations
exception in cases which clearly involve property rights, and not status determinations. See, e.g.,
Allen v. Allen, 518 F. Supp. 1234 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (postnuptial
property settlement agreement); Danel v. Lovelace, 428 F. Supp. 30 (W.D. Okla.
1976) (dispute over division of property under a property settlement contract).
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challenge to an already existing divorce decree. In Southard v.
Southard,t t0 the Second Circuit stated that Barber would not preclude a diversity action for a declaratory judgment to declare a
divorce decree invalid."' The court stated that "there is no reason why a declaratory action should not prima facie lie to determine the controverted status of the parties.""l 2 Another case
involving a determination of status is Vann v. Vann," 3 where a
wife brought an action in federal court seeking a declaratory judgment to void a divorce decree obtained by her husband in a Tennessee court. The wife asserted two grounds in support of her
request. She claimed first that the notice given her was insufficient to comport with due process requirements, and second, that
the pleadings and proof upon which the divorce judgment was
rendered contained fraudulent misrepresentations. The district
court denied the husband's motion to dismiss. The court held
that the domestic relations exception did not apply where the validity of a judgment was being questioned under the Constitution,
and that a federal district court had "the long recognized power
to deprive parties before it of the fruits of a judgment of divorce4
procured by fraud which goes to the validity of the judgment." 1
B.

The Modifiability Test

Some courts, in analyzing and defining the appropriate scope
of the domestic relations exception, draw a distinction between
actions involving obligations which are modifiable and actions involving obligations which are not modifiable. Under this approach, nonmodifiable obligations may be enforced in federal
court, while modifiable obligations may not."1 5 Thus, actions to
enforce property division awards, which generally are not modifi110. 305 F.2d 730 (2nd Cir. 1962).
111. Id. at 731 (citing Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1859)). The plaintiff
had sought a declaratory judgment because a Connecticut court had failed to
give full faith and credit to a Nevada divorce decree. Id. The Second Circuit,
however, ultimately dismissed the suit on the ground that it was barred by res
judicata. Id. at 732.
112. Id. at 731.
113. 294 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Tenn. 1968).
114. Id. at 194. Not all courts agree with the Vann court's statement that
the domestic relations exception is inapplicable to federal question cases. See
supra note 5. See also Comment, supra note 5, at 864-72.
115. For examples of courts embracing this modifiability test, see Jagiella v.
Jagiella, 647 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1981) (characterizing separation agreement as a
contract to pay money); Morris v. Morris, 273 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1960) (viewing
separation agreement as a modifiable instrument and reversing district court
judgment for unpaid installments).
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able,"I 6 are held to be within a federal court's jurisdiction.' 1 7 Disputes involving alimony, custody, or child support awards, which
generally are modifiable," 8 are excluded from jurisdiction by the
domestic relation exception. 19
The theory behind the modifiability test is that when a federal court is called upon to modify a domestic relations award, or
to enforce an award that is modifiable, the court entertaining the
action must necessarily examine factors which the state domestic
relations statutes set forth as relevant to modification.' 20 Such
factors are seen as matters of particular interest to state courts,
and within their special expertise, thus calling for the invocation
of the domestic relations exception.12 ' In contrast, the enforcement of nonmodifiable domestic relations obligations is viewed as
analogous to the enforcement of any other nonmodifiable debt,
and not involving the federal court directly in domestic relations
law.' 22 Thus, such actions are often held to be within thejurisdic116. See H. CLARK, supra note 18, § 14.8.
117. See, e.g., Lee v. Hunt, 431 F. Supp. 371 (W.D. La. 1977) (determination
of a putative marital relationship involves nothing more than property rights and
thus falls within the jurisdiction of federal courts); Turpin v. Turpin, 415 F.
Supp. 12 (W.D. Okla. 1975) (disposition of property under a property settlement agreement).
118. See H. CLARK, supra note 18, § 14.8. In some states an alimony award
is modifiable not only with respect to future installments, but also with respect
to accrued, unpaid installments. Id. § 14.9, at 454-55. Thus, if an obligee sues
in federal court to recover past due installments, the obligor can defend by raising circumstances which justify modification of the unpaid obligation.
119. See, e.g., Jagiella v. Jagiella, 647 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1981) (in part upholding dismissal of counterclaim to reduce child support and increase visitation
rights).
120. For example, the Indiana Code provides that modification of a child
support or spousal support award is to be allowed "only upon a showing of
changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms [of
the existing award] unreasonable." IND. CODE § 31-1-11.5-17 (1984). Thus, in
order to determine whether the existing award is unreasonable, the court must
examine the goals of the award and determine whether they were being served
by that award.
121. This point was recently emphasized by the Seventh Circuit:
[The] efforts by the district court to assume the broad equitable
powers of a divorce court in passing upon the questions which might
arise as to the continuance of the obligation of defendant to make the
periodic payments, despite the possibility of changing circumstances in
the future, would involve the district court in the administration of divorce law in a very real way . . . . [W]e feel that the [lower] court's
precipitate action is not consonant with the view expressed by the federal judiciary in the [Barber line of] cases.
Morris v. Morris, 273 F.2d 678, 681-82 (7th Cir. 1960). See also Hernstadt v.
Hernstadt, 373 F.2d 316, 317 (2d Cir. 1967).
122. See, e.g., Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 1978) (suit for
breach of separation agreement involves none of the justifications for the do-
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tion of federal courts.
This categorization often leads to problems for litigants seeking relief. For example, an alimony award may be nonmodifiable
under state law with respect to accrued but unpaid installments,
but prospectively modifiable with respect to future installments.' 23 Similarly, the law may allow damages for interference
with an existing child custody award without reconsideration of
the propriety of the award, and yet not permit an injunction to
order continued enforcement without considering present circumstances.12 4 Most litigants seeking redress for past breaches of
existing alimony or custody awards are also concerned with potential future breaches. They seek, in addition to damages, injunctive relief or some alternative means of enforcing continued
compliance.' 2 5 Courts utilizing the distinction between modifiable and nonmodifiable obligations have reached a schizophrenic
result as to their power to hear such cases. Several courts facing
this problem have concluded that federal courts have jurisdiction
to remedy past breaches, but lack jurisdiction to enforce future
mestic relations exception); Turpin v. Turpin, 415 F. Supp. 12, 13-14 (W.D.
Okla. 1975)(former wife's suit for ex-husband's breach of property settlement
agreement was primarily a contract dispute, thus rendering domestic relations
exception inapplicable).
The fact that a plaintiff relies on a separation agreement will not always
mean that the dispute will pass the modifiability test. Often alimony, custody
and child support disputes will be settled with a separation agreement which will
be submitted to the court for approval. See H. CLARK, supra note 18, § 16.
Although there is some case law to the contrary, the fact that the court-approved
award is based upon a separation agreement will not alter the general
modifiability of alimony, custody and child support agreements. Id. § 16.3.
123. See, e.g., Engleman v. Engleman, 145 Colo. 299, 358 P.2d 864 (1961)
(courts have power to reduce future support payments, but cannot cancel past
due amounts); Hafstad v. Hafstad, 20 Misc. 2d 979, 191 N.Y.S.2d 88 (Sup. Ct.
1959) (courts cannot modify past due installments).
124. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 1982) (tort of
wrongful interference with custody may be litigated independently of custody
proceedings); Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In Bennett,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that a child snatching tort
suit was within the competence of federal courts, since the case involved determination solely of the existence of a legal duty, the breach of that duty, and the
damages flowing from the breach. Id. at 1042. With respect to plaintiff's request for an injunction, however, the court noted that "[t]he decision whether or
not to grant injunctive relief in this case would not merely depend on the past
rights and wrongs of the parties to the suit. Rather, it would also require an
... Id. Therefore, the
inquiry into the present interest of the minor children.
court concluded there was no federal jurisdiction over the injunctive claim. Id.
at 1044.
125. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982). For a discussion of Loeffter, see infra notes 241-49 and accompanying text.
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compliance.' 26 This result leaves the litigant in the unfortunate
position of having to accept only a partial remedy if a federal forum is chosen. This may be particularly unsatisfactory if the
breaching obligor is beyond the jurisdiction of the state court that
originally imposed the obligation. In this situation, enforcement
would be much simpler if a federal court issued an injunction or27
dering continued compliance.
Some lower federal courts do not accept the modifiability test
as defining the appropriate boundaries of the domestic relations
exception. These courts have refused to hear actions involving
nonmodifiable awards on the grounds of the exception. 2 8 Ac126. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982); Bennett v.
Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1982). But cf. Ruffalo ex rel. Ruffalo v. Civiletti, 702 F.2d 710, 717 (8th Cir. 1983) (stating in dictum that the domestic relations exception does not bar the granting of an injunction to compel the return
of a child in accordance with a state custody decree).
127. The decision to grant retrospective relief in the form of damages, but
not prospective relief in the form of either an injunction or escalating punitive
damages, leaves a plaintiff in the unenviable position of having to bring repeated
suits to obtain compensation for the continuing tortious conduct of the defendant. This approach is clearly more time consuming and expensive for a plaintiff
than obtaining complete relief in one suit.
Plaintiff could, of course, seek an injunction in state court if the federal
court refused to grant prospective relief. However, in addition to the wasted
judicial resources required by two lawsuits, it is unclear that the state court remedy would be obtainable or effective. If plaintiff were fortunate and the defendant remained in the same state that handed down the original decree, then that
state court could continue to exercise jurisdiction and issue an injunction ordering compliance, or simply hold the defendant in contempt. H. CLARK, supra note
18, §§ 14.10, 17.7. Yet this would be an unusual situation since in most cases
where federal diversity jurisdiction properly could be invoked, the defendant
will no longer be within the state that issued the original decree. An injunction
or contempt order issued by that state would not be per se enforceable beyond
its borders. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 102 (1971). While
states may be required to recognize and enforce certain decrees rendered by a
sister state under either the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution or the
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, certain decrees may not fall within the
mandate of either provision. See H. CLARK, supra note 18, §§ 11.5, 14.11, 15.4
(inapplicability of full faith and credit clause to modifiable custody, alimony and
child support). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a)-(c) (1983) (defining those categories of child custody determinations entitled to the protection of the federal act).
In such situations, while state courts may choose to enforce such an order, there
has been no definitive Supreme Court ruling requiring enforcement. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 102 (1971).
Another method a litigant might use to enforce compliance with an out-ofstate domestic relations decree would be to domesticate the original decree. If
the litigant is successful, the state that has adopted the decree could use all remedies to enforce the judgment which it utilizes for other domestic decrees. See
H. CLARK, supra note 18, § 14.12. The domestication process is discretionary,
however, and involves both time and financial resources. It will also be of limited usefulness where the defendant moves frequently to avoid enforcement.
128. See, e.g., Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1019 (3d Cir. 1975)
(dismissing suit for nonpayment of support "based in contract upon a separa-
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cording to this view, the fact that such disputes arose from the
marital relationship is sufficient to brand the case as a domestic
relations case and thus within the exception.
C.

The Centrality of the Domestic Relations Issue

Courts encounter special difficulty in administering the domestic relations exception when a suit involving domestic relations issues is based on theories of contract, tort or constitutional
law. The question arises as to whether the court may delve into
the facts constituting the claim and characterize the suit as a "domestic relations" case subject to the exception. Furthermore, if
scrutiny of the facts is permitted, the courts must also decide to
what extent the suit involves a domestic relations issue in order to
determine whether the entire case falls within the domestic relations exception.
With respect to the power of federal courts to scrutinize the
facts to determine whether the case may indeed be a domestic
relations case for purposes of the exception, most courts allow
some level of scrutiny. What varies is the depth of that scrutiny
and the perspective of the court undertaking the task. For example, in Cole v. Cole' 29 an ex-husband brought a suit in federal court
for compensatory and punitive damages against his ex-wife and
several other defendants alleging malicious prosecution, abuse of
process, arson and conversion. Although it was unclear from the
pleadings whether the acts complained of occurred before or after the divorce, the appellate court proceeded on the assumption
that the parties were married at the time of the actions giving rise
to the claim.' 3 0 The trial court had dismissed the action on the
basis of the domestic relations exception. On appeal, the Fourth
Circuit reversed, stating, "[a] district court may not simply avoid
all diversity cases having intrafamily aspects. Rather it must consider the exact nature of the rights asserted or of the breaches
alleged."''
The Cole court then reviewed the facts of the case
and concluded that the case "does not present any true domestic
tion agreement" on ground of domestic relations exception); Danel v. Lovelace,
428 F. Supp. 30 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (suit for breach of property settlement agreement held within the domestic relations exception).
129. 633 F.2d 1083 (4th Cir. 1980).
130. Id. at 1085. The timing of the actions giving rise to the claim might be
relevant to a court's decision as to whether the suit involves "domestic relations." Here, however, the court held that federal jurisdiction was appropriate,
despite the fact that the actions complained of occurred during the marriage.
131. Id. at 1088.
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relations claims."' 3 2 The breaches of duty alleged in the complaint did not arise solely from domestic relations law, and the
court felt it inappropriate to "deny jurisdiction simply on the
grounds of the supposed etiology of the emotions underlying
either the alleged breach by the defendant or the decision by the
plaintiff to bring the suit.' l3 3 Finding that the case would not
require the district court to adjust family status or to set or enforce any duties under family relations law, the court held that the
34
case did not fall within the exception.
Not all courts take such a narrow view of the exception in tort
and contract cases. In Bacon v. Bacon,' 3 5 a woman sought to recover from her ex-husband for intentional infliction of emotional
distress during the eight years subsequent to their divorce. Unlike the court in Cole, the Bacon court felt compelled to review the
emotions which gave rise to the alleged acts, and concluded that
"[s]tripped of its verbiage, this is no more-and no less-than a
domestic relations case."' 36 Thus, despite the fact that a suit for
intentional infliction of emotional distress might be brought between strangers, 3 7 the Bacon court held the domestic relations
exception prohibited the exercise of jurisdiction in this case.
Courts describe in differing ways the place a domestic relations issue must occupy in a tort or contract action in order to
transform the case into a domestic relations case for purposes of
the exception. The Ninth Circuit describes its criterion as the
"primary issue test,"'' 38 while the District of Columbia Circuit has
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1089. The court also looked to whether the claims asserted
could have arisen between strangers. Id.

It concluded that the duty to refrain

from the alleged acts did not arise from a past or present family relation. Id. at
1088. Thus, jurisdiction was proper in federal court. Id. at 1089.
135. 365 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Or. 1973).
136. Id. at 1020. The court went on to state:
While it may be true, as Plaintiffs counsel has urged, that there are
instances where estranged parties may properly sue each other in federal courts, this is not one. This case is not the result of separate transactions between the parties where, for example, one may default on a
contract, "executed after arms length negotiations".... Indeed, it is
this court's distinct impression that the Bacons never have been at
"arms length." The language of the complaint shows this to be part of
an ongoing series of disputes centering around [sic] the dissolved but
still stormy relationship and the status of-and harm to-their children.
Id.
137. See, e.g., Hovis v. City of Burns, 243 Or. 607, 415 P.2d 29 (1966) (defendant allegedly disinterred the remains of plaintiffs husband).
138. See Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 1968) (domestic
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focused on the "essence" of the case.' 39 As might be expected,
interpretations of the terms "primary" and "essence" in different
contexts have led to a body of law that is lacking in predictability
140
and logic.
The tests discussed above represent some of the attempts of
the lower federal courts to fix boundaries on the amorphous domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction. An examination
of the case law, however, indicates that these attempts have been
unsuccessful. Federal courts in one circuit accept jurisdiction in
cases involving determinations of status,' 4 ' while courts in another circuit do not.' 4 2 A nonmodifiable property settlement
agreement may be enforced in some federal courts,143 but not in
others. 4 4 A suit between ex-spouses based on tort theories is
considered a domestic relations case in one federal court, 14 5 while
another considers the case as cognizable in federal court as any
46
other tort action involving diverse parties.'
The lack of agreement among lower federal courts as to the
appropriate scope of the domestic relations exception represents
more than differing approaches to achieving a consistent series of
results. The disagreement is more basic. It reflects the inability
of federal courts to define the basic contours of the exception.
The result of this basic disagreement is an exception to federal
jurisdiction without workable boundaries.
V.

THE APPLICABILITY OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS EXCEPTION
TO PARTICULAR TYPES OF ACTIONS

In addition to examining the general standards used by federal courts to define the scope of the exception, it is helpful to
relation exception must be invoked if the primary issue of the case involves the
status of husband and wife or parent and child).
139. See Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("[s]uits
whose essence is in, for example, tort or contract, and which do not require the
federal court to exceed its competence, will be heard"). For a discussion of Bennett, see infra notes 237-40 and accompanying text.
140. Compare Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (suits
whose "essence" was in tort were cognizable in federal court) with Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1982) (applying the "primary issue" test, but holding
that "tort allegations shall not all provide a means for circumventing" the domestic relations exception).
141. See supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 115-27 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
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examine the application of the exception to particular categories
of actions. The lack of uniform analysis, even with respect to the
same category of action, is indicative of the unsettled state of the
exception.
A.

Determination of Status-Husband and Wife, Parent and Child

As previously discussed, some federal courts view actions involving a determination of familial status as falling within the domestic relations exception. 14 7 For example, in Huffman v. Nebraska
Bureau of Vital Statistics,14 8 a prisoner filed a habeas corpus petition
which depended upon the ascertainment of putative spouse status
with respect to a woman who had been allowed to testify against
him.' 49 Invoking the exception, the district court dismissed the
petition on the ground that it would require the court to determine the issue of the petitioner's marital status. The court stated
that "[t]he legal conditions and boundaries of marriage traditionally have been reserved to the states."' 5 0 Similarly, federal courts
generally have been unwilling to hear cases involving the establishment of a parent-child relationship.'5'
Yet the reluctance to hear cases involving status determina52
tions is not shared by all federal courts. In Spindel v. Spindel,'
District Judge Weinstein held that his court had jurisdiction to
hear an ex-wife's action for damages and for a declaratory judgment that a Mexican divorce obtained by her husband was inva147. For a discussion of the status test, see supra notes 104-14 and accompanying text.
148. 320 F. Supp. 154 (D. Neb. 1970).
149. Id. at 156. "[Putative marriage] is usually defined as a marriage which
has been solemnized when one or both parties were ignorant of an impediment
which made the marriage void or voidable." H. CLARK, supra note 18, § 2.4, at
54. Once a putative marriage has been established, the party or parties who
entered into the marriage in good faith are entitled to certain benefits normally
incident to marriage, such as community property rights. Id. In Huffman, the
plaintiff sought a finding of putative marriage in order to claim entitlement to
the traditional husband-wife testimonial privilege, to challenge the prison's removal of his putative wife's name from his approved mailing list, and to require
the Nebraska Bureau of Vital Statistics to change the name on his son's birth
certificate to reflect the surname of the child's father. 320 F. Supp. at 156-57.
For a discussion of the husband-wife testimonial privilege, see H. CLARK, supra
note 18, § 13.7, at 396-97.
150. 320 F. Supp. at 157.
151. See, e.g., Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1968) (federal
courts do not have jurisdiction over actions brought to establish paternity and to
obtain child support); Albanese v. Richter, 161 F.2d 688 (3d Cir.) (domestic relation exception includes determination of putative father-illegitimate child relationship), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 782 (1947).
152. 283 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
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lid. 153 In his opinion, Judge Weinstein denounced the domestic
relations exception, both as to its historical bases and as to its
154
contemporary justifications under the doctrine of abstention.
He concluded that a federal court was competent to decide the
issues presented, even though they related to marital status.
While the Second Circuit has not entirely adopted Judge Weinstein's conclusions, 5 5 the Spindel opinion has become an influential force in the deliberations of many courts considering the
56
scope and applicability of the domestic relations exception.
Spindel is not alone in holding that questions regarding familial status may be decided by federal courts. 15 7 Thus, even as to
this most basic of all domestic relations issues, courts cannot
agree upon the scope of the domestic relations exception.
153. Id. at 806-13.
154. Id. at 806-12. Judge Weinstein found that "[t]he historical reasons relied upon to explain the federal courts' complete lack of matrimonial jurisdiction
are not convincing." Id. at 806. Furthermore, "[t]here appears to be no ground
for application of a generalized doctrine of abstention in matrimonial cases." Id.
at 811. For a further discussion of the rejection of the historical basis of the
exception, see infra note 336. For a further discussion of the doctrine of abstention, see supra note 7 and infra notes 308 & 482-84.
155. See Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d
509 (2d Cir. 1973). In Phillips, the Second Circuit reviewed the seminal
Supreme Court cases on the domestic relations exception, and concluded:
We have no disposition to question . . . whether the history was
right or not. . . . More than a century has elapsed since the Barber dic-

tum without any intimation of Congressional dissatisfaction. It is beyond the realm of reasonable belief that, in these days of congested
dockets, Congress would wish the federal courts to seek to retain territory, even if the cessation of 1859 was unjustified. Whatever Article III
may or may not permit, we thus accept the Barber dictum as a correct
interpretation of the Congressional grant.
490 F.2d at 514 (citing Spindel, 283 F. Supp. at 802-03).
Although the Second Circuit found that the domestic relations exception
had continued vitality, it stated that the exception has been narrowly confined.
Id. at 514-15. In support of that conclusion, the court cited its previous decision
in Southard v. Southard, 305 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1962) upholding jurisdiction in a
case involving status). The question in Southard was whether a Connecticut divorce decree was invalid under the Constitution because the court granting it
had failed to give full faith and credit to a previous Nevada divorce decree. Id. at
730-31.
156. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 491 (7th Cir. 1982);Jagiella v.
Jagiella, 647 F.2d 561, 564 n.11 (5th Cir. 1981). The importance of the Spindel
opinion as a thorough critique of the domestic relations exception is recognized
by legal scholars as well as by the courts. See, e.g., Atwood, supra note 7, at 59495.
157. See, e.g., Harrison v. Harrison, 214 F.2d 571 (4th Cir.) (action for declaratory judgment to void Mexican divorce decree and to adopt Ohio decree
awarding alimony), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 896 (1954); Southard v. Southard, 305
F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1962) (action for declaration of constitutional invalidity of
state divorce decree); Vann v. Vann, 294 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Tenn. 1968)(action
for declaration of constitutional invalidity of state divorce decree).
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Division of Property

All divorce statutes provide a mechanism for adjusting the
property rights of parties upon divorce. In most states, this adjustment takes the form of a judicial division of property. 5 8 Parties can, of course, agree to adjust their property rights through a
property settlement agreement, which the court may then incor59
porate into its final decree.'
There is little dispute that federal courts will not hear suits
requesting an initial division of property. 60 After the divorce,

however, disputes may arise between the parties as to the validity,
fairness, or enforcement of the property division. One or both of
the parties may have left the state that granted the divorce, and
thus an ex-spouse may bring a diversity suit in federal court to
correct perceived grievances. Federal courts must, therefore, determine whether such cases are domestic relations cases for purposes of the exception.
If the property division was effected by a property settlement
agreement, federal courts are more likely to find the domestic relations exception inapplicable. For example, in Turpin v. Turpin, 16 1 a woman brought a diversity suit against her ex-husband
alleging that he had breached a property settlement agreement.
The district court held the action was not primarily a marital dispute, but rather involved allegations based in tort and contract,
neither of which appeared to have arisen out of the parties' marital relationship. 62 Therefore, the court found that jurisdiction
was proper. Several other cases have also either held, discussed,
or implied that disputes regarding existing property settlement
decrees can be heard by federal courts. 63 Most of these decisions emphasize the similarity between these actions and ordinary
158. For a summary of the types of statutes adopted by states for the division of property at divorce, see Freed & Foster, supra note 11, at 376-81.
159. See generally H. CLARK, supra note 18, § 16.10.
160. For a discussion of the uniform application of the domestic relations
exception to cases involving the initial division of property, see supra notes 10203 and accompanying text.
161. 415 F. Supp. 12 (W.D. Okla. 1975).
162. Id. at 14.
163. See, e.g., Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 1978) (separation agreement involves "little more than a private contract to pay money");
Block v. Block, 196 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1952) (dicta that federal jurisdiction
would extend to an attack on a property settlement agreement if plaintiff alleged
fraud); Schoonover v. Schoonover, 172 F.2d 526 (10th Cir. 1949) (dispute over
validity of separation agreement without mention of a possible domestic relations exception); Cohen v. Randall, 137 F.2d 441 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 796 (1943).
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civil actions to enforce or overturn a contract and conclude that
since federal courts often hear cases involving contracts, property
settlement disputes are also within their competence and expertise.' 64 the fact that the property settlement contract dispute involves former spouses is not seen as sufficient to bring these cases
within the domestic relations exception.
As with most matters involving the domestic relations exception, not all courts agree with the foregoing characterization of
property settlement disputes. Some courts focus on the interrelationship between the property division dispute and other disputes
which fall more clearly within the exception. For example, in
Thrower v. Cox,16 5 a former wife brought a diversity action attacking the validity of a property settlement she had signed. She
claimed that at the time she entered the agreement she was mentally incompetent, under emotional duress, without assistance of
counsel and ignorant as to the extent of the property involved.
She asked that the agreement be declared null and void, that the
court require an accounting and a redivision of the property and
that the court award damages and other relief. After initial discovery, plaintiff sought to amend her complaint to add allegations
of adultery and a request for alimony. In discussing whether it
had jurisdiction to hear the case, the court conceded that "[i]t has
quite uniformly been held . . . that liquidated obligations arising
from domestic relations suits, such as accrued alimony or property settlements, may be enforced in the district courts if diversity
of citizenship and the jurisdictional amount exists."' 66 The court
went on to find, however, that since the former wife had joined
her request for a review of the property division with a request for
alimony, the general rule was inapplicable. The court refused to
accept plaintiffs argument that her request for alimony should be
granted as relief incident to the contract action. Without indicating how it arrived at its evaluation, the court stated that "the
greater portion of the case would be occupied by the issues of
adultery and recrimination, which can hardly be characterized as
contractual causes of action."' 6 7 The court concluded that "the
nature of the issues presented and relief sought is so completely
permeated by domestic relations law that it can only be rationally
164. See, e.g., Crouch, 566 F.2d at 488 (no special competence of state courts
in this area); Block, 196 F.2d at 933 (no difference between this dispute and those
involving other types of settlement agreements).
165. 425 F. Supp. 570 (D.S.C. 1976).
166. Id. at 573.
167. Id. at 574.

340

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30: p. 307

and logically characterized as an action arising from that field.' 68
The court dismissed the action, making no attempt to sever and
address those claims for relief over which it did have jurisdiction. 169 Instead, the court found that the alimony request tainted
the property division issue, so as to disqualify the entire case.
Allen v. Allen 170 presents another example of the effect that
tangential familial disputes between the parties have upon the decision of a federal court to hear a property division case. In Allen,
a husband filed an action against his wife in state court alleging
his wife had breached a postnuptial property settlement separation agreement by refusing to pay certain sums as provided in the
agreement. The wife removed the case to federal court on the
basis of diversity, and filed a counterclaim. The allegations of the
counterclaim formed the basis of a separate diversity action filed
by the wife. 17 The husband moved to remand the actions to
state court on the basis of the domestic relatidns exception. In its
review of the record, the district court listed seven pending state
court actions between the parties. Although none of the state
suits involved the exact issue raised in the removed actions, 17 2 the
federal court stated that the contract and fraud theories of the
complaint "must be interpreted against the background of ex73
treme acrimony emanating from the parties' marital dispute."'
The court pointed to the "overlapping factual and legal matrices"' 174 of the state and federal actions, "the dominant theme of
175
which is a dispute over the ownership of marital property."'
168. Id.
169. In other contexts, federal courts faced with multiple theories for relief
have dismissed claims over which they did not have jurisdiction while retaining
jurisdiction over appropriate severable claims. See, e.g., Phillips v. Carborundum
Co., 361 F. Supp. 1016 (W.D.N.Y. 1973) (dismissing claim arising under state
equal pay provision but retaining claim arising under similar federal provision);
Rakes v. Coleman, 318 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Va. 1970) (permitting declaratory
relief claims but dismissing claims for injunctive relief).
170. 518 F. Supp. 1234 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
171. Id. at 1235. In the counterclaim, the wife sought an injunction prohibiting her husband from recording a deed to a piece of property in Pennsylvania,
a declaration that the property settlement was void, and the return of property
which she claimed her husband had confiscated from her. Id. at 1235.
172. Id. at 1236. The court did note, however, that the property settlement
agreement at issue in the federal court proceeding was also relevant to some of
the state court actions. Id. at 1237. As an example, the court noted that the
agreement provided for the transfer of property that was also involved in an
equitable distribution action in state court. Id. at 1237 n.6.
173. Id. at 1237.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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The court accused the parties of trying to play one court system
off against another and remanded the suits. Thus, Allen suggests
that federal courts may refuse to hear a property settlement dispute not only where that dispute is combined in the same action
with a dispute falling more clearly within the domestic relations
exception, but also where related disputes falling within the exception are pending in state court.
C.

Alimony and Child Support

When a family unit is dissolved through divorce, the law provides a mechanism for the continued support of those family
members in need of support by those family members with the
resources to provide it. Where the support is to be provided to
an ex-spouse, that support is designated as alimony 176 or mainte178
nance.' 7 7 Support for children is designated child support.
There appears to be little dispute that, whatever the scope of the
domestic relations exception, it is broad enough to encompass
original requests for alimony and child support. 179 Beyond that,
little else is certain.
Those courts that broadly construe the exception view an action to enforce an alimony award as so inextricably related to the
domestic relations nature of the case as to bring the enforcement
action within the exception. 8 0 According to these courts, "[t]he
mere obtaining of a divorce decree, without more, does not remove the case from the arena of domestic relations and permit
the intervention of federal courts to adjudicate issues unaffected
by the decree."' 18 They argue that an enforcement action raises
82
questions which are best left to state courts.'
176. See generally H.

CLARK,

supra note 18, § 14.

177. Although they are synonomous, some statutes use the term "maintenance" instead of "alimony," See, e.g., IND. CODE § 31-1-11.5-9(c) (1984).
178. See generally H. CLARK, supra note 18, § 15.
179. For a discussion of the scope of the domestic relations exception in
cases involving original requests for alimony and child support, see supra notes
102-03 and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., Firestone v. Cleveland Trust Co., 654 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir.
1981) (dismissal of ex-wife's action for declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to husband's failure to meet obligations under divorce decree); Walker v.
Walker, 509 F. Supp. 853, 854 (E.D. Va. 1981) (dismissal of suit to enforce obligations under divorce decree on principle that federal courts should "keep our
federal hands off actions which verge on the matrimonial") (quoting Kamhi v.

Cohen, 512 F.2d 1051, 1056 (2d Cir. 1975)).
181. Firestone v. Cleveland Trust Co., 654 F.2d 1212, 1216 (6th Cir. 1981)
(citing Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1024 (3d Cir. 1975)).
182. See, e.g., Walker v. Walker, 509 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. Va. 1981). The
Walker court stated:
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Other federal courts, however, take a narrower view of the
exception in this situation. In Zimmermann v. Zimmermann,' 8 3 the
district court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss an action
brought by his ex-wife to enforce defendant's child support and
alimony obligations under the divorce decree. The court viewed
the suit as essentially a contract action: "What is presented is
simply a dispute between two persons, who for over nine years
have been divorced and living apart and between whom there
have been no domestic relations, as to whether there has been
184
compliance with two contracts existing between them."'
One characteristic of both alimony and child support cases
which often influences the domestic relations exception analysis is
the modifiability of these awards. 18 5 To the extent that enforcement is sought for a sum which is modifiable according to the
applicable domestic relations law,' 8 6 or to the extent that actual
modification is sought, many federal courts will. refuse to hear alimony and child support cases on the grounds that hearing them
would involve federal courts too directly in domestic relations issues. 18 7 All that can be obtained in these courts is partial relief. 18 Neither modification nor an injunction ordering future
compliance will be adjudicated.
[D]ifficult questions would remain in determining the amount of the
accrued alimony defendant owes; for instance, the escalator clause
must be interpreted in light of any increases in defendant's income in
the fourteen years since the divorce . . . . The Court believes that a
determination of accrued alimony, no less than of future alimony,
"would involve the district court in the administration of divorce law in
a very real way."
Id. at 855 (quoting Morris v. Morris, 273 F.2d 678, 681-81 (7th Cir. 1980)).
183. 395 F. Supp. 719 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
184. Id. at 721.
185. For a general discussion of the importance of modifiability in domestic
relations cases, see supra notes 115-28 and accompanying text.
186. For a discussion of modifiable alimony awards under state law, see
supra note 118.
187. See, e.g.,Jagiella v.Jagiella, 647 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1981) (competence
of state courts to settle family disputes militates in favor of federal court's refusal
to exercise jurisdiction over ex-husband's request for modification of divorce
decree); Morris v. Morris, 273 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1960) (federal courts have no
power to enforce divorce decree if past due support payments are subject to
modification or annulment under state law); McGovern v. Blaha, 496 F. Supp.
964 (W.D.N.Y. 1980) (award of child support which was subject to modification
under state law was not a final judgment for purposes of enforcement in federal
court).
188. See, e.g.,Jagiella v.Jagiella, 647 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1981) (district court
properly exercised jurisdiction over ex-wife's claim for arrearages under an "enforceable" divorce decree and refused jurisdiction over ex-husband's request for
modification of decree).
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The Fourth Circuit, however, has noted the problems arising
from the reluctance of federal courts to order prospective compliance with support awards. In Harrison v. Harrison,189 the court
ruled that a federal district court had the power both to issue a
judgment as to past due alimony and child support and to issue
an injunction ordering compliance with the judgment in the future.19 0 Were the plaintiff restricted to ajudgment at law for past
due alimony, the court noted, she would be compelled "to sue on
each alimony payment as it became due, (certainly a severe hardship)."' 19 1 In addition, such a cumbersome procedure might afford the defendant "too easy an opportunity to evade executions
issued on such judgments."'19 2 The court characterized the position that it had adopted as one "grounded in reason and flavored
''l s
with common sense. '
Therefore, depending upon both the inclination of the federal court and the specific features of the statutory scheme regulating modification of support awards, federal courts reaching
differing conclusions as to whether the domestic relations exception applies to disputes regarding alimony and child support
awards.
D.

Nonmarital Cohabitation

The absense of a concrete definition of the term "domestic
relations" for purposes of the exception presents special
problems with disputes arising from nonmarital cohabitation arrangements. During the past decade the increase in nonmarital
cohabitation 9 4 has been accompanied by an increase in the
189. 214 F.2d 571 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 896 (1954).
190. Id. at 574.

191. Id. at 573.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 574. In a later case, the Fourth Circuit made it clear that federal
courts within the circuit did not have discretion with respect to whether to enforce
an alimony award as to future payments. See Keating v. Keating, 542 F.2d 910
(4th Cir. 1976). Rather, the court stated, "[u]nder Harrison, the plaintiff is entitled
to the full breadth of relief afforded by the Ohio decree ....
"Id. at 912 (emphasis added).
194. In the ten-year period between 1970 and 1980, the number of unrelated, unmarried couples (defined as two adults of the opposite sex) living together rose from 523,000 to 1,560,000, an increase of approximately 200%.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING
ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1980, a5 4-5 (Current Population Reports, Population
Characteristics Series P-20, No. 365, (1981)). These statistics may include living
arrangements outside the scope of the term "nonmarital cohabitation" as it is
currently used in the field of family law. The 1980 statistics indicate that only
one percent of unmarried-couple households had a person 65 years or older
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number of lawsuits brought by aggrieved parties at the termination of those relationships.' 9 5 The most publicized of those
cases, Marvin v. Marvin,' 9 6 has been cited widely by litigants for
its delineation of the various remedies relating to property and
support rights available upon the termination of a nonmarital cohabitation relationship. Given our increasingly mobile population,1 9 7 it is quite probable that diversity of citizenship may exist
in many of these cases. The question then becomes whether the
federal courts will entertain such suits, or whether these cases fall
within the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction.
Federal courts have reached divergent conclusions as to their
power to hear cohabitation claims. For instance, Korby v. Erickson 198 involved a claim that the parties had orally agreed to
equally divide their property upon separation. Reviewing the defendant's jurisdictional challenge, the court found that the scope
of the exception was restricted to cases involving a "true marital
relationship and . . . the incidental rights that flow therefrom. . ."199 The court characterized the issues presented by
the contract claims as "of a common garden variety that not only
do not require the special competence of the state courts, but are
routinely determined by the federal courts in diversity actions." 20 0 Thus, the federal court saw no reason to decline
jurisdiction.
sharing living quarters with an unrelated person under 35 who was of the opposite sex. Sixty-three percent of all unmarried couples comprised two adults
under the age of 35. Id. at 4.
195. See, e.g., Glasgo v. Glasgo, 410 N.E.2d 1325 (Ind. App. 1980); Tyranski
v. Piggins, 44 Mich. App. 570, 205 N.W.2d 595 (1973); Carlson v. Olson, 256
N.W.2d 249 (Minn. 1977); Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 NJ. 378, 403 A.2d 902
(1979).
196. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976). In Marvin,
Michelle Marvin brought an action against actor Lee Marvin, with whom she had
lived for six years. Michelle alleged that she and Marvin entered into an oral
agreement which provided that during the time they lived together they would
combine their earnings and efforts and share equally all property accumulated,
and that Marvin would provide for her financial support for the rest of her life.
Michelle sought a declaration of her property and contract rights under the alleged oral agreement. Id. at 666-67, 557 P.2d. at 110-11, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 81920.
197. For a discussion of the significance of the mobility of the modern
American population, see infra notes 282-83 and accompanying text.
198. 550 F. Supp. 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
199. Id. at 138. The Erickson court found that "[tihe fact that as an incident
of the alleged agreement to combine their skills, earnings and investments the
parties also agreed to live together and did live together as husband and wife did
not create a matrimonial status so as to come within the exception." Id.
200. Id. (citing Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 1978); Graning v. Graning, 411 F. Supp. 1028, 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)).
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The United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey reached a conclusion different from the court in Korby
when faced with a similar question. In Anastasi v. Anastasi,20 ' a
woman brought an action against the man with whom she had
cohabited, claiming breach of an agreement "to provide plaintiff
with all her financial support and needs for the rest of her life." 20 2
Ruling on defendant's motion to dismiss, the court originally held
the domestic relations exception inapplicable.2 0 3 Although New
Jersey law at that time allowed recovery for contracts made by
nonmarital cohabitants, the court found that state law "ha[d] not
given special significance to the phenomenon of unmarried
couples." 20 4 The district court reconsidered its ruling, however,
after the New Jersey Supreme Court handed down a decision
which the district court perceived as indicating a new recognition
of a significant state interest in nonmarital cohabitation arrangements. That case, Crowe v. De Gioia,20 5 held that temporary support payments could be awarded to a litigant in a lawsuit
involving the termination of a nonmarital cohabitation relationship. 20 6 De Gioia led the district court to reverse its earlier decision in Anastasi regarding federal subject matter jurisdiction, and
to hold that the domestic relations exception barred jurisdiction. 20 7 The case was remanded to state court.

The test employed to determine the applicability of the domestic relations exception and the results reached in the second
Anastasi decision are problematic. The test focused on two inquiries. First, does the state exhibit a significant interest in the rela201. 544 F. Supp. 866 (D.N.J. 1982).
202. Id. at 866.
203. See Anastasi, 532 F. Supp. 720 (D.NJ.), withdrawn, 544 F. Supp. 866
(D.NJ. 1982).
204. Id. at 724. The court stated that "[t]he most that can be said is that the
state recognizes and accepts the existence of such a status and will enforce any
financial arrangements to which the parties have agreed." Id. In addition to
cohabitation arrangements, the court also noted that while some of the matters
that it would be forced to consider would be similar to matters arising in a support action, the court's basic role was analogous to the traditional role of a court
in awarding damages in contract action. Id. The court reached this conclusion
in spite of the fact that it also recognized that its contract-based determinations
might involve matters relevant to an alimony or child support action. See id. at
724-25.
205. 90 NJ. 126, 447 A.2d 173 (1982).
206. The court in De Gioia emphasized that it was not awarding alimony,
which could only be awarded in matrimonial actions. The court limited its holding to approving the temporary relief that had been granted by the trial court as
a proper application of traditional equitable principles to prevent irreparable
harm pending adjudication of a lawsuit. Id. at 132-35, 447 A.2d at 176-77.
207. Anastasi v. Anastasi, 544 F. Supp. 868 (D.N.J. 1982).
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tionship at issue akin to the state's interest in marriage? Second,

are the inquiries that the court will be forced to make similar to
the types of inquiries that traditionally have called for application
of the domestic relations exception? 20 8 The initial problem with
applying this test is having to determine what constitutes a significant state interest in the nonmarital relationship. The first Anastasi decision did not consider the recognition of contractual rights
between nonmarital cohabitants by New Jersey courts as evidence
of a significant state interest in the relationship, despite the fact
that some jurisdictions have refused to recognize such rights on
public policy grounds.2 0 9 Moreover, the decision of the New
Jersey Supreme Court in De Gioia was interpreted by the district
court as evidence of a state interest in nonmarital cohabitation
sufficient to bring into play the domestic relations exception; it
did this even though the New Jersey Supreme Court explained its
decision, not in terms of protection of the nonmarital relationship, but rather as a general exercise of the equitable power of
courts to grant preliminary relief to preserve the status quo pending a lawsuit. 210 The district court's interpretation of De Gioia illustrates the difficulty inherent in defining "a significant state
interest in nonmarital relationships." For example, would state
recognition of remedies for nonmarital cohabitants such as contracts implied in law, 2 1' constructive trusts, 2 12 or resulting
208. See id. at 867-88.
209. See, e.g., Rehak v. Mathis, 239 Ga. 541, 238 S.E.2d 81 (1977) (cohabitation is "immoral consideration" and precludes cohabitant from relief based on
contract); Roach v. Button, 6 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2355 (Hamilton Cty. Ct. Tenn.
Feb. 29, 1980) (plaintiff is without a right to equitable relief because live-in relationship was "immoral").
210. Crowe v. De Gioia, 90 N.J. 126, 135-36, 447 A.2d 173, 176-77 (1982).
The narrowness of the De Gioia holding is further exemplified by its affirmance
of the lower court's denial of other relief on the ground that statutory authorization for the additional relief applied only to matrimonial, not cohabitational,
actions. Id. at 136, 447 A.2d at 178.
211. If one party has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another, the
law may find an implied contract, often described as a "quasi-contract," to rectify the perceived injustice. SeeJ. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 1-12 (2d
ed. 1977); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937). Cases granting this remedy
in nonmarital cohabitation situations include: Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti, 9 Cal.
2d 95, 69 P.2d 845 (1937); Edgar v. Wagner, 572 P.2d 405 (Utah 1977); Doyle v.
Giddley, 3 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2730 (Dane Cty. Ct. Wis., Sept. 8, 1977).
212. An equitable counterpart to the quasi-contractual remedy is the constructive trust. This occurs where one holds property under circumstances in
which he or she would be unjustly enriched if permitted to retain it. The court
can then impose a constructive trust upon the property whereby the party unjustly enriched is deemed to be holding the property in trust for another. See
G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 77 (5th ed.
1973); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 160 (1937). For an example of the use
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trusts 2 13 also signify such a state interest?

Focusing on this elusive state interest in nonmarital relationships has the additional drawback of predicating access to federal
courts upon the law of the state to be used in adjudicating the
nonmarital dispute.2 14 Such a scheme is neither desirable nor
consonant with the principle that federal courts should be equally
available to all citizens meeting federally created jurisdictional
standards.
Problems also exist in employing a test that examines the nature of the inquiries that a court must make to determine whether
the case falls within the domestic relations exception. In the first
Anastasi opinion, the district court recognized that some of the
inquiries it would be called upon to make were similar to those
that would be considered in a support action. 21 5 The court nevertheless analogized the issues to those found in contract actions,
with which federal courts were familiar. In the second Anastasi
decision, the court changed its decision, not by reevaluating the
issues presented by the litigants, but rather by examining the issues presented by De Gioia.2 1 6 It did this even though the plaintiff
in Anastasi had not requested the preliminary relief sought in De
of this remedy in a case involving nonmarital cohabitation, see Omer v. Omer,
11 Wash Ct. App. 386, 523 P.2d 957 (1974).
213. A resulting trust may be decreed when a court finds that one party
purchased property with consideration furnished entirely or in part by another
party, and that the circumstances surrounding the purchase demonstrate that
the title holder intended to hold the property or an interest in the property in
trust for the person providing the consideration. G.G. BOGERT &G.T. BOGERT,
supra note 212, § 74. For cases utilizing this remedy in situations involving
nonmarital cohabitation, see Albae v. Hardin, 249 Ala. 201, 30 So.2d 459
(1947); Padilla v. Padilla, 38 Cal. App. 2d 319, 100 P.2d 1093 (1940).
214. The extent to which states recognize nonmarital cohabitation varies
widely from state to state. Compare Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d
106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976) (agreements between nonmarried cohabitants
fail only to the extent that they rest upon an explicit consideration of meretricious sexual services) and Tyranski v. Piggins, 44 Mich. App. 570, 205 N.W. 2d
595 (1973) (illicit cohabitation does not render unenforceable all agreements
between the parties) with Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 11. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979)
(public policy disfavors grant of mutually enforceable property rights to unmarried cohabitants).
215. For a discussion of the first Anastasi decision, see supra notes 201-04
and accompanying text.
216. Anastasi, 544 F. Supp. at 868. The Anastasi court noted that to arrive at
a temporary support award in the De Gioia case, a court would necessarily inquire
into the minimal needs of the plaintiff, including such matters as medical, dental,
and pharmaceutical needs. The court considered these as "the kinds of inquiries and judgments which the state courts are best equipped to handle . . [and
which] may not be made by federal courts." Id. The validity of this conclusion is
questionable since it is unclear the extent to which these issues are any different
from the types of inquiries federal courts routinely undertake in diversity actions
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Gioia. It is questionable whether an approach that does not focus
upon the actual issues a federal court would be called upon to
resolve is appropriate. In addition, it is doubtful that one can get
a uniform and meaningful answer to the question of what types of
issues call the exception into play.
This disagreement among courts as to the applicability of the
domestic relations exception to disputes involving nonmarital cohabitation further emphasizes the unworkable nature of the exception. The field of domestic relations law is rapidly changing to
accomodate new lifestyles. 21 7 Many of these changes are reflected in new types of lawsuits. And because of our society's increased mobility, some of these suits may be filed in federal
courts based on diversity of citizenship. The federal courts have
no consistent guidelines for evaluating which cases are within the
exception and which are not. The conflicting conclusions just described evidence the unsettled state of the exception.
E. Child Custody
When a marriage is dissolved and the couple has minor children, the court generally makes an award of child custody to one
21 8 If
of the parents, although other types of awards are possible.
dearth of reported cases is any indication, few litigants attempt to
bring original requests for custody before the federal court. 2 19 As
involving personal injury claims, where medical, dental or pharmaceutical needs
are in question.
217. See e.g., Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at
831 ("The mores of the society have indeed changed so radically in regard to
cohabitation that we cannot impose a standard based on alleged moral considerations that have apparently been so widely abandoned by so many."). For a
discussion of the increasing number of nonmarried cohabitants, see supra note
194 and accompanying text.
218. See generally H. CLARK, supra note 18, § 17. There is a growing trend to
encourage joint custody awards, rather than the traditional custody awards
under which one of the divorcing parents is awarded sole custody of the child.
See generally Folberg & Graham, Joint Custody of Children Following Divorce, 12
U.C.D. L. REV. 523 (1979); Mills & Belzer,Joint Custody As A ParentingAlternative,
9 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 853 (1982); Trombetta,Joint Custody: Recent Research and
Overloaded Courtrooms Inspire New Solutions to Custody Disputes, 19 J. FAM. L. 213
(1981). If neither parent is a fit custodian, custody may be awarded to a third
party. See generally H. CLARK, supra note 18, § 17.5.
219. Requests for an original custody decision, as well as for alimony, child
support and property division are generally made in the divorce petition. See id.
§ 17.3. Diversity is unlikely to exist at this stage if the family relationship has
only recently disintegrated. Another possible reason for the scarcity of custody
adjudications in federal courts may be that the decision is seen as so clearly a
domestic relations issue as to be within the scope of the exception, however
narrowly defined.
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with alimony disputes, most of the litigation raising the issue of
the applicability of the domestic relations exception to disputes

regarding child custody involves suits to enforce child custody
awards. In these cases, federal courts tend to construe broadly
the term "domestic relations" for purposes of the exception.
In Cheny v. Cheny, 2 20 a mother and her parents brought a diversity action alleging that the custodial parent, the father, had
breached the terms of a separation agreement which provided visitation rights for the mother. 22 1 The district court held that it had
no jurisdiction over the controversy on the ground that the domestic relations exception prohibits "federal jurisdiction in domestic relations cases in general, and child custody cases in

particular.-

22 2

The court made no attempt to analyze any poten-

tial distinctions between cases involving original child custody
awards and suits involving breach of existing custody awards.
Since the suit "involved" child custody, the dispute fell within the
exception. A similar position was taken by the Second Circuit in
Hernstadt v. Hernstadt.2 23 A father had brought a declaratory judgment action in federal district court seeking construction of the
custody and visitation provisions of a Connecticut divorce decree.
In support of the district court's dismissal of the action, the Second Circuit stated that "federal courts do not adjudicate cases involving the custody of minors and, a fortiori, rights of
visitation." 22 4 The decision suggests that the mere fact that the
agreement related to child custody was sufficient to invoke the
22 5
domestic relations exception.
220. 438 F. Supp. 88 (D. Md. 1977).
221. Id. It is usual for the court to grant the noncustodial parent periodic
visitation at the time it awards custody rights. See H. CLARK, supra note 18,
§ 17.4, at 590.
222. 438 F. Supp. at 89.
223. 373 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1967).
224. Id. at 317.
225. Id. The plaintiff attempted to avoid the impact of the domestic relations exception by arguing that the assertion of a full faith and credit claim
raised a constitutional question which rendered the exception inapplicable. Id.
at 317-18 (citing Southard v. Southard, 305 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1962)). The court
rejected this argument on several grounds. First, the court characterized the
plaintiffs assertion of a federal question as "frivolous." Id. at 318. The court
explained that since the custody decree was modifiable under Connecticut law,
the demands of full faith and credit could be satisfied whether or not the terms
of the original decree were obeyed. Second, the court held that Southard could
not be applied "where the District Court could become enmeshed in factual disputes." Id. The court reasoned that since the custody and visitation decree was
modifiable, any enforcement action would necessarily include a reexamination
of the decree in light of any changed circumstances, a task barred by the domestic relations exception. Third, the court noted that even if the domestic rela-
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In recent years, however, "child-snatching" tort actions have
been increasingly recognized by states as appropriate remedies
for the unauthorized taking of children from their proper custodians. 22 6 These suits serve both compensatory and deterrent functions by making the improper seizure and retention of children
very costly not only to the person actually seizing the children,
but also to those assisting the snatcher.2 27 As the number of such
suits has grown, federal courts have had to face the question of
the applicability of the domestic relations exception to these actions. In general, federal courts have been receptive to hearing
these suits sounding in tort, notwithstanding their refusal to hear
suits couched in terms of enforcing a custody award. In fact,
some federal courts have entertained child-snatching tort actions
22 8
without even discussing the exception.
In Wasserman v. Wasserman,2 29 the Fourth Circuit did address
the question of the applicability of the domestic relations exception to child-snatching torts, and concluded that the exception
was inapplicable. In Wasserman, a mother brought an action
against her former husband and others to recover for child enticement and intentional infliction of emotional distress for the alleged removal of the couple's children from the mother's custody.
tions exception were not applicable, the amount in controversy requirement for
both federal question jurisdiction (since repealed) and diversity jurisdiction was
not satisfied, since monetary values could not be placed upon custody and visitation rights. Id.
226. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 495-96 (7th Cir. 1982) (Wisconsin recognizes tort of wrongful interference with child custody); Wasserman
v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832, 834 (4th Cir.) (ex-wife's allegations of child enticement and intentional infliction of emotional distress as "generally cognizable
common law torts"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1014 (1982); Fenslage v. Dawkins, 629
F.2d 1107, 1109 (5th Cir. 1980) (Texas Supreme Court would recognize childsnatching tort).
227. Child-snatching tort suits have been allowed against third parties, as
well as against the non-custodial parent. See, e.g., Fenslage v. Dawkins, 629 F.2d
1107 (5th Cir. 1980) (suit against child's father and his relatives); Kajtazi v.
Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (suit against infant's father and father's
stepfather and brother); McEvoy v. Helikson, 277 Or. 781, 562 P.2d 540 (1977)
(suit against attorney whose alleged negligence and malpractice facilitated childsnatching); Cramlet v. Donohue, No. 80-C-1737 (removed to D. Colo. May 13,
1983) (suit against television personality Phil Donahue, two broadcasting corporations and certain employees of those corporations for failure to disclose information regarding father who had taken child illegally from custodian parent).
228. See, e.g., Fenslage v. Dawkins, 629 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1980); Kajtazi v.
Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). The failure to discuss the exception
may be based either on unfamiliarity with the exception or on an assumption by
both the court and the parties that because the action is framed in terms of tort
theories rather than as a direct enforcement action, the exception is
inapplicable.
229. 671 F.2d 832 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1014 (1982).
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The district court dismissed the action on the basis of the domestic relations exception. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed.
In holding the exception inapplicable, the court first considered
whether the causes of action in the complaint were dependent on
either a present or prior family relationship. The court found
that they were not, and that the complaint alleged "generally cognizable common law torts." 23 0 In the second part of its analysis,
the court reviewed the nature of the issues that would arise in
adjudicating the dispute. It concluded that no rule "particularly
marital" 23 ' in nature would be involved in resolving the case, particularly because the plaintiff was not "seeking a determination of
entitlement to custody or any other adjustment of family status." 23 2 Absent such a request, the court concluded that the types
of inquiry involved in the case were within the jurisdiction of the
federal courts. Other federal courts have reached similar
2 33
conclusions.
Not all federal courts, however, agree with the Wasserman
analysis. In Gargallo v. Gargallo,2 34 a father brought an action alleging that his former wife had illegally removed their children
from the state of Ohio. He sought $50,000 in compensatory and
punitive damages and a restraining order prohibiting the defendant from removing the children from the country. Upon its own
motion, the district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal
with the sole explanation that "[t]his is essentially a child custody
case," falling within the domestic relations exception. 2 35 The
Gargallo court made no attempt to distinguish the case from origi230. Id. at 834 (footnote omitted).
231. Id. at 835. The court added that "these claims could have arisen between persons with no marital relationship whatsoever ....
"Id.
232. Id.
233. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982); Bennett v.
Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In Bennett, the court analyzed the
child-snatching case before it in terms of competence of the federal court to deal
with the issues which would arise in such a case:
A federal court is entirely competent, in this case as much as any
other, to determine traditional tort issues such as the existence of a
legal duty, the breach of that duty, and the damages flowing from that
breach. Although the existence of a legal duty in this case may depend
in whole or in part on the validity and effect of the various state court
decrees in existence at the time of the alleged tort, the task of determining such validity and effect is also not beyond the competence of the
federal courts.
Bennett, 682 F.2d at 1042.
234. 472 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir.)(per curiam), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 805 (1973).
235. Id. at 1220.
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nal requests for child custody. 2 36
In at least two recent child-snatching tort cases, federal
courts addressed their inquiry to particular requests for relief,
rather than to the entire dispute. In Bennett v. Bennett, 2 37 the District of Columbia Circuit held that a district court had jurisdiction
to hear a request for damages in a child-snatching tort suit, but
that federal courts did not have jurisdiction to issue an injunction
ordering compliance with an existing custody order. 23 8 Jurisdiction to hear the request for damages was proper because the federal court was "entirely competent . . . to determine traditional
tort issues." 23 9 Lack of jurisdiction to grant the injunction was
based on the discretionary nature of a decision to grant equitable
24 0

relief.

The Seventh Circuit took the reasoning of Bennett a step further in Lloyd v. Loeffier. 24 1 In Loeffler, the court concluded that federal district courts had jurisdiction to entertain a child-snatching
tort suit and to award the plaintiff both compensatory and punitive damages.2 4 2 In dicta, however, the court questioned whether
the district court had jurisdiction to award, as it did, prospective
punitive damages of $2000 per month for each month following
236. Id. Similarly, a New York district court refused to hear an action
brought by a woman against her ex-husband and his mother for false imprisonment of the couple's two minor daughters. See Kilduff v. Kilduff, 473 F. Supp.
873 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). In reaching its conclusion the court looked beyond the
designated causes of action: "It is painfully apparent from a reading of the complaint that the dispute between the parties, no matter how labeled, is essentially
one arising with respect to the provisions of a property and custody agreement,
visitation rights and other incidents of a matrimonial dispute." Id. at 874. Having thus characterized the action, the court concluded that the case came clearly
within the domestic relations exception and dismissal was therefore in order. Id.
Although acknowledging that other courts had declined to apply the domestic
relations exception in cases sounding in tort, the court concluded that a federal
court could decline jurisdiction where "the tortious conduct is part of an ongoing series of disputes centering around [sic] the marital relationship." Id. (quoting 13 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 101, § 3609, at 667).
237. 682 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
238. See id. at 1042-44.
239. Id. at 1042.
240. Id. at 1042-44. A court considering the granting of an injunction can
inquire into the interests of third parties, in this case the children. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 942 (1979). Such an inquiry, the court concluded,
was "within the peculiar province, experience, and competence of the state
courts. For a federal court to try its hand at the task, even during the courses of
a tort suit, would-in the absence of an overriding federal interest-seriously
compromise the principles underlying the domestic relations exception." 682
F.2d at 1043 (footnotes omitted).
241. 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982).
242. Id. at 491-93. The district court had awarded compensatory and punitive damage payments of $70,000 and $25,000, respectively. Id. at 491.
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the judgment until the child was restored to plaintiffs lawful custody.2 43 The court analogized the variable punitive damage
award to the granting of an injunction:
[T]he variable award is also the practical equivalent of an
injunction ordering the McMahans to return Carol. It is
as if the district court had issued an injunction, the
McMahans had disobeyed it, and the court had then
found them in civil contempt of its decree and ordered
them to pay the plaintiff $2,000 a month until they complied. Of course there was no injunction and no finding
of contempt and perhaps that is reason enough to doubt
the propriety of the relief. But in any event it would
seem that, before entering the kind of judgment it did,
the district court should have considered whether it had
244
the power to enjoin the McMahans directly.
While the Loeffler court cited Bennett for the proposition that
an injunction in a child-snatching tort suit is within the domestic
relations exception, a close examination of the opinions in Bennett
and Loeffler reveals two quite dissimilar sets of concerns. Bennett
found that issuing an injunction to comply with an existing child
custody award was within the domestic relations exception because the district court would have to inquire into the effects of
the injunction upon the children. The court stated that this inquiry was similar to a child custody determination, which was
"within the peculiar province, experience, and competence of the
245
state courts."
In contrast, the Loeffler court spoke not of the competence of
federal courts to grant a variable punitive damage award or an
injunction, but rather of the coercive effect a variable punitive
damage award would have on those who had physical, as opposed
to legal custody of the child. The court feared that the mounting
damage award would pressure the defendants to surrender the
child to the parent with rightful custody. 24 6 To apply such indirect pressure, the court noted, was "implicitly to answer the ques243. Id. at 493-94. Since no party to the appeal actually challenged the portion of the decree which awarded the variable punitive damage award, the court
expressed reservations about vacating that part of the award. Id. at 494. Nevertheless, the court felt it was necessary to question the district court's subject
matter jurisdiction to grant the prospective award because of the analogy to an
injunction. Id.
244. Id.
245. Bennett, 682 F.2d at 1043.
246. Loeffler, 694 F.2d at 494.
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tion [of] who should have custody of [the child] today." '2 4 7 Yet
the court did not address the potential coercive effects of a compensatory damage award of $70,000 and a punitive damage award
of $25,000 for the past wrongful conduct of the defendants.
Given the court's clear indication that the plaintiff could sue again
as additional damages accrued, 2 48 the existence of the award of
$95,000 would most likely also have a coercive effect on the
wrongdoers.2 49 To the extent that the Loeffler court refused to
take any injunctive action which might affect the actual custody of
the child, its analysis is flawed by its failure to give adequate
weight to the coercive impact of a $95,000 damage award for past
wrongful conduct.
The bifurcated approach to jurisdiction in the Bennett and
Loeffler decisions is unsatisfactory in a number of respects and is
further evidence of the need to reexamine the continued viability
of the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction. First,
bifurcation poses obvious practical problems to litigants seeking
to obtain speedy effective redress. Further, on a policy level, the
refusal of federal courts to order compliance with state court custody decrees, or to grant otherwise proper awards of damages because such awards may coerce compliance with state court
custody decrees, runs counter to two of the articulated reasonsfor
the exception-the special state interest in domestic relations
matters 2 50 and state court expertise in these matters. 25 ' These
interests would be furthered if federal courts would cooperate in
enforcing state court custody decrees instead of refusing to take
direct enforcement action. The fact that a state court might consider changed circumstances or the effect on third persons when
asked to enforce previously granted custody decrees does not
mean that federal courts should be precluded from enforcing existing decrees. Federal courts could enforce existing decrees eas247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. The court in Loeffler was aware that "so long as Kenneth is free to
bring fresh suits against the Loefflers and the McMahans for damages incurred
by him after the date of the judgment below, the same financial pressure will be
brought to bear on the McMahans to return the child regardless of what is best
for her." Id. The court found the pressure deriving from the contingency of a
future suit to be of the same kind, but of a lesser degree, than the pressure
deriving from the escalating punitive damages award in the district court's decree. Id.
250. For a discussion of the state's special interest in domestic relations
matters, see infra notes 271-87 and accompanying text.
251. For a discussion of state expertise in domestic relations matters, see
infra notes 288-309 and accompanying text.
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ily, while leaving any modification or reexamination of existing
circumstances to state courts. By this approach, no disrespect
would be cast on state court decrees.
Alternatively, the federal court could undertake to review
only those circumstances pertinent to the request for the issuing
of an injunction. This could be done with a clear understanding
that the court would not be reviewing the original decree, but
rather undertaking a much more circumscribed inquiry as to the
propriety of an injunction under the present circumstances. Such
a limited review would not infringe significantly on state interests
or expertise. If the federal court decided to issue the injunction,
the result would be to assist a state in the enforcement of its decrees. If the federal court, in the exercise of its discretion, decided not to issue the injunction, that decision would not void the
state decree. Moreover, it would not reflect an evaluation of the
propriety of the underlying decree itself. It would merely reflect
some questions as to the present effect of an injunction on third
parties such as the children. The original decree still could be
enforced through a child-snatching tort action or a criminal
charge,2 52 or through a contempt action by the state court issuing
the original custody decree. Thus, the decision of whether to issue an injunction need not substantially infringe on either state
rights or expertise. The failure of the Bennett and Loeffler courts to
consider the actual implications of federal court intervention on
the interest of the states in domestic relations matters is representative of the superficial approach that federal courts have adopted
in ruling on the applicability of the exception.
F. Other Disputes
Thus far, this article has concentrated upon those categories
of disputes which, because of their nature, lead to the frequent
invocation of the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction. The exception also has been raised in other types of disputes in which the domestic relations nature of the suit is less
apparent. Here, too, the results are inconsistent.
Questions regarding the jurisdiction of federal courts to hear
domestic relations disputes have appeared in a variety of contexts. These include: an action for compensatory and punitive
damages for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, arson, con252. The proliferation of child snatching has prompted a number of states
to make child snatching a crime. See Freed & Foster, supra note 11, at 410-14.
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version and conspiracy; 253 an action for damages for intentional
infliction of emotional distress; 2 54 an action for damages for
fraudulent inducement of marriage and fraudulent procurement
of divorce; 2 55 an action to challenge a garnishment on the
grounds that the divorce creating the obligation was fraudulently
procured; 25 6 an action for the recovery of money on the ground
of provisions of necessaries; 25 7 and an action for attorney's fees
for services rendered in conjunction with a divorce action. 25 8 No
pattern emerges in the resolution of the jurisdictional issue in
these claims. The decision in each case appears to rest primarily
on the particular judge's perception of the rationale for the exception and its proper scope.
VI.

A CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE
DOMESTIC RELATIONS EXCEPTION

A.

Why Reexamination Is Appropriate Now

One may ask why a critique of the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction should be undertaken now, some 125
years after the Supreme Court first intimated its existence in Barber v. Barber.2 59 Should not questions as to the wisdom of the exception have been raised at a much earlier time, before the
exception became so entrenched in case law? While, of course,
such an earlier examination might have been preferable, there are
several aspects of contemporary American society that make reexamination at this time particularly appropriate.
First, in recent years, overcrowded federal dockets have
prompted a general examination of the appropriate contours of
253. Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083 (4th Cir. 1980) (federal jurisdiction upheld because suit was based on breaches of duties that did not arise exclusively
from family relations law).
254. Bacon v. Bacon, 365 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Or. 1973) (federal jurisdiction
denied because claim was part of ongoing family dispute).
255. Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (federal jurisdiction upheld because federal court was competent to apply state divorce policy).
256. Overman v. United States, 563 F.2d 1287 (8th Cir. 1977) (federal jurisdiction upheld only with respect to federal defendants).
257. Bercovitch v. Tanburn, 103 F. Supp. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (federal jurisdiction denied because complaint gave rise to marital issues).
258. Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509
(2d Cir. 1973) (stay of federal action pending initiation of state proceedings
would have been appropriate if defendant had timely moved; because of lateness
of defendant's motion, however, it was not an abuse of discretion for district
court to have denied stay).
259. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1859). For a discussion of Barber, see supra
notes 17-31 and accompanying text.
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federal jurisdiction, especially with respect to suits based on diversity. 260 An examination of one particular judicially-created jurisdictional doctrine certainly can provide insights useful to
shaping the future of federal jurisdiction.
Second, the rapid and far-reaching changes in the field of
family law in recent years have spawned new questions regarding
the appropriate scope of the domestic relations exception. 26 ' It is
reasonable to predict that such questions will be raised with increasing frequency in coming years.
Third, the traditional reluctance of the federal government to
intrude into regulation of the domestic affairs of state citizens has
weakened substantially. Recent federal involvement in such do26 3
mestic relations matters as child support, 26 2 child custody,
child abuse,264 and juvenile delinquency 26 5 is well documented.
Thus, a major premise underlying the exception no longer may
be valid.
Fourth, the very fact that lower courts often feel compelled to
rationalize their continued adherence to the exception suggests
an uneasiness with the doctrine. Were the exception a fully recognized and accepted part of contemporary law governing federal
jurisdiction, nothing more than a citation to the Supreme Court
260. See, e.g., Frank, supra note 1, at 403; Rowe, supra note 1, at 963. See also
H.R. 3689-90, 98th Cong., 1st Ses., 129 CONG. REC. H5918 (daily ed. July 28,
1983) (bills to eliminate or modify diversity jurisdiction).
261. For a discussion of one such change, the proliferation of remedies for
unmarried cohabitants, see supra notes 10 & 194-217 and accompanying text.

262. See H.

KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA-THE LEGAL PERSPECTIVE

307-53 (1981) (describing the great variety of federal programs concerned with
enforcement of child support awards). Congress recently enacted legislation imposing numerous additional requirements on the states' child support enforcement programs. Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-378, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 1305. Among the provisions of the act is a requirement that states establish programs for the withholding of income by employers to fulfill child support arrearages owed by their
employees. Id. § 3, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD NEWS (98 Stat.) at 1306.
263. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982) (requiring states to enforce and not
modify certain child custody decrees).
264. See, e.g., Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform
Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5115 (1982). Among other provisions, this act
requires states to enact child abuse and neglect reporting statutes as a prerequisite to obtaining federal assistance for child abuse programs. Id.
§ 5103(b)(2)(A),-(C).
265. See, e.g., Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, 42
U.S.C. §§ 5601-5751 (1982). One provision of this act, for example, conditions
federal funding upon a state's providing separate correctional and rehabilitation
programs for juvenile delinquents and status offenders. Id. § 5633(a)(10).
For a further discussion of the relevance of federal involvement in family
law, see infra notes 408-14 and accompanying text.
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decisions giving rise to the exception would be necessary. Yet
many federal courts feel constrained to include in their decisions
lengthy discussions of why the domestic relations exception is
good law. 2 66 For these reasons, a critique of the justifications for
continued application of the domestic relations exception is in
order.
B. Justifications Cited by Contemporary Federal Courtsfor Continued
Adherence to the Domestic Relations Exception
Although early cases justified the existence of the domestic
relations exception in terms of lack of constitutional or statutory
power, 2 67 most contemporary courts2 68 and legal scholars 2 69 recognize that the power argument is no longer viable because it was
based upon erroneous historical analysis. Instead, a variety of
other justifications are given by lower federal courts for contin266. See, e.g., Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1021-27 (3d Cir. 1975);
Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim, & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509, 512-16
(2d Cir. 1973).
267. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
268. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 491 (7th Cir. 1982) ("[tlhe
historical account is unconvincing"); Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 842, 843 (1st Cir.
1981) ("historical inaccuracies and doctrinal distortions ... mark the birth and
early years of this exception"); Cherry v. Cherry, 438 F. Supp. 88, 89 (D. Md.
1977) (neither the Constitution nor federal statutes mandate the refusal to hear
domestic relations cases); Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 799-801
(E.D.N.Y. 1968) (federal courts have constitutional power to hear domestic relations cases, but may be precluded from granting divorces under language of the
diversity statute). Even those courts which express an unwillingness to secondguess history do not rest their adherence to the domestic relations exception on
the historical justifications, but rather on either policy of precedential concerns.
See, e.g., Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1025-26 (3d Cir. 1975) (precedent
requires application of the exception); Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon
v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509, 514 (2d Cir. 1973) (congested federal dockets militate in favor of applying the exception).
269. See, e.g., COLUMBIA Note, supra note 5, at 1834-39; B.C. Note, supra
note 5, at 684-88. Cf. Rush, supra note 9, at 12-19. While most scholars recognize that historical justifications no longer can support the exception, they fail to
focus on the fact that contemporary courts rarely give explicit approval of the
historical analysis. Instead, when contemporary courts discuss lack of power to
hear domestic relations cases, they focus on the holdings of Supreme Court
cases, to which the lower courts feel bound by the doctrine of stare decisis. See,
e.g., McGovern v. Blaha, 496 F. Supp. 964, 965 (W.D.N.Y. 1980); Vann v. Vann,
294 F. Supp. 193, 194 (E.D. Tenn. 1968). There is little evidence that these
courts are independently convinced of the correctness of historical arguments.
Thus, more attention must be focused on the validity of the precedential concerns of contemporary courts. The Columbia Note states summarily that
"[miodern courts should not be constrained by the Supreme Court's inaccurate
view of history .... ," but does little to give lower courts the tools necessary to
justify departure from those cases. COLUMBIA Note, supra note 5, at 1840. For a
discussion of attempts to provide courts with these tools, see infra notes 334-414
and accompanying text.
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ued adherence to the exception. These justifications fall into two
main categories: (1) justifications based upon policy considerations and (2) justifications based upon the existence of unchallenged precedent supporting the exception. A third justification
for the exception, although not expressly articulated by federal
courts, is evident from reading federal court opinions: the distaste with which federal judges view domestic relations disputes
and their disinclination to hear these cases. Recent commentary
has explored the first of these categories of justification, policy
considerations, 2 70 but no attention has been paid to the latter
two. This article will first review and expand upon the critique of
the policy justifications. It will then argue that neither the existence of unchallenged precedent nor distaste for domestic relations cases are appropriate justifications for continued adherence
to the exception.
1. Policy Justificationsfor the Domestic Relations Exception
a.

Special State Interest

The most common policy justification for the domestic relations exception is that domestic relations matters are of special
interest to the states, and that there is no concomitant federal interest present. Therefore, federal courts should not usurp the
states' interest by becoming involved in the adjudication of such
cases. 27 1 This justification fails for a number of reasons. First,
the very existence of diversity jurisdiction is evidence of a federal
interest in providing a neutral federal forum to litigants despite
the fact that the law to be applied in adjudicating their disputes is
state law. 2 72 One purpose of diversity jurisdiction was to mitigate
2 73
the effects of local prejudice towards out-of-state litigants.
While scholars and others recently have questioned whether local
270. See, eg., Comment, supra note 5, at 851-53; COLUMBIA Note, supra note
5, at 1846-51; B.C. Note, supra note 5, at 688-91.
271. See, e.g., Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490
F.2d 509, 516 (2d Cir. 1973) (marital and custody issues are strong interests of
the states); Magaziner v. Montemuro, 468 F.2d 782, 787 (3d Cir. 1972) (child
support cases should be handled by local state courts); Buechold v. Ortiz, 401
F.2d 371, 373 (9th Cir. 1968) (domestic relations cases are peculiarly unsuited
to federal adjudications); Cherry v. Cherry, 438 F. Supp. 88, 90 (D. Md. 1977)
(federal courts do not possess the proficiency of state courts in domestic relations cases).
272. The United States Supreme Court has made clear that § 34 of the Federaljudiciary Act of 1789 requires federal courts in diversity cases to utilize substantive state law in adjudicating those disputes. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938).
273. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 6, § 23, at 133.

360

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30: p. 307

bias remains a sufficient justification for diversity jurisdiction in
general, 2 74 nonetheless legislative attempts to abolish diversity jurisdiction have been unsuccessful thus far. 2 75 To the extent that
the local bias rationale has validity, domestic relations is one area
of the law in which such local bias is most likely to surface. Indeed, the enactment in all states of the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act 2 76 and Congress' enactment of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980277 were direct responses to the
unfortunate tendency of states to seize jurisdiction and relitigate
previous custody orders when one of the parents and/or the child
2 78
was within their borders.
274. For an excellent discussion of the debate over the continued necessity
for diversity jurisdiction, and a listing of pertinent articles, see C. WRIGHT, supra
note 6, § 23.
275. Bills to abolish diversity jurisdiction have been proposed several times
in the last decade, but none has been enacted. See, e.g., H.R. 3689, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H5918 (daily ed. July 28, 1983); S. 2389, 95th Cong.,
2nd Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 30-32 (1978).
276. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT §§ 1-27, 9 U.L.A. 116 (1968).
Faced with conflicting state judicial responses to child custody decrees and modifications, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
promulgated the UCCJA "to bring some semblance of order into the existing
chaos." Id. pref. note, 9 U.L.A. at 114. The draftsmen outlined the structure of
the UCCJA as follows:
It limits custody to the state where the child has his home or where
there are other strong contacts with the child and his family. It provides for the recognition and enforcement of out-of-state custody decrees in many instances. Jurisdiction to modify decrees of other states
is limited by giving a jurisdictional preference to the prior court under
certain conditions. Access to a court may be denied to petitioners who
have engaged in child snatching or similar practices.
Id. (citing UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT §§ 3, 8, 13-15 (1968)). According to the commissioners,
[u]nderlying the entire Act is the idea that to avoid the jurisdictional
conflicts and confusions which have done serious harm to innumerable
children, a court in one state must assume major responsibility to determine who is to have custody of a particular child; that his court must
reach out for the help of courts in other states in order to arrive at a
fully informed judgment which transcends state lines and considers all
claimants, residents and nonresidents, on an equal basis and from the
standpoint of the welfare of the child.
Id. For a discussion of the impact of this act, see supra note 11 and infra notes
434-39 and accompanying text.
277. Federal Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982). For a
further discussion of this act, see supra note 11 and infra notes 440-48 and accompanying text.
278. The United States Department of Justice has recognized that state
courts tend to rule in favor of their own state residents in domestic relations
cases. In a letter to Congressman Peter W. Rodino regarding proposed legislation to remedy child-snatching, Assistant Attorney General Patricia M. Wald
noted that when individuals who have lost custody of their children attempt to
evade that state's jurisdiction by fleeing with the child to another state, "[tihe
second state will often switch custody to the parent within its jurisdiction. .. "
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Even conceding the special interest of states in domestic relations matters, the exercise of diversity jurisdiction in such cases
will not harm these state interests. The Erie doctrine, which mandates that state substantive law be applied to disputes reaching a
federal diversity court,2 79 ensures that state law will control in domestic relations disputes in diversity cases. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court, in Kulko v. Superior Court,280 recognized that the
interest of a particular state in a domestic relations dispute can be
properly protected by choice of law doctrines if the dispute is being adjudicated in another state. Kulko involved a request for
modification of child support. The Supreme Court rebuffed the
argument of the state of California that it was the proper forum
for the action because of its special interest in the welfare of children within its borders. The Court stated that any interest California might have was properly protected by choice of law
doctrine rather than by control of the forum.2 81 Although Kulko
involved a choice between two state court forums, the principle
that choice of law protects state interest in domestic relations
matters can be applied with equal force where a federal forum is
involved, thereby countering the "special state interest" argument made in support of the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction.
In addition, the time may have come to question the strength
of the state interest in domestic relations matters altogether. The
mobility of today's society stands in marked contrast to the stability of family life one hundred years ago. At a time when family
members normally lived their entire lives within the confines of a
single state, it was understandable that a state would exhibit a
special interest in the regulation of that family. In contrast, modern families frequently change their state of residence several
times. 282 In addition, the family unit may dissolve, 2 83 with its
ParentalKidnapping PreventionAct of 1979: Addendum toJoint Hearingon S. 105 Before
the Subcomm. on CriminalJustice of the SenateJudiciary Comm. and the Subcomm. on Child
and Human Development of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 101, 102 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Joint Hearing].
279. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
280. 436 U.S. 84 (1978). The Kulko case involved a due process challenge
to the assertion of personal jurisdiction by a California court over a New York
resident in an action to modify a child support order. Id. at 86-92.
281. Id. at 98. The Court concluded that basic considerations of fairness
pointed to New York as the proper judicial forum. Id.
282. A government survey of geographical mobility from March 1975 to
March 1980 noted that 45% of all persons five years of age or older moved
during the 1975-80 period. Of that number, approximately 20%, or nearly 18.5
million persons, moved to a different state. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T
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members dispersing to several states. These factors suggest a
substantial diminution of the states' interest in domestic relations
matters. Some evidence of this declining interest can be found in
the waning state involvement in the formation and termination of
marriage.284
The growing mobility of contemporary society also calls into
question a complement to the special state interest argument, i.e.,
the contention that federal courts have no interest in the area of
domestic relations law. In testimony before a congressional subcommittee considering the proposed Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, Senator Alan Cranston stated that while domestic
relations issues were traditionally within the domain of the state,
"[i]t is within the province of the Federal Government to resolve
problems that are interstate in origin and which the States, acting
independently, seem unable to resolve." 28 5 The subsequent enactment of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, as well as
federal legislation in the areas of child abuse, juvenile delinquency, and child support, are strong indications that the states
no longer are the sole governmental units with interests in domestic relations matters. 28 6 Developments in the field of constitutional law also manifest a federal interest in domestic relations
law. The Supreme Court has expanded the constitutional right of
privacy to encompass many aspects of domestic relations, thereby
circumscribing the states' power to regulate these areas of domestic life. 28 7 Thus, one may question whether a "special state interOF COMMERCE, GEOGRAPHICAL MOBILITY: MARCH

1975

TO MARCH

1980, at 3, 7

(Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 368, 1981).
283. The growth of the divorce rate during this century is a well known
phenomenon. Between 1940 and 1978, the annual rate of divorce grew from
approximately 2 per 1,000 population to 5.1 per 1,000. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, DIVORCE, CHILD CUSTODY, AND CHILD SUPPORT 1
(Current Population Reports, Series P-23, No. 84, 1979).
284. For a discussion of the declining state involvement in the formation
and termination of marriage, see W. WEYRAUCH & S. KATZ, AMERICAN FAMILY
LAW IN TRANSITION

352-53 (1983).

285. Joint Hearing,supra note 278, at 2 (opening statements of Senator Alan
Cranston, Chairman of the Subcomm. on Child and Human Development of the
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources).
286. For a discussion of recent federal legislation in these areas of domestic
relations, see supra notes 262-65 and accompanying text.
287. See B.C. Note, supra note 5, at 691-95. See also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374 (1978) (right to marry); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(right to use contraceptives); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to
establish a home and bring up children). For a further discussion of Supreme
Court decisions in this area, see infra notes 362-65 and accompanying text.
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est" is a sufficient justification for continued adherence to the
domestic relations exception.
b.

State Court Expertise in Domestic Relations Matters

Another justification for adherence to the exception is the
purported superior expertise of state courts in domestic relations
matters. 28 8 An implied corollary of this justification is that federal
courts lack the requisite expertise.
The immediate response to this argument is that any perceived disparity between the expertise of state and federal judges
in this area may be the result, rather than the cause, of the domestic relations exception. 28 9 It may be argued that if the exception
were repudiated and federal courts were to begin adjudicating
domestic relations disputes, their expertise would soon equal or
perhaps surpass that of the state judiciary.
A more fundamental objection to the state expertise justification arises if one questions the validity of its premise. There is
certainly no innate difference between the background of the
state and federal judiciary that makes the former more competent
in the field of domestic relations than the latter. The existence of
diversity jurisdiction, taken in conjunction with the Erie doctrine,2 9 0 assumes that federal judges have the expertise necessary
to interpret and apply state law. There is nothing in the inherent
nature of domestic relations cases that puts them uniquely beyond the competence of the federal judiciary.
There are, in fact, affirmative indications that federal courts
do possess the expertise necessary to decide domestic relations
cases. For instance, federal courts frequently make determinations involving marital status for purposes of tax law 29 1 and immi288. See, e.g., Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (domestic relations are within the "peculiar province, experience, and competence
of the state courts"); Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1025 (3d Cir. 1975)
(state courts have "developed both a well-known expertise in these cases and a
strong interest in disposing of them"); Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371, 373 (9th
Cir. 1968) (state courts deal with child support cases daily and have developed
an expertise that should discourage federal intervention); Cherry v. Cherry, 438
F. Supp. 88, 90 (D. Md. 1977) (state courts have traditionally adjudicated domestic relations cases and thus have developed a "proficiency and expertise in
the area that is almost completely absent in the federal courts").
289. See B.C. Note, supra note 5, at 688-89.
290. For a discussion of the significance of the Erie doctrine in domestic
relations cases, see supra note 272.
291. See, e.g.,
Donigan v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 632 (1977) (Internal Revenue Code and New York law do not recognize separation agreements as conferring upon petitioner the status of an unmarried individual); Potson v.
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gration law. 29 2 Additionally, in immigration cases federal courts
may be called upon, not only to determine marital status, but also
to determine whether the couple actually intended to remain married. 29 3 If federal courts are competent to decide these questions
of marital status for purposes of tax law or immigration law, they
also would appear competent to decide similar issues in more
conventional contexts, such as whether a party in a divorce action
perceives his marriage to be irretrievably broken. Moreover, if
federal courts are competent to grant equitable remedies in property disputes between unrelated litigants, 29 4 they also should be
competent to equitably divide property acquired by parties during their marriage. 29 5 In diversity cases, the federal judiciary is
perceived competent to adjudicate a variety of complex areas of
fact and law, even where juries are perceived as incompetent to
do so. 296 It is therefore questionable whether state courts have
Commissioner, 22 T.C. 912, 929 (1954) (individuals who lived together as husband and wife were entitled to marital exemption even though they were never
formally married), aft'd, 239 F.2d 336 (7th Cir. 1956).
292. See, e.g., United States v. Rubenstein, 151 F.2d 915, 919 (2d Cir.)
(where spouses agreed to terminate marriage once alien spouse became a
United States citizen, court will not recognize the marriage), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
766 (1945). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (1982) (marriage by alien to United States
citizen places alien in a preferred status for entry into the United States); id.
§ 1430 (marriage by alien to United States citizen exempts alien from immigration requirements of § 1427(a) concerning minimum time of residency required
for naturalization).
293. It is a federal crime for an alien to enter the United States by means of
a willfully false or misleading representation, or the willful concealment of a material fact. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982). Thus, in a prosecution under § 1001, the
government can introduce evidence that an alien, although validly married
under state law, may have concealed from the government the material fact that
the marriage was contracted for the limited purpose of securing the alien's entry
into this country. In these cases, federal courts must determine whether "two
parties have undertaken to establish a life together and assume certain duties
and obligations." Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953) (validity of marriage between United States citizen and alien is immaterial for purposes of determining alien's immigration status if it appears that alien intended to dissolve
the marriage after becoming a citizen).
294. See, e.g., In re F.W. Koenecke & Sons, Inc., 605 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1979)
(imposing a constructive trust upon an accountant who received misappropriated funds from bankrupt corporation); GAF Corp. v. Amchem Prods., 514 F.
Supp. 943 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (refusing to impose constructive trust over patents
where petitioner failed to prove entitlement to patent); United States v. King,
469 F. Supp. 167 (D.S.C. 1979) (government entitled to have constructive trust
imposed upon property purchases by former consular official with money obtained through bribes).
295. For a discussion of property divisions at the time of divorce, see supra
notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
296. See, e.g., In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d
Cir. 1980) (trial by judge without a jury does not violate seventh amendment
where suit is too complex for a jury).
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sufficiently superior expertise to justify continued adherence to
the domestic relations exception.
The state court expertise argument is further undercut by recent changes in the nature of domestic relations law and disputes.
29 7
With all states adopting some form of no-fault divorce statutes,
divorce suits no longer revolve around the lengthy and difficult
determination of who was "at fault" for the breakdown of a marriage.2 98 Rather, the focus is more often on the equitable distribution of the couple's property.2 9 9 Questions in such cases may
include the valuation of stock options,3 0 0 pension plans30 1 and
professional degrees. 30 2 These are certainly areas in which federal court judges have expertise equaling that of the state judiciary. Even in jurisdictions where fault is relevant to property
division or alimony decisions,3 0 3 the determination is analogous
to the nebulous "fault" determination frequently at issue in other
30 4
federal court cases.
297. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.305 (Vernon 1977).
298. See Du Canto, Book Review, 71 A.B.A. J. (1985) (reviewing B.
GOLDBERG, VALUATION OF DIVORCE ASSETS (1984)).

The author explained:

The nature of divorce litigation has turned abruptly from trial by
character assault to one of "locate, valuate, and divide." That is, an
abandonment of "who did what to whom" in favor of a logical systemized method for identifying marital property, evaluating all its components, and an allocation of the property in ways that satisfy the desires
and aspirations of concerned clients.
Id.
For a discussion of the traditional grounds for fault and a listing of pertinent cases, see H. CLARK, supra note 18, § 12.
299. See Freed & Foster, supra note 11, at 388-409.
300. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Moody, 119 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 457 N.E.2d
1023 (1983) (stock options do not constitute marital property until exercised).
301. See, e.g.,Jerry L.C. v. Lucille H.C., 448 A.2d 223, 225 (Del. 1982) (wife
entitled only to portion of ex-husband's pension plan earned during marriage);
Bolt v. Bolt, 113 Mich. App. 298, 317 N.W.2d 601 (1982) (value of husband's
pension benefits at time of divorce calculated to be 70% of accrued value). See
generally Freed & Foster, supra note 11, at 399-409.
302. Wilcox v. Wilcox, 173 Ind. App. 661, 365 N.E.2d 792 (1977) (potential future earnings derived from Ph.D. property subject to equitable distribution); Moss v. Moss, 639 S.W.2d 370 (Ky. App. 1982) (value of degree in
pharmacy is determined on basis of the cost of obtaining the degree and not on
the basis of potential future earnings); Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich.
App. 258, 337 N.W.2d 332 (1983) (remand to trial court to determine value of
law degree); De La Rosa v. De La Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981) (value of
medical degree limited to cost of obtaining degree). But see Fioretti v. Fioretti, 9
FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2634 (1983) (N.Y. Supreme Ct. Nassau County) (dental
practice valued at $150,000 for purposes of property distribution). See generally
Freed & Foster, supra note 11, at 388-99.
303. For a discussion of the significance of fault in property and alimony
awards, see Freed & Foster, supra note 11, at 382-84.
304. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.) (question of
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Courts that rely on the state expertise argument often seek to
bolster the argument by pointing to the existence of specialized
state tribunals to adjudicate domestic relations cases3 0 5 or to the
availability of community services to assist state judges in making
their decisions.30 6 The majority of states, however, do not have
separate domestic relations courts or community service agencies.3 0 7 It is, therefore, inappropriate to adhere to the domestic
relations exception as a general bar to federal jurisdiction simply
because some jurisdictions may have specialized family courts. In
cases where federal courts should defer to an existing state judi30 8
cial scheme, ordinary abstention doctrines can be invoked.
With respect to using community resources to aid the judge in
making a decision, there does not appear to be any reason why a
federal court could not request evaluations from outside agencies
in the same way that state courts do. The costs of such evaluations can be charged to the parties, just as they are in many state
3
courts. 09

negligence of physician for failure to warn patient of dangers of proposed medical treatment), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Burrow v. Finch, 431 F.2d 486,
492 (8th Cir. 1970) (determination of fault in overpayment of social security
benefits); Compania TransAtlantic Espanola, S.A. v. Melendez Torres, 358 F.2d
209, 213 (1st Cir. 1966) ("fault" is not synonomous with "negligence").
305. See, e.g., Anastasi v. Anastasi, 532 F. Supp. 720, 724 (D.N.J. 1982) (specialized courts deal with matrimonial matters involving custody).
306. See, e.g., Thrower v. Cox, 425 F. Supp. 570, 573 (D.S.C. 1976) (state
courts often work in close conjunction with social welfare agencies that are not
available to aid federal courts).
307. See Family Court Committee of Family Law Section of ABA, Family
Courts-A Status Report, 3 FAM. ADVOc. 26 (1980). In a 1980 survey, 29 states had
no specialized family courts, while eight others had an incomplete system consisting of either pilot projects or family courts in one or more cities. Id. at 26-28.
308. See Note, supra note 7, at 1111-14. The author of this note suggests
that federal courts should not abstain "unless there is a state interest of substantial concern and either an issue of unsettled state law, or a complex administrative scheme with which federal review would interfere." Id. at 1111 (citing
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943)). Under this analysis, the existence
of specialized state family courts would militate in favor of abstention by federal
courts in domestic relations matters. A similar argument about the possible use
of Burford abstention is made by Professor Barbara Atwood in a recently published article. Professor Atwood concludes that "when the state itself views the
subject of domestic relations as one of unique importance and has so indicated
by creating specialized forums or programs, the case for abstention is strong."
Atwood, supra note 7, at 607 (footnote omitted). For further discussions of abstention doctrines, see supra note 7 and infra notes 481-84 and accompanying
text.
309. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.12, 11.18 (Vernon 1975 & Supp.
1985).
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Inconsistent State and Federal Decrees

Although federal courts most frequently cite state interest
and state expertise as the policy justifications for continued adherence to the domestic relations exception, the courts have advanced other reasons as well. Among them is the argument that
rejection of the exception would increase the possibility of conflicts between existing state decrees and later federal judgments
affecting the decrees 3 1 0 This concern is usually stated in a conclusory way, without any analysis of the actual dimensions of the
perceived problem. No explanation is offered of why the possibility of inconsistent decrees between state and federal courts differs
at all from the possibility of inconsistent decrees from courts in
separate states. 3 1 In fact, it is unclear whether the term "inconsistency" is appropriate at all. In the event a federal court is
asked to enforce or modify a state court decree, principles of res
judicata 3 12 and collateral estoppel3 13 would operate to prevent
the federal court from relitigating any causes of action or issues
previously litigated between the parties. 3 14 Thus, an action in
federal court to enforce or modify an existing state court judgment would not be inconsistent in any way with the state court
310. See, e.g.,
Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 1982) (federal
jurisdiction would result in "piecemeal, duplicative, or inexpert handling of
what is substantially a single controversy"); Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 842, 844
(1st Cir. 1981) (expressing fear of incompatible state and federal decrees since
state court has continuing jurisdiction).
311. If a litigant is barred from bringing suit to enforce a domestic relations
decree in a federal court because of the domestic relations exception, the litigant
could alternatively sue in state court in the state where the obligor resides. See
H. CLARK, supra note 18, § 14.11. The same possibility of "inconsistency" between a federal and state court adjudication exists when a state court adjudicates
a matter related to a prior decree of another state.
312. Res judicata, often described as claim preclusion, provides that "a
valid and final judgment on a claim precludes a second action on that claim or
any part of it." C. WRIGHT, supra note 6, § 100A, at 680 (footnote omitted).
313. See id. Professor Wright defines collateral estoppel as follows:
The general rule of issue preclusion [also referred to as collateral estoppel] is that if an issue of fact or law was actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, the determination is conclusive in
a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.
Id. at 682 (footnote omitted).
314. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982). Section 1738 requires federal courts to
give the same res judicata and collateral estoppel effects to a state court judgment as would the state court itself. This same obligation is placed upon the
states by the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution. U.S. CoNsT. art IV,
§ 1. Thus, federal courts would be under the same constraints as other state
courts in not relitigating issues or causes of action previously litigated by the
state court rendering the initial judgment.
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judgment. A new federal court judgment would be based upon
an adjudication of facts not previously litigated. In addition, the
mere possibility of inconsistent decrees is insufficient reason for
federal courts to decline jurisdiction in cases where they would
5
otherwise have jurisdiction .1
d.

Problems with Continuing Jurisdiction

A fourth reason advanced by some courts to justify the exception is the practical difficulty which would result if federal
courts were forced to maintain continuing jurisdiction over certain types of domestic relations decrees, such as custody and alimony awards which remain open for later modification. 3 1 6 Yet it
is clear that in other contexts federal courts have the power to
retain jurisdiction over decrees they have rendered.3 1 7 The
Supreme Court has held that "a sound judicial discretion may call
for the modification of the terms of an injunctive decree if the
circumstances, whether of law or fact, obtaining at the time of issuance have changed, or new ones have since arisen." 3 18 Federal
courts often have exercised the discretion described by the
31 9
Supreme Court and modified existing decrees.
In addition, the perceived burden on federal courts of retainingjurisdiction to modify domestic relations decisions is overestimated. State courts do not actively monitor modifiable domestic
relations ordersA2 0 Rather, a party first must petition the court to
315. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424
U.S. 800, 816 (1976) (while "exceptional circumstances 'make abstention appropriate here,' the mere potential for conflict in the results of adjudications, does
not, without more, warrant staying exercise of federal jurisdiction").
316. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 1982) (actions to
enforce decrees are outside diversity jurisdiction when the decrees are subject to
modification by the issuing court); Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486, 487 (5th
Cir. 1978) (federal courts should refuse to exercise diversity jurisdiction if state
decree remains subject to state court modification); Thrower v. Cox, 425 F.
Supp. 570, 573 (D.S.C. 1976) (federal courts would be overtaxed if forced to
retain jurisdiction over child custody and alimony cases).
317. See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 24849, 251 (1968) (district courts have power to modify decrees if situation warrants
a change); System Federation No. 91, Ry. Employees' Dep't v. Wright, 364 U.S.
642, 646-48 (1961) (same); United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114
(1932) (federal court has power to modify injunction).
318. System Federation, 364 U.S. at 647.
319. See, e.g., Association Against Discrimination in Employment v. City of
Bridgeport, 710 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1983) (decree to remedy discrimination in hiring); Libby Rod & Gun Club v. Moraski, 519 F. Supp. 643 (D. Mont. 1981) (decree enjoining construction of dam).
320. While some states have optional procedures allowing child support
payments to be deposited with the court for forwarding to the obligee, this ad-
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modify an award. 3 2' Until such a petition is filed, the burden
placed upon the court is no greater than that imposed by any
other type of decree.
e.

Federal Court Congestion

Even where courts are not fully convinced that continued adherence to the domestic relations exception can be supported by
the policy considerations discussed above, they have upheld the
exception on the theory that repudiation would result in a significant addition to the workload of the already overcrowded federal
docket. 32 2 This justification can be attacked on two separate
grounds. First, one may question whether the fear of a flood of
domestic relations cases in federal courts is justified.3 2 3 Repudiation of the domestic relations exception will not create a new category of federally cognizable cases based solely on the existence
of a domestic relations issue. Domestic relations cases still will
have to meet one of the traditional bases of federal jurisdiction in
order to be cognizable in federal court.
Although some courts have suggested that the domestic relations exception applies in cases involving federal questions,3 24
other federal courts have held the exception inapplicable in such
contexts. 32 5 It is unlikely that repudiation of the exception would
ministrative service involves clerical rather than judicial resources. See, e.g.,
CODE ANN.

§ 31-6-6.1-16 (West 1979); Mo.

ANN.

STAT.

IND.

§ 452.345 (Vernon

1977).
321. See generally H. CLARK, supra note 18, at 456, 500. But see id. at 598 (in
some cases courts have modified custody decrees on their own motion).
322. See, e.g., Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490
F.2d 509, 514 (2d Cir. 1973) ("[i]t is beyond the realm of reasonable belief that,
in these days of congested dockets, Congress would wish the federal courts to
seek to regain territory . . ."); Cherry v. Cherry, 438 F. Supp. 88, 90 (D. Md.
1977) (court expressing its unwillingness to increase its already overburdened
workload).
323. See COLUMBIA Note, supra note 5, at 1847-48 (other jurisdictional requirements would continue to limit access to federal courts); B.C. Note, supra
note 5, at 689-90 (elimination of the exception would not result in an increased
burden on federal courts).
324. See, e.g., Zak v. Pilla, 698 F.2d 800, 801 (6th Cir. 1982) (per curiam)
(federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear action brought under § 1983 if case involves domestic relations); La Montagne v. La Montagne, 394 F. Supp. 1159,
1161 (D. Mass. 1975) (controversy involving domestic relations is outside jurisdiction of federal courts even when "couched in terms characterizeable as a constitutional context").
325. See, e.g., Franks v. Smith, 717 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1983) (federal courts
have jurisdiction over nonfrivolous actions grounded upon fourth amendment
violation even though action involves domestic relations); Overman v. United
States, 563 F.2d 1287, 1292 (8th Cir. 1977) (federal courts should hear domestic
relations cases presenting "important. concerns of a constitutional dimension").
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make any substantial difference in the workload of federal courts
in federal question cases. In the absense of a federal question,
the requirements for diversity jurisdiction would have to be satisfied.3 26 While some domestic relations cases may meet these requirements, many will not. Especially in the paradigm domestic
relations suit-a divorce case-diversity of citizenship probably
3 27
will not exist if the family has only recently broken down.
Moreover, even where actual diversity of citizenship exists, the
328
amount in controversy requirement also must be satisfied.
Since cases involving the adjudication of marital status or child
custody do not present claims capable of monetary valuation, it is
unlikely that such actions will satisfy the $10,000 ampunt in controversy requirement.3 2 9 These requirements will limit significantly the number of domestic relations cases which may be heard
in federal court if the domestic relations exception were
abolished.
Even if one concedes that repudiation of the domestic relations exception will increase to some degree the workload of federal courts, it still may be argued that the potential for an
increased workload is by itself an insufficient justification to refuse to exercise jurisdiction in cases otherwise falling within the
constitutional and statutory boundries of federal jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court has recognized that federal courts have a
"virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction
given them." 3 3 0 While doctrines have been developed to allow a
326. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1982) (in diversity cases, a dispute must be
between citizens of different states).
327. Citizenship for diversity purposes has been interpreted to require that
parties be domiciled in different states. C. WRIGHT, supra note 6, § 26. Domicile
requires more than transient residency; it requires residence within a state with
an intent to remain indefinitely. Id. Usually, where a family has recently broken
down and a divorce petition is filed, the parties still will be domiciliaries of the
same state, thus precluding diversity jurisdiction. Also mitigating against a finding of diversity is the common law rule that a wife's domicile follows that of her
husband. H. CLARK, supra note 18, § 4.3. Although strict application of the rule
has been modified to allow the wife, under certain circumstances to acquire her
own domicile, the rule is still a basic rule of thumb in many states and may prevent a showing of diversity in domestic relations cases. Id.
328. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1983) (diversity jurisdiction exists only in those
cases where the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000). The relevant text of
§ 1332 is excerpted supra at note 5.
329. See, e.g., Hernstadt v. Hernstadt, 373 F.2d 316, 318 (2d Cir. 1967)
(custody and visitation rights are incapable of being reduced to a monetary
value). See also B.C. Note, supra note 5, at 690 ("the amount in controversy requirement severely limits which cases can be brought in federal court").
330. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800, 817 (1976) (discussing obligation of federal courts to hear cases pending in
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federal court to abstain from hearing various cases brought
before it,33' mere congestion of federal court dockets has been
rejected as a sufficient reason to refuse jurisdiction.3 3 2 To refuse
to hear domestic relations cases because of crowded federal court
dockets is both a breach of the duty of federal courts to take jurisdiction over cases where statutory jurisdiction exists and a viola-

tion of the litigant's right to choose a federal forum where
333
jurisdictional requirements are satisfied.
2.

Reasons for Continued Adherence to the Domestic Relations
Exception Based on Precedent

Courts usually justify the use of a particular legal doctrine by
citing an existing case as precedent. It is relatively unusual, however, for a court to preface its adherence to a particular line of
cases with a rejection of the reasoning behind the precedents.
Yet, this rejection of reasoning and resigned acceptance of precedent can be found in several cases upholding the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction. For example,'in Lloyd v.
Loeffler, 33 4 the Seventh Circuit rejected the traditional justification
for the exception that it derives from the ecclesiastical origins of
state courts). See also England v. Medical Examiner, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964)
(federal court has duty to exercise jurisdiction over a case where jurisdiction
granted by law).
331. For a general discussion of abstention principles, see supra note 7 and
infra notes 481-84 and accompanying text. See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 6,
§ 52.
332. See Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 344
(1976). In Thermtron, the Supreme Court held that a diversity action which had
been removed to federal court could not be remanded to state court solely on
the ground of congested federal court dockets. The Court declared that "an
otherwise properly removed action may no more be remanded because the district court considers itself too busy to try it than an action properlyfiled in the federal
court in the first instance may be dismissed or referred to state courtsfor such reason." Id. at
344 (emphasis added).
333. See Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909) (suit to
enjoin state enforcement of maximum rates for public utilities). In Wilcox, the
Court made the following statement concerning the right of litigants to invoke
federal jurisdiction:
When a Federal court is properly appealed to in a case over which
it has by law jurisdiction, it is its duty to take such jurisdiction ...
That the case may be one of local interest only is immaterial, so long as
the parties are citizens of different States or a question is involved
which by law brings the case within the jurisdiction of a Federal court.
The right of a party plaintiff to choose a Federal court where there is a
choice cannot be properly denied.
Id. (citation omitted).
334. 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982). For a discussion of Loeffler, see supra
notes 241-44 and accompanying text.
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domestic relations jurisdiction in England.3 3 5 Noting historical
inaccuracies, the court stated that "[t]he historical account is unconvincing.- 3 3 6 Yet the court went on to conclude that the exception was simply too well established to be challenged by a lower
court. Similarly, in Solomon v. Solomon,3 3 7 the Third Circuit acknowledged that the domestic relations exception had its critics,
but concluded that until Congress or the Supreme Court saw fit
to repudiate the exception, it remains "an historically engrained
limitation upon us." 3 3 8 The dissent in Solomon argued that the

history of the exception was little more than a "collection of misstatements of ancient holdings and of ill-considered dicta." 3 3 9
The dissent characterized the majority opinion as giving "new
3 40
currency to a hoary heresy."
As suggested by the Solomon majority, the precedentialjustifications for continued adherence to the exception fall into two
main categories. First, courts cite the seminal Supreme Court
cases giving rise to the exception as binding precedent.3 4 ' Second, the courts state that the failure of Congress to amend the
3 42
diversity statute represents tacit approval of the exception.
The following two sections of this article argue that neither justification compels lower federal courts to adhere to the exception.
335. 694 F.2d at 491. For a discussion of the early Supreme Court opinions
which traced the domestic relations exception to English ecclesiastical courts,
see supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
336. 694 F.2d at 491 (citing Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 802-03,
806-09 (E.D.N.Y. 1968)). In Spindel, Judge Weinstein discussed at length the
theory that the exception derived from the distinction in England between temporal and ecclesiastical courts. 283 F. Supp. at 806-09. He concluded that jurisdiction over domestic relations matters was only theoretically within the
exclusive province of the ecclesiastical courts, and that as a practical matter temporal courts often exercised jurisdiction. Id. at 807. For a further discussion of
judicial criticism of the historical analysis, see supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text. See also Note, supra note 7, at 1098-99.
337. 516 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1975) (suit by former wife seeking money damages for nonsupport under separation agreement).
338. Id. at 1025.
339. Id. at 1030 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
340. Id. For an excerpt from Judge Gibbons dissent, see supra text accompanying note 15.
341. For a discussion of the five seminal Supreme Court opinions, see supra
notes 17-75 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the subsequent cases
which cite the seminal Supreme Court opinions as binding precedent for the
domestic relations exception, see supra notes 46, 48, 52 & 75 and accompanying
text.
342. For a discussion of the argument that inaction by Congress is tacit
approval of the exception, see infra notes 386-414 and accompanying text.
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Existence of Supreme Court Cases Creating the Exception

Federal courts invoking the domestic relations exception
usually cite one or more of the five Supreme Court cases handed
down between 1859 and 1931 which discuss the existence of the
exception.3 43 Yet it can be argued that lower federal courts could
repudiate the exception without violating the principle of stare dec s s.344 Of those five cases, four-Barber,Burrus, Simms, and De La
Rama-did not involve direct holdings that federal courts lacked
jurisdiction over domestic relations cases. While courts often cite
these cases in support of the domestic relations exception, the
345
language cited is dicta.
The fifth decision, Popovici,346 is the clearest Supreme Court
authority for the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction. Nevertheless, there are a number of factors that restrict the
precedential value of the case. 34 7 As has been shown, Popovici
dealt with a specialized grant of federal jurisdiction-cases affecting ambassadors, public ministers and consuls-rather than the
broad diversity grant. 348 Popovici, therefore, is not compelling
support for the proposition that the contemporary diversity statute3 4 9 and the federal question statute 35 0 are limited by the exception. Additionally, Popovici involved a suit for a divorce,
clearly the paradigm domestic relations case. 35 ' Thus, Popovici
343. See, e.g., Gargallo v. Gargallo, 472 F.2d 1219, 1220 (6th Cir.) (per
curiam) (citing Barber; Bu-rus), cert. denied and app. dismissed, 414 U.S. 805 (1973);
Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 1968) (citing all five cases).
344. Stare decisis is "[t]he doctrine or principle that decisions should stand
as precedents for guidance in cases arising in the future." BALLANTINE'S LAw
DICTIONARY 1209 (3d ed. 1969).

345. For a discussion of the language and holdings of these cases, see supra
notes 17-58 and accompanying text.
346. For a discussion of Popovici, see supra notes 60-75 and accompanying
text.
347. For a discussion of the factors which limit Popovici as authority for the
domestic relations exception, see supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
348. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
349. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982).
350. Id. § 1331.
351. The Supreme Court has suggested in dicta that the rationale of Popovici can be extended generally to deny federal jurisdiction in divorce proceedings. See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,
370 U.S. 530 (1962). In both Hisquierdo and Glidden, however, the Court couched
its discussion in prudential or discretionary terms, as opposed to stating that the
federal courts lacked power to hear such cases. In Hisquierdo, the Court stated
that "[fQederal courts repeatedly have declined to assert jurisdiction over divorces." 439 U.S. at 581 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). In a footnote to
Glidden, the Court added that "divorce proceedings [are]... beyond the ken of the
federal courts ..
" 370 U.S. at 581 n.54 (emphasis added)(citations omitted).
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could be interpreted as confining the exception to suits for divorce,3 52 with other actions deemed beyond the mandate of the
Popovici holding.

Finally, Popovici can be further limited by pointing to language in the decision which appears to condition the holding on
the correctness of certain historical assumptions:
If when the Constitution was adopted the common
understanding was that the domestic relations of husband and wife and parent and child were matters reserved to the States, there is no difficulty in construing
the instrument accordingly and not much in dealing with
353
the statutes.
Since Popovici, both courts and commentators have questioned
the validity of these historical assumptions. A federal court,
therefore, could properly reject Popovici as precedent for the exception by interpreting the Supreme Court's language as conditioning its holding on the existence of a "common
understanding"-an understanding that now appears not to have
3 54
existed.
Even were a court to conclude that Popovici, when handed

down, held that a domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction did exist, the court could still repudiate the holding today
without violating the principle of stare decisis. Although as a gen-

eral matter, lower federal courts are not free to disregard existing
Supreme Court cases directly on point,3 55 there is a line of cases
that clearly indicates that certain circumstances may justify a
lower federal court's failure to adhere to existing Supreme Court
precedent. An example of this approach is found in the 1964 case
For a further discussion of the significance of Hisquierdo and Glidden, see infra
notes 366-70 and accompanying text.
352. Both Glidden and Hisquierdo also involved divorce proceedings. See
supra note 351.
353. Popovici, 280 U.S. at 383-84.
354. For a discussion of the debate over whether such a "common understanding" existed at the time the Constitution was adopted, see supra notes 26869 and accompanying text.
355. See, e.g., United States v. Swift & Co., 189 F. Supp. 885, 901 (N.D. Ill.
1960) (lower courts are not free to disagree with or disregard Supreme Court
precedent "in the guise of reinterpretation"), aft'd, 367 U.S. 909 (1961)(per
curiam); United States v. Silverman, 166 F. Supp. 838 (D.D.C. 1958) (lower
courts are bound by Supreme Court precedent and may not speculate as to what
the Court might do in the future), aft'd, 275 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1960), rev'd on
other grounds, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); Family Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 79 F. Supp.
62, 68-69 (E.D.S.C. 1948) (lower courts may not review decisions of Supreme
Court), rev'd on other grounds, 336 U.S. 220 (1949).
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of Gold v. DiCarlo,3 5 6 where plaintiff brought a substantive due
process challenge to a New York antiticket-scalping statute. In its
decision, the district court found that it was not constrained to
follow a 1927 Supreme Court decision that had held a predecessor to the New York statute unconstitutional.3 57 The court
pointed to Supreme Court cases subsequent to the 1927 decision
which appeared to depart from the rationale of the earlier decision, although not directly overruling it.358 The district courtjustified its failure to adhere to the 1927 Supreme Court case with
the following reasoning:
We would be abdicating our judicial responsibility if
we waited for the Supreme Court to use the express
words "We hereby overrule Tyson," as the plaintiffs contend we should, before recognizing that the case is no
longer binding precedent but simply a relic for the constitutional historians. Judges do not have such mechanical or wooden attitides nor are they devoid of all powers
of interpretation, analogy and application of constitutional principles; they and the law must keep pace with
our vibrant and dynamic society and the changes in the
3 59
law which the courts have pronounced.
The doctrine expressed in Gold v. DiCarlo has been utilized by
other lower federal courts3 60 and could be applied to repudiate
356. 235 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 380 U.S. 520 (1965)(per
curiam).
357. Id. at 820 (citing but not following Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273
U.S. 418 (1927)).
358. Id. at 819 (citing Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Olsen v.
Nebraska 313 U.S. 236 (1944); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934)). The
district court interpreted Nebbia as rejecting the standard pronounced in Tyson.
235 F. Supp. at 819. In addition, the court noted thatJustice Black's opinion in
Ferguson declared that the Tyson approach had been abandoned. 235 F. Supp. at
819.
359. Id. at 819-20 (emphasis added). The district court concluded that Tyson was "antiquated" and "legally unsound." Id. at 820.
360. See, e.g., Rowe v. Peyton, 383 F.2d 709, 714 (4th Cir. 1967) (rejection
of Supreme Court decision concerning availability of writ of habeas corpus
where "subsequent Supreme Court opinions have so eroded [the] older case,
without explicitly overruling it, as to warrant a subordinate court in pursuing
what it conceives to be a clearly defined new lead. . . to a conclusion inconsistent with an older Supreme Court case"), afd, 391 U.S. 54 (1968); Perkins v.
EndicottJohnson Corp., 128 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1942) (rejecting 30-year old decision concerning power of courts to enforce administrative subpoena), aff'd, 317
U.S. 501 (1943); Barnett v. West Va. Bd. of Educ., 47 F. supp. 251 (S.D.W.Va.
1942) (rejecting prior Supreme Court decision concerning first amendment
rights when Court had indicated in recent decisions that it was leaning toward
overruling the prior decision), afd, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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the domestic relations exception. While the Supreme Court has
not directly questioned the continued validity of domestic relations
exception to federal jurisdiction, it may be argued that the
Supreme Court in a variety of ways has called into question the
premises underlying the exception. For example, a basic premise
underlying the domestic relations exception was articulated by
the Supreme Court in In re Burrus, where the Court stated that
"[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and
wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to
the laws of the United States." '3 6' Yet the Supreme Court has
made quite clear during this century that the federal government
does indeed have a role to play in the field of domestic relations.
The Court has held that the Constitution restricts the power of
the states to infringe upon parental rights to direct the upbringing of their children,3 6 2 to restrict unduly an individual's decisions regarding marriage 3 63 and procreation, 364 or to define the
term family, inappropriately.3 6 5 Thus, recent Supreme Court
cases contradict a basic premise upon which the Court previously
had relied to justify the exception.
In addition to those Supreme Court decisions expanding the
constitutional protection of the family, there are other cases calling into question the Court's adherence to the concept of a broad
domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction. The Court's
recent references to the exception are framed in historical terms,
rather than as an ongoing part of constitutional doctrine. In Glid361. 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890). For a discussion of Burrus, see supra
notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
362. See, e.g.,
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (state law requiring
parents to send children to private school is unconstitutional); Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (state law requiring parents to send children to
public school past eighth grade is unconstitutional); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923) (state law forbidding the teaching of modern foreign languages to
children is unconstitutional).
363. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (declaring unconstitutional a state law requiring court permission to remarry for an individual with
child support obligations); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (fourteenth amendment prohibits denial of divorce to indigents who cannot afford
court fees); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (statute preventing marriage
solely on the basis of race violates the fourteenth amendment).
364. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 70 (1976) (state
cannot prohibit a woman from obtaining an abortion during first trimester); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973) (Texas criminal abortion law unconstitutional); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Connecticut statute
prohibiting married couples' use of contraceptives violates Constitution).
365. See, e.g.,
Village of Belle Terre v. Borass, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (New York
zoning ordinance narrowly defining family and restricting land use in certain
areas to one-family dwelling is unconstitutional).
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den Co. v. Zdanok, 3 66 the Supreme Court stated in a footnote that
" [u]nder Barber... the federal courts in the States were incompetent to render divorces .... ,367 In another footnote, the Court
spoke not of any constitutional or statutory infirmity in adjudicating a broad range of domestic relations cases, but rather of the
fact that divorce proceedings "are beyond the ken of the federal
courts in the states." 368 In Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo,369 the Court
characterized the exception as a fact of life rather than as a rule of
law, stating that "[f]ederal courts repeatedly have declined to assert jurisdiction over divorces that presented no federal
370
question."
To the extent that Glidden and Hisquierdo do support the existence of the domestic relations exception, it should be noted that
both cases discussed restraints on federal jurisdiction with respect
to a very narrow group of domestic relations cases-divorce proceedings. Insofar as neither opinion refers to other types of domestic relations cases, they may represent a retrenchment from
the Court's expansive language regarding the exception in prior
cases. Thus, lower courts should not feel constrained to apply the
exception to a broader spectrum of domestic relations cases.
Recent references by the Court to the lack of jurisdiction of
federal courts over domestic relations cases are rare, even as
dicta. The Court's citations to the Barber line of cases are usually
interposed, not in support of ajurisdictional limitation, but rather
to support the concept that federal courts should apply state substantive law in the adjudication of domestic relations cases. For
example, in three recent cases, the Court, in considering the issue
of whether federal law regarding the divisibility of federal government benefits at divorce should supplant state law, 3 7 ' cited the
language of In re Burrus: "[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife. . . belongs to the laws of the States
and not to the laws of the United States." 3 72 But in each case this
statement was cited only to support the choice of law principle
366. 370 U.S. 530 (1962) (suit challenging validity of designation of patent
court and court of claims judges to federal district courts and federal courts of
appeals to adjudicate certain cases).
367. Id. at 545 n.14 (emphasis added)(citation omitted).
368. Id. at 581 n.54 (emphasis added)(citation omitted).

369. 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
370. Id. at 581.
371. Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 54 (1981); McCarty v. McCarty, 453
U.S. 210, 220 (1981); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979).
372. Burrus, 136 U.S. at 593-94. For a discussion of Burrus, see supra notes
32-38 and accompanying text.
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that state law, and not federal law, should control in cases where
federal courts exercise jurisdiction over actions involving domes3 73
tic relations.
Even in a case that specifically dealt with the appropriate
reaches of federal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court declined to
rest its holding on the domestic relations exception. In Lehman v.
Lycoming County Children's Services Agency 374 the Supreme Court
held that a plaintiff could not invoke federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to challenge the constitutionality of a state statute utilized
to terminate the plaintiff's parental rights.375 The Court stated
that "federal habeas has never been available to challenge parental rights or child custody," 376 and cited In re Burrus.377 Yet the
Court did not mention the domestic relations exception in its citation to Burrs, correctly noting that the decision in Burrus rested
on the absence of a federal question.3 78 Burrus was cited as
merely "suggesting" that federal habeas corpus was not available
3 79
in child custody cases.
It is significant that Lehman does not mention the domestic
relations exception to federal jurisdiction, since the applicability
373. Ridgway, 454 U.S. at 54; McCarty, 453 U.S. at 220; Hisquierdo, 439 U.S.
at 581.

374. 458 U.S. 502 (1982).
375. Id. at 512. The question of whether the federal habeas statute permitted challenges to child custody differs substantially from the interpretation of
the Constitution and federal jurisdictional statutes engaged in by the Supreme
Court in the domestic relations cases. In Lehman, the Court was faced with the
interpretation of the term "custody" in the habeas statute:
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district
court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf
of a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of a State court only on
the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws
or treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Because "custody" was not defined in
the statute, the Court has previously addressed the question of which circumstances should be considered custody for purposes of the statute. See Hansley v.
Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973) (criminal defendant in custody even
though released on his own recognizance); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234,
239 (1968) (petitioner is in custody if he or she is in physical custody of state
when writ is filed);Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963) (parolee is in
custody). In contrast, in the seminal domestic relations exception cases, the
Court was not interpreting ambiguous constitutional or statutory language, but
rather inferring an exception in the face of and in opposition to the plain meaning of constitutional and statutory language conferring jurisdiction in these
cases. See supra notes 17-75 and accompanying text.
376. 458 U.S. at 511 (footnote omitted).
377. Id. at 511 (citing Burrus, 136 U.S. 586).
378. Id. For a discussion of the Burrus holding, see supra notes 34-38 and
accompanying text.
379. 458 U.S. at 511.
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of the exception to federal habeas corpus proceedings had been
discussed in circuit court opinions, and the Court had granted
3 80
certiorari to resolve the conflicting decisions of the circuits.
The Supreme Court in Lehman did state that its decision was influenced by "[flederalism concerns," 38 1 and noted that "federal
courts consistently have shown special solicitude for state inter3 82
ests in the field of family and family-property arrangements."
The Court did not, however, cite any of the domestic relations
exception cases in support of this perceived solicitude. Rather, it
cited United States v. Yazell, 383 a case involving not a question of
whether domestic relations cases could be heard in federal courts,
but the question of whether state substantive law should be utilized in construing the terms of a Small Business Administration
loan issued to the defendant.3 8 4 Since the question before the
Court in Lehman related to the scope of federal court jurisdiction,
rather than to choice of law, if the domestic relations exception
were still good law, a reference to the exception and to the relevant cases would have been much more clearly on point than a
3 85
citation to Yazell.
380. Id. at 507 & n.7. At least two circuits had reached divergent conclusions. Compare Rowell v. Oesterle, 626 F.2d 437, 438 (5th Cir. 1980)(per
curiam)(habeas corpus action challenging state action on constitutional grounds
is within federal court jurisdiction even though state action involves domestic
relations) with Sylvander v. New England Home for Little Wanderers, 584 F.2d
1103, 1112 (1st Cir. 1978) (domestic relations exception bars federal court jurisdiction over habeas corpus proceeding to challenge state child custody
proceeding).
381. 458 U.S. at 512. The Court explained that "[t]he writ of habeas
corpus is a major exception to the doctrine of res judicata, as it allows relitigation of a final state-court judgment disposing of precisely the same claims." Id.
The Court refused to extend the writ to the petitioner for prudential reasons,
stating that courts should be "reluctant to extend the writ beyond its historic
purpose." Id. at 512-13. Child custody was not included within that historical
purpose. Id.
382. Id. at 512 (quoting United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966)).
383. 382 U.S. 341 (1966).
384. Id. at 342-43. The family law issue in Yazell was whether Texas law
preventing a married woman from personally binding herself by contract should
be applied to prevent the United States from recovering on a loan made to defendant and her husband through the Small Business Administration. Id. The
Supreme Court held that the federal interest in this case did not justify displacing state family law. Id. at 352-53.
385. The fact that Lehman held that a federal court was without jurisdiction
in a case involving domestic relations should not be interpreted as indicative of
the continued vitality of the domestic relations exception. As previously noted,
the Lehman Court in no way rested its holding on the domestic relations exception. See 458 U.S. at 512-13. Rather, Lehman was concerned that a habeas
corpus petition would involve a collateral attack on a state court judgment,
which the Court viewed as a greater infringement on states than other methods
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While of course it would be preferable for the Supreme
Court itself to reconsider the domestic relations exception and
either abandon the exception or provide lower courts with some
guidance as to its appropriate scope, the failure of the Supreme
Court to do so need not condemn lower federal courts to another
fifty years of struggling to administer an amorphous exception
that many courts feel lacks significant justification in our contemporary world. It has been demonstrated that doctrines do exist
that would justify the lower courts' repudiation of the exception.
In light of recent Supreme Court pronouncements regarding the
appropriate balance of power between the states and the federal
government in domestic relations matters, grave doubts are cast
upon continued Supreme Court support of a broad domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction.
b. Congressional Inaction as Implied Acceptance of the
Exception
Even those courts that recognize the weak precedential compulsion of the seminal Supreme Court cases nevertheless feel
constrained to adhere to the domestic relations exception because of the failure of Congress to make clear through legislation
that the judicially created exception is an inaccurate interpretation of the statutes defining federal jurisdiction. For example, in
the Second Circuit case of Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v.
Rosenstiel,38 6 Judge Friendly justified the court's adherence to the
domestic relations exception on the following ground:
We have no disposition to question. . . whether the
history was right or not . . . . More than a century has
elapsed since the Barber dictum without any intimation of
Congressional dissatisfaction. It is beyond the realm of
reasonable belief that, in these days of congested dockets, Congress would wish the federal courts to seek to
regain territory, even if the cession of 1859 was unjustiof review. Id. at 512-16. By contrast, the adjudication of domestic relations disputes in federal courts under established bases ofjurisdiction would not involve
collateral review of existing state court judgments, since ordinary res judicata
principles would prevent the relitigation of causes of action or issues previously
litigated between the parties in state court. Thus, the Lehman Court's construction of the term "custody" for purposes of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to
exclude the case before it in no way intimates a continued adherence to the
domestic relations exception. Rather, the Court's decision, by its failure to cite
the exception and by its definition of the concept of federal solicitude for state
interests intimates a retreat from, if not a repudiation of, the exception.
386. 490 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1973).
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fled. Whatever Article III may or may not permit, we
must accept the Barber dictum as a correct interpretation
38 7
of the Congressional grant.
Other federal courts have drawn similar conclusions about
the significance of congressional inaction, 388 yet none of the opinions relying on this concept cite any authority for the proposition
that congressional inaction may bar courts from reevaluating previous judicial interpretations of a statute. Although in some circumstances congressional inaction has been held to imply
38 9
congressional acceptance of previous judicial interpretations,
courts and commentators alike have narrowly defined the appro390
priate circumstances for such inferences.
387. Id. at 514 (citation omitted).
388. See, e.g., Flood v. Braaten, 727 F.2d 303, 307 (3d Cir. 1984) (after a
century of silence, Congress may be said to have acquiesced to the exception);
Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 842, 843 (1st Cir. 1981) (exception has endured for too
long to abandon it without action by Congress or the Supreme Court); Cherry v.
Cherry, 438 F. Supp. 88, 90 (D. Md. 1977) (100 year-old exception cannot be
overruled without action by Congress).
389. See, e.g., Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953). In a
one paragraph per curiam opinion, the Toolson Court affirmed the decision of the
Ninth Circuit, holding that federal antitrust legislation is inapplicable to baseball. Id. at 356-57. The Court noted that it had reached the same conclusion
thirty years earlier and that "Congress has had the ruling under consideration
but has not seen fit to bring [baseball] under [the antitrust] laws .... ." Id. at
357. See also Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386 (1983) (congressional inaction regarding the Securities Exchange Act has "ratified the cumulative nature of the Section 10(b) action").
390. See, e.g., Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S.
235 (1970). The Boys Markets Court reversed its seven year stance that the antiinjunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act preclude a federal district
court from enjoining a strike which violates an enforceable no-strike clause in a
collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 237-38. The striking employees in Boys
Markets had argued that the Court's prior decision "ought not to be disturbed
because the decision turned on a question of statutory construction which Congress can alter at any time . . . [and] Congress has not modified [the prior decision] even though it has been urged to do so .... ." Id. at 240 (footnote
omitted). The Court rejected the argument that congressional silence should be
interpreted as acceptance of the statutory construction, stating that "[i]t is at
best treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law." Id. at 241 (quoting Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69
(1946)). See also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 288 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("unbroken silence of Congress should not prevent [the Court] from correcting [its] mistakes"); Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. University of Ill. Found., 402
U.S. 313 (1971) (mere congressional inaction is not equivalent to congressional
acceptance of prior judicial construction of a federal statue); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119-20 (1940) (congressional silence is not a sufficient reason for refusing to reconsider a prior decision). See generally Tribe, Toward a
Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the Sounds of Congressionaland Constitutional Silence,
57 INC. L.J. 515 (1982); Hart, The Legal Process 1393-1406 (1958)(unpublished
manuscript-available in Boston University Law School Library).
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Distinctions have been drawn between different categories of
congressional inaction. For example, in the 1971 case of Flood v.
Kuhn, 3 9 1 the Supreme Court compared situations involving the
"positive inaction" 3 92 of Congress with "mere congressional silence and passivity" 393 and suggested that in the latter case, the
courts were not bound to give conclusive weight to congressional
silence.3 94 In Kuhn, the Court noted that Congress had considered "numerous and persistent" legislative proposals on the issue
at hand, but had failed to enact legislation.3 95 The Court concluded that these circumstances amounted to positive inaction
rather than mere congressional silence.3 96 Similarly, in Bob Jones
University v. United States, 39 7 the Supreme Court noted that inaction by Congress was "not often a useful guide, ' 398 but character3 99
ized congressional inaction in that case to be "significant"
since Congress had considered and rejected no fewer than thirteen bills to overturn the judicial interpretation of the Internal
40 0
Revenue Code provisions at issue in that litigation.

391. 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (antitrust suit challenging baseball's reserve system, under which players could not freely contract with major league teams
other than the team for which they played).
392. Id. at 283-84.
393. Id. at 283.
394. Id. at 283-84 (citing Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local
770, 398 U.S. 235, 241-42 (1970)). In Boys Markets, the Court noted that the
failure of Congress to respond legislatively to a previous court decision should
not be interpreted as acceptance of the decision, and should not bar reconsideration of the decision by the Court. 398 U.S. at 241-42.
395. 407 U.S. at 281 & n.17. The Court noted that more than fifty bills had
been introduced in Congress which would have effectively invalidated the
Court's prior construction of the statute in question. Id. The bills which eventually passed, however, had no effect upon the Court's statutory construction. Id.
396. Id. at 283-84. The Kuhn analysis was recently followed by the Court in
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983). At issue in Huddleston
was whether an implied cause of action under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 was limited by the express remedy of § 11 of the Securities Act of
1933. Id. at 379. A "consistent line ofjudicial decisions" prior to 1975 had held
that § 10(b) was not so limited. Id. at 384. The Huddleston Court found that the
failure of Congress to legislatively overrule these prior decisions when it "comprehensively revised the securities laws in 1975" was indicative of congressional
approval of the prior judicial decisions. Id. In attaching significance to this congressional inaction, the Huddleston Court went out of its way to note that the
1975 revisions were the most substantial revisions in the history of the federal
securities laws. Id. The Court was clearly concerned that it rely on a situation of
positive congressional inaction, and not mere silence or passivity.
397. 461 U.S. 574 (1983)(nonprofit private schools that prescribe and enforce radically discriminatory admission standards on the basis of religious doctrines do not qualify for tax-exempt status under the Internal Revenue Code).
398. Id. at 2033.

399. Id.
400. Id.
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In contrast to the situations in Kuhn and Bob Jones, congres-

sional inaction concerning the domestic relations exception 40is
analogous to "mere Congressional silence and passivity." '
Congress has not considered legislation that would amend the
federal jurisdiction statutes so as to clarify the applicability of
these statutes to domestic relations cases. To ascribe significance
to the silence of Congress in this situation is of questionable legitimacy. 40 2 Therefore, congressional silence concerning the exception should be accorded little, if any weight.
The Supreme Court has also recognized that congressional
activity seemingly at odds with a previous judicial interpretation of
a statute is relevant in determining when courts may judicially repudiate that interpretation and when the repudiation must be accomplished through amendment of the statute. In Monell v.
Department of Social Services,403 the Supreme Court repudiated an
interpretation of a federal civil rights statute 40 4 that it had announced seventeen years earlier in Monroe v. Pape.40 5 One of the
401. Kuhn, 407 U.S. at 283.
402. The only case involving the domestic relations exception which refers
to specific federal legislation to support the congressional inaction argument is
Bennett v. Bennett. 682 F.2d 1039, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (citing the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982)). The plaintiff in
Bennett argued that the Act was indicative of congressional intent to leave domestic relations cases in state courts, since the act did not create or recognize "a
direct role for the federal courts in determining child custody." Id. at 1043.
This argument is flawed, however, since the Act does indeed provide for a federal role in determining child custody. See Flood v. Braaten, 727 F.2d 303, 313
(3d Cir. 1984) (suit to compel enforcement with the Act may be heard in federal
district court under federal question jurisdiction).
The only indication that Congress directly considered jurisdictional questions at the time of the enactment of the Act was the submission to the House of
Representatives of two bills, H.R. 325 and H.R. 772, which would have given
federal district courts jurisdiction to enforce custody orders against a parent
who had taken a child in contravention of a custody order of one state and traveled with the child to another state. No hearings were ever held on the bills, and
they died in the committees to which they were referred. Both bills would have
granted federal courts jurisdiction over the enforcement of certain custody decrees, without the necessity of demonstrating federal question jurisdiction, diversity jurisdiction, or satisfaction of the jurisdictional amount. The bills
apparently died after doubts were expressed about the constitutionality of grantingjurisdiction in the absence of an affirmative constitutional basis. ParentalKidnapping, Hearing on H. R. 1290 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 139 (1980)(statement of Russell M. Coombs, Associate Professor, Law School, Rutgers University, Camden, N.J.). For a further
discussion of the Federal Parental Kidnapping Act, see infra notes 409-11 & 44048 and accompanying text.
403. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
404. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) (authorizing civil damages action for violation
of rights, privileges, or immunities under color of state law).
405. 436 U.S. 658, 664-89 (overruling Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
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factors the Court considered in determining the propriety of
overruling its previous interpretation was the significance of recent expressions of congressional intent. 40 6 In Moneil, the Court
noted collateral actions by Congress since Monroe v. Pape that implied that Congress had not entirely accepted the previous judicial interpretation of the statute. The Monell Court concluded
that given these collateral congressional actions, the case was not
one where the Court should place "on the shoulders of Congress
40 7
the burden of the Court's own error."
Recent congressional activity in the field of family law indicates that Congress does not accept the premise that "[t]he whole
subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and
child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the
United States." 40 8 As previously noted, the Parental Kidnapping

Prevention Act of 1980409 requires the states to recognize and enforce certain child custody decrees handed down by other
states.41 0 Through this act, the federal government has explicitly

curtailed the freedom of individual states to make determinations
(1961)). In Monroe, the Court had ruled that a municipal corporation was not
included in the definition of "persons" under § 1983. 365 U.S. at 191. Monell
held to the contrary. 436 U.S. at 688-89.
406. 436 U.S. at 696-99 (citing Emergency School Aid Act, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(1)(A)(i)(1982)(local educational agency may be ordered to implement
desegregation plan); Equal Educational Opportunities Act, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1702(a)(3)(1982)(implementing desegregation plans requires large expenditures); S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976)(state or local officials or
bodies may be liable for attorney's fees)).
407. Id. at 696 (quoting Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 70 (1946)).
Another factor discussed in Monell which had an impact on the Court's decision
to judicially repudiate its prior interpretation in Monroe was the lack of a justifiable reliance interest which would be harmed should the law be judicially altered. Id. at 699-700. The Monell Court contrasted the interests of the
municipalities whose potential liability was at issue with the interests of those
engaged in the area of commercial law "in which, presumably, individuals may
have arranged their affairs in reliance on the expected stability of decision." Id.
at 700 (quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at 221-22 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part)).
A similar factor was considered in Toolson, where the Court was concerned that a
repudiation of its prior statutory interpretation would injure the baseball industry, which had developed in the ensuing years in reliance on the previous interpretation. See Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357. For a discussion of Toolson, see supra note
394. In the case of the domestic relations exception, it can be argued that no
reliance issue is present to prevent judicial reinterpretation. Individuals do not
regulate their daily lives with an eye toward the availability or nonavailability of a
federal forum for their future domestic relations disputes.
408. Burrus, 136 U.S. at 593-94. For a discussion of Burrus, see supra notes
32-38 and accompanying text.
409. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982).
410. See id. Section 1738A provides in pertinent part that "[tihe appropriate authorities of every State shall enforce according to its terms, and shall not
modify ...any child custody determination made ...by a court of another
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regarding the custody of children living within their borders. The
Act has also resulted in increased participation by the federal judiciary in domestic relations matters, with federal courts recently
holding that suits to mandate compliance with the Act can prop41
erly be brought in federal court. '
The enforcement of child support orders is another area previously reserved to the states with respect to which the federal
government now takes an active role due to the positive action of
Congress. Indeed, a recent treatise on child support includes an
entire chapter on the subject of "The Federalization of Child
Support Enforcement.- 41 2 The federal government's role in this
area continues to grow, with Congress having recently enacted
legislation. 41 3 Federal activity concerning juvenile delinquency
and child abuse prevention also are indicative of congressional
activity in the area of domestic relations law. 4 14 These actions are
pursuasive evidence that Congress no longer accepts the premise
underlying the judicially created domestic relations exception
that family law is solely the province of the states.
Congressional inaction clearly does not compel continued
adherence to the domestic relations exception. To the contrary,
recent congressional activity recognizing that the area of domestic relations law does not belong exclusively to the states far outweighs any inference that may be drawn from congressional
passivity in failing to amend a statute that by its plain language
already gives federal courts the power to adjudicate domestic relations matters.
3.

The Hidden Reason-Distastefor Domestic Relations Disputes

Although not expressly articulated in federal court opinions,
there is a persistent undercurrent in many cases involving the domestic relations exception: federal courts have a distaste for domestic relations disputes. This distaste may be a significant factor
State." Id. For a further discussion of the Act, see infra notes 440-48 and accompanying text.
411. Heartfield v. Heartfield, 749 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1985); Flood v.
Braaten, 727 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1984); McDougald v. Jenson, 596 F. Supp. 680
(N.D. Fla. 1984).
412. H. KRAUSS, supra note 262, at ch. VII.
413. See Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98378, 1984 U.S. CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 1306 (amendment to Social Security Act to aid child support enforcement programs through mandatory
withholding).
414. See supra notes 264-65.
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in the decision of many federal courts to invoke the exception. 4 15
For example, in Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel,4 16 the Second Circuit stated that "we do not believe that
the Supreme Court today would demand that federal judges
waste their time exploring a thicket of state decisional law in a
case such as this."'4 17 Because the defendant did not timely move
for a stay, however, the court felt that it was forced to "treat the
merits, painful as that may be." 4 18 Domestic relations disputes
have been described by federal courts as "vexatious," 4 19 as "little
family quarrel[s]," 42 0 "intra-family feuds," 42 1 and "imbro4 23
glio[s]," 42 2 and as requiring the airing of "sordid evidence.
In Thrower v. Cox, 42 4 a district court discussed the exception and
concluded that federal courts should continue to allow state
courts "the dubious honor" 42 5 of exclusively adjudicating domestic relations cases. Even courts accepting jurisdiction over domestic relations cases express their distaste for this type of case.
In Cole v. Cole, 4 2 6 the Fourth Circuit reluctantly concluded that
"[s]o long as diversity jurisdiction endures, federal courts cannot
shirk the inconvenience of sometimes trading in wares from the
4 27
foul rag-and-bone shop of the heart."
While no court has expressly rested its invocation of the domestic relations exception on such considerations, the murky origins and nebulous contours of the exception have provided
courts with the latitude to refuse to hear cases which they find
distasteful or onerous, even though the letter of federal statutes
indicates that such cases are properly before them. Clearly, however, considerations of distaste should not enter into the jurisdictional determination.
415. See Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1087-88 (4th Cir. 1980). In Cole, the
Fourth Circuit noted that some federal courts appeared to find the "contemplated proof. .. particularly distasteful." Id. at 1088.
416. 490 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1973).
417. Id. at 516 (footnote omitted).
418. Id. at 517.
419. Thrower v. Cox, 425 F. Supp. 570, 573 (D.S.C. 1976).
420. Hinton v. Hinton, 436 F.2d 211, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
421. Bacon v. Bacon, 365 F. Supp. 1019, 1020 (D. Or. 1975).
422. Overman v. United States, 563 F.2d 1287, 1292 (8th Cir. 1977).
423. Cox, 425 F. Supp. at 574.
424. 425 F. Supp. 570 (D.S.C. 1976).
425. Id. at 573.
426. 633 F.2d 1083 (4th Cir. 1980).
427. Id. at 1089.
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THE CASE FOR REPUDIATION RATHER THAN REDEFINITION

The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the domestic relations exception is plagued by inconsistent application and
poorly analyzed justifications. Courts agree neither on the nature
of the exception, 4 28 nor on its application to particular types of
domestic relations cases. 42 9 Such an unpredictable approach is
undesirable.
Were inconsistency of application the only problem with the
exception, it might be argued that the development of a more
the
tractable test to determine which cases are properly within
43 0 Yet
scope of the exception would be an appropriate solution.
the problems with the contemporary use of the exception are
much more serious than inconsistency and unpredictability.
From a policy perspective, the exception denies litigants access to
federal courts in cases where federal jurisdiction may be especially appropriate.
As previously discussed, an often cited justification for the
original constitutional and statutory grants of diversity jurisdiction is the concern that state courts might be biased against outof-state parties. 4 3 ' While some commentators question whether
prejudice against out-of-state residents remains a sufficient concern in our mobile society to justify retention of diversity jurisdiction, 4 32 studies have shown that the possibility of bias against
those from out-of-state continues to enter into the decisions of
attorneys as to whether to select a federal or state forum. 4 3 To
428. See supra notes 76-92 and accompanying text.
429. See supra notes 93-258 and accompanying text.
430. For a discussion of commentators who have advocated such an approach, see infra notes 476-84 and accompanying text. Cf.Krauskopf, Remedies
for ParentalKidnapping in Federal Court: A Comment Applying the ParentalKidnapping
Prevention Act in Support ofJudge Edwards, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 429, 444 n.99 (1984)
(the "alarming degree of inconsistency in application of the exception" is "a
major reason for recommendation that the exception be abrogated entirely").
431. For a discussion of local bias as it relates to policy rationales for the
domestic relations exception, see supra notes 271-81 and accompanying text. See
also C. WRIGHT, supra note 6, § 23, at 128.
432. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, supra note 6, § 23, at 128; Landes & Posner, Legal
Change, Judicial Behavior, and the DiversityJurisdiction, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 367, 386
(1980).
433. See, e.g., Goldman & Marks, DiversityJurisdictionand Local Bias: A Preliminay EmpiricalInquiry, 9J. LEGAL STUD. 93 (1980). The authors of this study affirm "what critics of diversity jurisdiction deny .... [F]ear of local bias enters
the calculus of decision in selecting a judicial forum." Id. at 104. See also Note,
The Choice Between State and Federal Court in Diversity Cases in Virginia, 51 VA. L. REV.
178, 179 (1965)(60.3% of plaintiffs' counsel responding to survey cited local
prejudice against out-of-state plaintiff as reason for choosing federal court, and
52.1% of plaintiffs' counsel who chose state court cited prejudice against out-of-
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the extent that protecting out-of-state citizens from local bias
continues to be one of the purposes served by diversity jurisdiction, access to federal courts under the diversity statute should be
available in situations where such bias is a concern. Domestic relations cases often present such concerns.
The promulgation of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act 434 and its subsequent enactment by every state 43 5 were direct
responses to the problems caused by the tendency of states to
disregard custody decrees issued in other states and to issue their
own custody decrees in favor of the residents of their own
state. 43 6 Yet the Act failed to check what has been described by
one commentator as the problem of "parochial [state] courts"
and their penchant for "hometowning." '4 3 7 State courts contin' 43 8
ued to exhibit their "propensity for hometown decisions
state defendant as reason for that choice of forum). But see Summers, Analysis of
Factors that Influence Choice of Forum in Diversity Cases, 47 IOWA L. REV. 933, 937-38
(1962)(fear of local prejudice is a factor in only 4.3% of cases taken to federal
court).
A 1982 poll conducted for the American Bar Association by a New York
public opinion research firm demonstrated that approximately 63.0% of the lawyers and law students polled felt that diversity jurisdiction should be retained
because there is prejudice against nonresidents in some state courts. Access to
CourtsforJudges-And Others 69 A.B.A.J. 582 (1983). The percentage of respondents perceiving such prejudice in 1982 was 7% higher than that found in a
similar poll conducted in 1979. Id.
434. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT §§ 1-27, 9 U.L.A. 116
(1968)[hereinafter cited as UCCJA]. The UCCJA represents an attempt to avoid
jurisdictional conflict and to promote cooperation among the courts of the several states. Id. § 1. For an explanation of the basic provisions of the UCCJA, see
supra note 276.
435. See UCCJA, 9 U.L.A. 22, 22-23 (Supp. 1985) (table of jurisdictions
wherein act has been adopted).
436. The Commissioners' Prefatory Note to the UCCJA described the
problems sought to be remedied through promulgation of the Act as follows:
There is growing public concern over the fact that thousands of
children are shifted from state to state and from one family to another
every year while their parents or other persons battle over their custody
in the courts of the several states. . . . [The party who has lost custody]
will remove the child in an unguarded moment or fail to return him
after a visit and will seek their luck in the court of a distant state where
they hope to find-and often do find-a sympathetic ear for their plea
for custody.
UCCJA pref. notes, 9 U.L.A. 111 (1968).
437. Sampson, What's Wrong With the UCCJA? Punitive Decrees and Hometown
Decisions Are Making a Mockery of This Uniform Act, 3 FAM. ADVOC., Spring 1981, at
28, 29.
438. Id. at 30. The author points out the "intrinsic naivete" of the UCCJA
in that the act depends for its success upon state courts communicating and
cooperating with one another. d. Such a requirement is seen as beyond hope
"in a system heretofore characterized, in an unfortunate number of cases, by
judicial intemperance, recalcitrance, chauvinism and xenophobia." Id.
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through their interpretation of the malleable language of the Uni4 39
form Act.
The recent interest of Congress in the prevention of parental
kidnapping 4 40 was motivated in part by a recognition that state
courts, even in states that had adopted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, often responded to appeals by child-snatchers who sought haven in their states by "switch[ing] custody to
the parent within [their] jurisdiction ..
"441 As did the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act attempted to deal with the problem through rules
designed to restrict the ability of states to modify child custody
4 42
decrees entered by other states.
Yet the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act itself has shortcomings. Some state courts fail to comply with the mandate of
the Act and modify child custody decrees issued by other states by
awarding custody to the litigant within their borders. 4 43 When
such noncompliance occurs, federal courts are now becoming involved through suits to mandate compliance. 44 4 This circuitous
"..

439. For a discussion of the ways in which the language of the UCCJA can
be utilized by state courts to accept jurisdiction and rule in favor of their own
residences, see Note, Family Law: Courts'Adoption of Uniform Child CustodyJurisdiction Act Offers Little Hope of Resolving Child Custody Conflicts, 60 MINN. L. REV. 820
(1976). See also W. WEYRAUCH & S. KATz, supra note 284, at 548-51 (noting that
the open-ended language of the UCCJA invites judicial discretion which may be
used to foster parochial interests); Krauskopf, supra note 430, at 434 (bemoaning
the differing versions of the UCCJA enacted in the several states and the resulting uneven interpretation of the Act's requirements); Sampson, supra note 443,
at 28-29 (citing the hometown bias in state court decisionmaking as the cause of
the interstate child custody dilemma).
440. See Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1728A
(1982).
441. Letter from Assistant Attorney General Patricia M. Wald to Congressman Peter W. Rodino, reprinted in Joint Hearings, supra note 278, at 101-02.
442. Compare UCCJA §§ 2-3, 14, 9 U.L.A. 116, 119-23, 151-54 (1968)(defining the determination ofjurisdiction in custody matters and prescribing when
recognition and/or modification of another court's custody decree is permissible) with Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1983)("[T]he
appropriate authorities of every State shall enforce. . . any child custody determination made consistently with the provisions of this section by a court of another State.").
443. See, e.g., Flood v. Braaten, 727 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1984). In Flood, the
mother of four children brought suit in federal court because the states of residence of both the mother and father exercised jurisdiction over the question of
the custody of the children. Each state court had awarded custody to the parent
residing within its borders. Id. at 306. See also Heartfield v. Heartfield, 749 F.2d
1138 (5th Cir. 1985); McDougald v. Jenson, 596 F. Supp. 680 (N.D. Fla.
1984)(inconsistent custody decrees entered by Florida and Washington state
courts).
444. See Flood v. Braaten, 727 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1984). In Flood, the court
asserted:
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route to preventing the unjustified preference of state courts for
ruling in favor of their residents often involves three judicial proceedings: the original custody proceeding, the modification of
the custody decree by the second state court, and the federal
4 45
court action to mandate compliance with the federal act.

Allowing a federal court to hear a custody dispute in the first
instance where there is the possibility of bias against one of the
parties because of diversity of citizenship could lead to decisions
truly in the best interest of the child. 44 6 It would remove the

threat of a state court's possible predisposition to rule in favor of
its resident. As a result, a parent losing custody following trial in
a federal court might be less likely to feel dissatisfied with a decision granting custody to the other parent since the decision
would not be perceived as swayed by local bias. Additionally,
child-snatching might be a less attractive course of conduct to the
parent losing custody if custody determinations were cognizable

in federal court. For even if the child-snatcher appealed to a state
court in another state, the case would be removable to federal
court by the spouse with legal custody. 447 Finally, the defending
spouse in a federal court might be able to invoke the federal
transfer statute to move the place of trial back to the state of her
residence, 448 thus nullifying any advantage gained by the childWe cannot believe that Congress intended to render § 1738A virtually
nugatory by so restricting the availability of a federal forum that state
compliance with the legislation would become optional. Rather, we are
persuaded that in limited circumstances of noncompliance with
§ 1738A, federal district court intervention is permissible [notwithstanding the domestic relations exception].
Id. at 312 (citing Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A
(1983)).
445. Flood, 727 F.2d at 313. The necessity for federal appellate review in
this instance actually created a fourth proceeding, since the case had to be remanded to the district court. Id.
446. The standard generally used in domestic relations statutes for making
a child custody determination is "the best interest of the child standard." See,
e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 4600(b) (West 1983); MAss GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, § 28
(West Supp. 1984); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 240 (McKinney Supp. 1984).
447. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)(1982). Section 1441(a) provides that:
any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of
the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for
the district and division embracing the place where such action is
pending.
Id. In all cases, other than federal question cases, removal is proper "only if
none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a
citizen of the State in which such action is brought." Id. § 1441(b).
448. Id. § 1404(a). Section 1404(a) allows a district court, "[nor the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest ofjustice" to transfer any civil
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snatcher by forcing the defending spouse to defend in an inconvenient location.
One could argue that whatever the perceived advantages of
allowing federal courts to adjudicate custody disputes where diversity of citizenship exists, such an exercise ofjurisdiction would
involve the federal courts in determinations best left to the
states. 44 9 However, the tendency of courts to favor their own residents in child custody determinations casts some doubts on the
basic premise that in cases involving litigants of diverse citizenship, the custody determination is best left to the states. Child
custody determinations are to be made according to what would
be in the best interest of the child. To the extent that a state
court bases its decision on the residence of the parents, rather
than on an evaluation of what truly would be in the child's best
interest, the preference for a state forum is highly questionable.
Since the enactment of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention
Act, federal courts have already become involved in determining
issues very similar to those they would be forced to make in child
custody determinations. In lawsuits brought in federal court to
challenge assertions of jurisdiction allegedly improper under the
federal act, federal courts may be called upon to determine
whether a child "has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse;" 4 50 whether a child "has been abandoned" 45 '
whether it was "in the best interest of the child that [a state] court
assume jurisdiction;" 4 52 and whether there is available in a particular state "substantial evidence concerning the child's present or
453
future care, protection, training, and personal relationships."
None of these terms are defined in the Act, thus leaving federal
45 4
courts to fashion definitions.
action to any other district or division where the case might originally have been
brought. Id. Thus, where a parent has snatched a child and instituted a custody
proceeding in a distant state, the parent with legal custody could remove the
action to a federal court in the distant state and then seek transfer to the federal
district in which she or he resides. It is likely that a federal court would find
transfer both convenient and just in situations in which the child, prior to being
snatched, had resided in the transferee state.
449. For arguments that child custody determinations are best left to the
states, see Atwood, supra note 7, at 620-21; Comment, supra note 5, at 851-53.
450. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(C)(ii) (1982).
451. Id. § 1738A(c)(2)(C)(i).
452. Id. § 1738A(c)(2)(D)(ii).
453. Id. § 1738A(c)(2)(B)(ii)(II).
454. See id. § 1738A. One may attempt to differentiate the actual determination of custody from the determination that a federal court must make when
deciding whether a state court custody decree was entitled to the protection of
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The propensity of state courts to favor their own residents in
domestic relations cases is not necessarily peculiar to child custody determinations. The same local bias that may taint the decision of the state court in a child custody dispute may threaten also
the integrity ofjudgments in other disputes, such as those regarding spousal support, child support, or the disposition of property.
The domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction restricts
access to federal courts in the very cases where a neutral forum is
most needed.
The need for an available federal forum is even more compelling where a domestic relations case presents a substantial federal question. Domestic relations cases can involve rights of
fundamental importance to United States citizens. 4 5 5 Developments in constitutional law have made clear that states are limited
in the extent to which they can infringe upon those rights 4 56 and
in the mechanisms through which they seek to affect those
rights. 45 7 Certainly, state courts can claim no greater expertise in
the area of constitutional law than the federal judiciary. Of
course, as with any other case brought in federal court, existing
abstention doctrines may call for a federal court to postpone its
consideration of the federal question or even to dismiss the
the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act. Yet, the similarities in the types of issues is striking. In both situations, the court is asked to look at the child's past
relationships with his parents and to make a determination that will affect the
child's future.
455. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). In Carey,
the Supreme Court declared:
While the outer limits of [the right to personal privacy] have not
been marked by the Court, it is clear that among the decisions that an
individual may make without unjustified government interference are
personal decision "relating to marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 338 U.S. 1,
12 (1967); procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S.
535, 541-42 (1942); contraception, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S., at 45354; id., at 460, 463-65 (White, J., concurring in result); family relationships, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); and child rearing
and education, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer
v. Nebraska, [262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)]."
Id. at 684-85 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973)). See also
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 749 (1982)(noting the fundamental liberty
interest of parents in the care, custody and management of their children).
456. See supra notes 287 & 362-65 and accompanying text.
457. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 764-70 (1982) (mere "fair
preponderance of the evidence" standard prescribed by New York Family Court
Act for the termination of fundamental parental rights denied parents due process); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978)(statutory classification of
individuals which significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right
cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests
and is closely tailored to effectuate those interests; support payment collection
device was not supported by such interests).
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sUit. 4 58

Absent such considerations, however, the federal courts
should not be precluded from considering important federal issues by the domestic relations exception.
In domestic relations cases where federal jurisdiction is
based on diversity of citizenship, a federal forum may be in some
cases the most effective and efficient forum. Where diversity of
citizenship is present prior to the filing of an original suit for divorce, the very fact of this diverse citizenship portends potential
problems, both for the effective trial of the action in state court
and for the enforcement of any state court decree for support,
custody or property division. The party who has left the marital
domicile may file for divorce in his new domicile. 4 59 Yet the facts
that one of the parties is a domiciliary and personal jurisdiction
can be obtained over the other spouse do not necessarily mean
that the new domicile is the most effective forum for the action. It
is possible that important evidence and witnesses are in the state
where the other spouse is domiciled. Where the action is brought
in state court, there is no mechanism whereby one state can transfer the action to courts of another state. 4 60 In contrast, if suits
were cognizable in federal court, federal transfer provisions could
be employed to transfer the case to a federal court in the state
where the action can be tried most effectively. 46 ' The availability
of transfer may also be important in minimizing disruption to any
children of the marriage that might result from an extended trial
in a distant forum.
Where an original decree has been obtained in state court, a
federal forum for enforcement could be more effective, less timeconsuming, and cheaper than enforcement in the state court of
another state. While the full faith and credit clause mandates that
certain domestic relations decrees be recognized in states other
than the state rendering the decree, 4 62 ordinarily enforcement of
458. For a discussion of the application of abstention doctrines to domestic
relations cases, see infra notes 481-84 and accompanying text.
459. See H. CLARK, supra note 18, § 11.2.
460. A state court may decline jurisdiction and dismiss the case under the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. See 20 AM.JUR. 2D Courts §§ 172-182 (1965);
Annot., 9 A.L.R. 3D 547 (1966). A great deal of deference is usually given to
plaintiffs choice of forum, however, and unless the balancing of factors is
strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum will rarely be
disturbed. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
461. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1982). For a discussion of the relevant aspects
of § 1404, see supra notes 276 & 442 and accompanying text.

462. See Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910). In Sistare, the United States
Supreme Court held that alimony decrees were entitled to full faith and credit as
to accrued nonmodifiable installments. Id. at 26. The actual award in the Sistare
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the out-of-state decrees still requires the filing of an independent
lawsuit in the state where enforcement is sought. 46 3 The Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 4 64 some version of which
has been accepted by all states, 4 6 5 does provide a mechanism for
allowing the obligee of a support decree to file an enforcement
action in her own state.4 66 The process, however, is cumbersome 4 6 7 and relies on the availability and efforts of law enforce4 68
ment officials in the state where the obligor resides.
While the matter is not free from controversy, a federal statcase was a single award for alimony and child support, and therefore the full
faith and credit requirements set forth in Sistare apply as well to child support
orders. Id. at 708 n. 1. See also H. CLARK, supra note 18, § 15.4. Property division
awards, once final, would presumably be entitled to full faith and credit as well.
463. For a summary of the process of obtaining enforcement of a foreign
judgment in the courts of another state, see J. LANDERS & J. MARTIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 958-59 (1981). The process may be simpler in states that have adopted
the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, which provides an enforcement mechanism similar to the registration available in the federal district
courts. Id. (citing UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT, 13 U.L.A.

173 (1964)).
464. UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT, 9A U.L.A. 643
(1968). The purpose of this act is "to improve and extend by reciprocal legislation the enforcement of duties of support." Id. § 1, at 648.
465. H. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW-CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS 930 (2d
ed. 1983).
466. For a complete description of the procedure through which enforcement is accomplished, see id.
467. The procedure established under the Act contemplates two contemporaneous proceedings, one in the state of the obligor and the other in the state
of the obligee. Id. Documents, findings, depositions, and evidence must all be
transmitted between the two particular courts. Id. For a summary of the procedure, see id. at 930-31.
468. In a newsletter of the National Reciprocal and Family Support Enforcement Association, Gina Dipola, the Family Support Coordinator of the
Thurston County, Washington, Prosecution Attorney's Office, notes some of the
problems in the enforcement of support obligations through the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act:
The incidents where the URESA petition in itself is inadequate to process the matter in a responding jurisdiction are becoming overwhelming ....
What effect does this have on efficiency and cost effectiveness? It depends on
the size, staff and present processing practices of the responding jurisdictions. Some take three months just to acknowledge a receiptothers may attain resolvement with 90-120 days. The delay caused by
the requirement of documentation-waiting to receive it and then proceeding-will most assuredly double the time lag. Meanwhile, the status of the respondent may have changed financially, physically or
residentially. Again, more delay or worse yet-no respondent. Back to
Square Number One-locate, file new pleadings, etc. This happens too
often without such delaysl
8 NRFSEA News (National Reciprocal and Family Support Enforcement Association), January-February 1983, at 4 (emphasis in original).
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ute allowing judgments of one district to be registered in any
other district 46 9 may make it possible to enforce federal domestic
relations judgments for the recovery of money or property more
efficiently. 4 70 Such registration, accomplished through the simple
procedure of filing a certified copy of the judgment, results in the
judgment having the same effect and enforceability as if the district court where it is registered had rendered the judgment in the
47 1
first place.
469. 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982). Section 1963 provides:
A judgment in an action for the recovery of money or property
now or hereafter entered in any district court which has become final by
appeal or expiration of time for appeal may be registered in any other
district by filing therein a certified copy of such judgment. Ajudgment
so registered shall have the same effect as a judgment of the district
court of the district where registered and may be enforced in like
manner.
A certified copy of the satisfaction of any judgment in whole or in
part may be registered in like manner in any district in which the judgment is a lien.
Id.
470. Compare Gitlin v. Gitlin, 15 F.R.D. 458, 459 (E.D.N.Y. 1954)(legislative
intent to exclude divorce decree from registration bars application of § 1963)
with Gullet v. Gullet, 188 F.2d 719, 720 (5th Cir. 1951)(action to enforce support agreement did not constitute divorce decree, but one "for the recovery of
money" as contemplated by § 1963). The uncertainty as to the applicability of
the registration statute to domestic relations cases derives from a comment in
the Historical and Revision Notes to the statute. The Notes state that the language limiting registration to judgments "for the recovery of money or property" was included "to exclude judgments in divorce actions and any other
actions, the registration of which would serve no useful purpose." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1963 historical and revision notes (1982). The Gullet court, however, allowed
registration of a divorce decree providing for separate maintenance, characterizing it not as a divorce decree but as one for the recovery of money. 188 F.2d at
720.
The cases might be distinguished on the grounds that in Gitlin, the alimony
decree sought to be enforced through registration was included as part of a divorce judgment, a type ofjudgment specifically referred to in the Historical and
Revision Notes, while the separate maintenance decree in Gullet was issued during the marriage, and it therefore was not a part of a divorce decree. To interpret the language of the Notes to exclude from the registration statute any
judgment rendered in conjunction with a divorce decree, however, is not warranted by the purpose of the statute. The Notes explain the language of the
registration statute as a means of restricting registration to those judgments the
enforcement of which can be aided through registration. See 28 U.S.C. § 1963
historical and revision notes (1982). Divorce judgments are given as an example
of a type of judgment the registration of which would serve no purpose. The
portion of a divorce decree that dissolves the marriage of the parties accomplishes that task by the very rendering of the decree; thus there is no need to
allow registration. That is not the case, however, with judgments for alimony,
child support or division of property. Registration of these judgments does
serve a purpose: the simplification of the procedure through which a party can
enforce his federal judgment.
471. 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982).
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Where domestic relations decrees have been issued by state
courts, a federal court may sometimes serve as a more effective
forum than a state court for enforcing that judgment. Enforcement of a domestic relations decree may be relatively simple
where both parties remain in the jurisdiction that issued the original decree. In such a case, the issuing court retains jurisdiction
over the parties and may enforce its judgment through contempt
procedures or otherwise. 4 72 A more difficult problem, however,
is presented where a person seeks to enforce a judgment against a
party who has left the state.
For example, if the state court that handed down the original
domestic relations decree issues an injunction or contempt order
against the offending party, that injunction or contempt order
would not be per se enforceable against the offending party in
another state. 473 By leaving the state, the offending party can insulate himself somewhat from that state's enforcement efforts.
The party seeking enforcement is then put to the time, inconvenience and expense of attempting to convince officials of the state
in which the offender is now located to enforce the decree. By
contrast, if the party seeking enforcement were able to resort to a
federal court for enforcement, the mandate of any injunction issued by that federal court would run throughout the United
States. 4 74 The offending party would be in contempt of court for
violating the injunction wherever in the United States he sought
to flee. Moreover, enforcement efforts by the unified federal
court system would be less cumbersome than attempts to convince a state court to enforce an injunction issued by an entirely
independent court.
Thus, the repudiation of the domestic relations exception
can be supported on affirmative policy grounds. First, domestic
relations cases involving parties of diverse citizenship present significant problems of bias against which diversity jurisdiction was
meant to protect. In addition, in many domestic relations cases
based on diversity of citizenship, federal courts may be the most
effective and efficient forums. Finally, the superior ability of federal courts to enforce domestic relations judgments when one of
the parties to the original judgment has left the state militates to472. H. CLARK, supra note 18, §§ 14.10, 15.3.
473. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 102 (1971). The
Restatement provides: "A valid judgment that orders the doing of an act other
than the payment of money, or that enjoins the doing of an act, may be enforced, or be the subject of remedies, in other states." Id.
474. See 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982).
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ward making a federal forum available, especially at a time when
both the states and the federal government recognize the special
problems of interstate enforcement of domestic relations. 4 75
All piecemeal attempts at improving the unsatisfactory state
of the domestic relations exception have been unsuccessful. A
1956 proposal by Professors Vestal and Foster suggested a statusproperty distinction, with the former category within the scope of
the exception, and the latter category within the jurisdiction of
federal courts. 4 7 6 This proposal has been criticized as unworkable. 4 7 7 Indeed, it does little to further the goal of consistent application of the exception. The proposal merely shifts the focus
of the inquiry from the difficult question of whether a particular
case involves domestic relations to the equally difficult question
of whether a particular case involves status or property concepts. 4 78 Despite the widespread citation to the Vestal and Foster
article for its excellent discussion of the exception, 4 79 its proposal
for redefining the contours of the domestic relations exception
has not received widespread support. 4 80
Other attempts at reformulating the exception are likely to
be similarly unsuccessful. Recent attempts at reformulation purport to employ existing federal jurisdictional 4 8' and abstention 482
475. See supra notes 276-78 and accompanying text.
476. See Vestal & Foster, supra note 6,.at 31.
477. Brandtscheit v. Britton, 239 F. Supp. 652, 654 (N.D. Cal. 1965) (proposal overlooked "sound policy considerations" behind the exception and is unworkable because many cases involve both status and property disputes).
478. See Vestal & Foster, supra note 6, at 29-31.
479. See, e.g., Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1026 n.19 (3d Cir.
1975); Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509, 513
n.4 (2d Cir. 1973); Korby v. Erickson, 550 F. Supp. 136, 138 n.1 (S.D.N.Y.
1982).
480. For a discussion of cases using a property-status analysis, see supra
notes 104-14 & 152-75 and accompanying text.
481. See generally COLUMBIA Note, supra note 5. This note suggests that the
case and controversy requirement of article III of the Constitution and the impartiality component of article III justiciability should be utilized as a means of
excluding some domestic relations cases from federal jurisdiction. Id. at 185153.
482. See Atwood, supra note 7, at 603-11, 627-28 (application of the various
abstention doctrines only where state interests are sufficiently important is a
more principled approach than wholesale abstention under the domestic relations exception); Note, supra note 7, at 1105-20 (federal courts should abstain
under the Burford doctrine only if the case presents a state interest of substantial
concern and either an issue of unsettled law or a comprehensive administrative
and judicial mechanism with which federal review would interfere; federal courts
should utilize the Younger doctrine of equitable restraint only where the case involves enjoining of state domestic relations proceedings or modifying a domestic relations decree involving important local factors). See generally C. WRIGHT,
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doctrines to delineate the scope of the exception. These proposals, however, invariably involve special extensions of the existing
concepts in order to encompass domestic relations cases. These
special extensions are as difficult to apply as the current domestic
relations exception. 48 3 In addition, these proposals do not fur4 84
ther any of the recognized policies behind the exception.
Given the dynamic nature of the field of family law, a workable
redefinition of the term domestic relations for purposes of the
exception may be an insurmountable task.
Any attempt to render the domestic relations exception more
easily and uniformly applied presupposes that the exception deserves to survive. It has been argued in this article, however, that
there are affirmative reasons why federal courts should be available to litigants in domestic relations cases, where established
federal jurisdictional requirements are otherwise met. Moreover,
it has been demonstrated that judicial repudiation of the exception is clearly within the power of lower federal courts.
Repudiation of the domestic relations exception will not necessarily result in a flood of domestic relations cases into federal
court. As discussed above, 48 5 repudiation of the exception will
not mean that all domestic relations cases will be cognizable in
federal court. Rather, it will mean only that those domestic relations suits that otherwise meet established requirements for federal jurisdiction may be filed in, or removed to, federal court.
Inability to satisfy the diversity of citizenship 48 6 and amount
in controversy requirements 48 7 will limit the number of domestic
supra note 6, § 52. For a discussion of the relation of the abstention doctrines to
the domestic relations exception, see supra note 7.
483. For example, while recognizing that family and juvenile courts cannot
be equated with the complex administrative schemes which have in the past justified abstention, one commentator counsels extension of the abstention doctrine to include cases involving "analogous comprehensive state administrative
and judicial mechanisms employed in domestic relations actions." Note, supra
note 7, at 1111. No guidance is given, however, in determining whether a particular state has such analogous comprehensive mechanisms. Such an individualized approach is necessary because of the varied structure of domestic
relations courts and the differences in local judicial practices with respect to domestic relations cases. For a discussion of local practices, see supra note 307 and
accompanying text.
484. For example, the proposal advocated in a recent student note would
result in contested cases, involving utilization ofjudicial expertise and temporal
resources, being within federal court jurisdiction, while uncontested cases, involving little imposition in terms of time or expertise, falling outside federal
court jurisdiction. See COLUMBIA Note, supra note 5, at 1851-61.
485. See supra notes 323-29 and accompanying text.
486. See supra notes 326-27 and accompanying text.
487. See supra notes 328-29 and accompanying text.
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relations cases that are within the bounds of federal jurisdiction.
In fact, it is primarily those cases which some consider to be at the
"core" of the domestic relations exception that are least likely to
satisfy federal jurisdictional requirements. Suits to adjudicate
marital and custodial status will not by themselves be cognizable
in federal court without the presence of a federal question because of the inability of these suits to satisfy the amount in contro488
versy requirement.
Original divorce suits are probably the least likely to satisfy
diversity of citizenship requirements. Until the court can sever
the bonds of the marital relationship, divide the property of the
parties, and award custody of the parties' children, the divorcing
spouses may be unable or unwilling to leave the marital domicile
to establish domicile elsewhere for fear of the effect of that move
on the already stressed family or on the impending divorce
suit. 4 89 These very real concerns about the effect of a move on
488. A question not addressed by this article is the propriety of those decisions which have held that neither marital status nor entitlement to child custody
is capable of monetary valuation, and that therefore suits involving such matters
do not satisfy the amount in controversy requirement. See supra notes 328-29
and accompanying text. It may be argued that, while the relief sought in these
cases is not capable of monetary valuation, the issues to be determined are of
sufficient importance to the parties involved and to society as to satisfy the function which the amount in controversy serves-to set an amount that is "not so
high as to convert the Federal courts into courts of big business nor so low as to
fritter away their time in the trial of petty controversies." C. WRIGHT, supra note
6, § 32, at 176 (quoting S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in
1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3099, 3101).

489. A parent may be unwilling to disrupt the lives of any children of the
marriage by requiring the children, who may already be under stress because of
the breakdown of the family unit, to move to another state. A decision to leave
the children in the state of the married domicile with the other parent carries
with it the risk of having that action be taken into account when custody of children is decided upon by the court.
The parties may also be unwilling to leave the state for fear of losing control
over assets of the marriage. Once a divorce petition is filed, one party may obtain a restraining order preventing the other party from disposing of the assets
of the marriage during the pendency of the lawsuit. See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 311-11.5-7()(b)(1)(West Supp. 1984). Until a suit has been filed, however, and
unless the parties live in a community property state, each party has the ability to
dispose of any property he or she owns regardless of the fact that that property
may be subject to division by the court in a divorce suit. While a spouse, even if
he or she remains in the state of the marital domicile, may have no recourse to
the disposition of property by the other spouse until a lawsuit is filed, a spouse
who chooses to leave the state to establish diversity of citizenship will of necessity be delaying the filing of the suit through which an order restraining alienation of property can be obtained until sufficient evidence of change of domicile
can be established. In addition, knowledge of attempts at disposition of property would be more difficult to obtain where the spouses are living in different
states.
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the family and on the disposition of the issues to be determined in
the divorce suit strongly suggest that there is little possibility of a
move merely to create diversity of citizenship. Thus, it is quite
likely that the majority of domestic relations suits will continue to
be outside the boundaries of federal court jurisdiction.
The number of domestic relations cases actually brought to
federal court may be further restricted by the fact that notwithstanding the availability of a federal forum, many litigants will
choose state forums instead. Studies have shown that attorneys
consider a variety of factors when making the decision as to
choice of forum. 4 90 In one study, attorneys who had chosen a
state forum for their cases despite the availability of a federal forum cited factors such as lower litigation costs, familiarity with
judges, the degree of participation of the judge in trial, and the
accessibility of the court as reasons for their choice. 49 1 In domestic relations cases, other factors, such as the perceived greater expertise of state courts in domestic relations matters or the
availability of support services in state courts-the very factors
cited by those who would maintain the domestic relations exception-may lead litigants to prefer state courts, even where the
federal forum is available to them. Therefore, the number of domestic relations cases brought or removed to federal court may
be far smaller than the number of cases in which federal jurisdictional requirements can be met. A final factor that will restrict the
burden on federal dockets caused by repudiation of the domestic
relations exception is the availability of settled abstention doctrines to remand to state court those domestic relations cases
more properly adjudicated there. 492 Use of these doctrines,
rather than the amorphous domestic relations exception, will result in more finely-tuned decisions as to the wisdom of federal
court adjudication of cases containing domestic relations issues.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Although both the Constitution and the federal jurisdictional
statutes appear to provide otherwise, federal courts today refuse
490. See Goldman & Marks, supra note 439, at 98 (quality of judges, court
calendar, rules of discovery, availability of practical procedures); Summers, supra
note 439, at 937-38 (geographical convenience, jury awards, discovery, judicial
temperment, etc.).
491. See Note, supra note 439, at 179.
492. For a discussion of the abstention doctrines, see supra notes 7, 308 &
481-84 and accompanying text. See generally Atwood, supra note 7; and Note,
supra note 7.
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to hear a large number of cases on the basis of an implied domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction.
Because of its murky origins, federal courts have received no
guidance as to the boundaries of the domestic relations exception. As a result, they disagree on the nature of the exception and
on its applicability to various types of domestic relations cases.
The inconsistency in application of the exception is unacceptable,
since access to federal court should be regulated by a standard
that is uniformly applied throughout the country, regardless of
the location of the court.
Contemporary courts justify their continued adherence to
the domestic relations exception on both policy and precedential
grounds. However, as demonstrated above, neither justification
should stand as a bar to judicial repudiation of the exception.
Nor should the distaste with which federal courts appear to view
domestic relations cases play any part in a court's decision
whether to hear such cases. In contrast to the lack of merit to
arguments for retention of the domestic relations exception, several important policies would be furthered by repudiation of the
exception.
This article calls for judicial repudiation of the exception.
Past attempts at redefinition of the exception to rectify perceived
problems in its application fail to present a workable solution.
Further, given the changing nature of domestic relations law and
the shift in the extent and nature of state and federal interests in
domestic relations matters, judicial repudiation of the exception,
rather than any makeshift revision, is the appropriate course of
action.

